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ABSTRACT
In modern US history, the 1990s are often regarded as “The Decade of Peace and
Prosperity.” Though the liberalization of markets and a technology boom fueled American
prosperity, expectations of post-Cold War peace remained elusive. The purpose of this study is to
observe how, in the moment when the US became the world’s superpower, it also began to
retreat from a position of active leadership. Elected in 1992, President Bill Clinton looked
towards the United Nations as the answer to keeping peace around the globe. His
administration’s policies of democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism aimed to
combine the spread of free market democracy and collective security as concepts upon which to
contain foreign conflict. While noble in its idealism, Clinton was absent any clear objectives
when faced with international crises. His focus on domestic issues, and lack of attention to cases
where US leadership was necessary, hurt America’s credibility as a force for humanity and
justice in the eyes of many around the globe. With a focus on five serious foreign entanglements
that erupted during Clinton’s two terms—Somalia, the Bosnian War, the Rwandan Genocide,
Haiti, and the rise of Al Qaeda—this work illuminates a distrust of resolute American leadership
among Clinton and his primary advisors. His hesitancy to wield American power, actively
persuade allies, and use US influence to direct international policy reflected a nation unwilling to
confront either friend or foe to advance its own interests. The rise of Al Qaeda during his
presidency gives additional weight to this study’s findings regarding the administration’s dearth
of focus and willpower involving direct national security threats. As Clinton increasingly looked
to international bodies for direction, even at the height of US power, he allowed the nation to
become mired in incompetent peacekeeping missions that too often yielded disastrous
consequences, both for US forces and those they were sent to protect.

xi

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
The 1990s. Many Americans reminisce about this period in recent history as the “Decade
of Peace and Prosperity.”1 Its commencement features the abrupt, and to most, quite surprising
end to almost a half of a century of bilateral conflict between two allies-turned-adversaries after
the Second World War. The quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the rise of the
United States as the world’s lone, undisputed superpower.2 People worldwide cheered the
demolition of borders, both literal and figurative, which once fenced in millions from their
families, from their freedom, and from their hopeful dreams of unfettered economic prosperity.
Although the 1990s also began with renewed tensions in the Middle East, and a
subsequent war to halt and reverse the violent invasion of the Persian Gulf state of Kuwait by
Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, this military conflict was short and decisive. Executed by a US-led
coalition of thirty-five nations, with the support of the United Nations (UN) and the backing of
most Americans, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm blurred the painful memories of
Vietnam and, at least symbolically, placed the nation and its military back atop its perch as the
most noble and powerful on the globe.3 Optimism for a new epoch of goodwill and a cessation
of hostilities spread out from the US worldwide.
The 1990s also introduced the world to a boom in technology that remains unsurpassed in
terms of global interconnectedness and access to information. Increasingly common ownership
of the home computer, coupled with the massive transformation of international communications
brought about by the Internet, led to a steadying of the US economy, and eventually, to a
balanced federal budget.4 Much of this prosperity, particularly in Silicon Valley, nicknamed for
its housing of the high-tech enterprises that defined the decade, developed out of American
ingenuity and entrepreneurship coupled with the liberalization of global markets during the
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Reagan Administration.5 However, politically speaking, and whether right or wrong, credit is
often given to one man. And it is not Ronald Reagan.
On November 3, 1992, Americans elected a young governor from Arkansas to the office
of the presidency. This unlikely underdog, nicknamed the “Comeback Kid”6 due to his
resiliency throughout the 1992 primary campaign, electorally outperformed a well-liked
Republican incumbent in George H.W. Bush, whose foreign policy credentials were nothing if
not impressive. But as with most US elections, William Jefferson Clinton used a simple, direct
message about America’s financial instability to win over voters. The Clinton Campaign’s
concise answer to the then-present recession was simply “[It’s] The Economy, Stupid.”7 Coined
by one of Clinton’s chief strategists, James Carville, this cutting yet candid line resonated with
an economically frustrated electorate, and thus secured the Oval for the smooth-talking
southerner and self-proclaimed "New Democrat."8
Loosely defined, the “New Democrat” moniker arose in reaction to the overwhelming
political success of President Reagan, and the national move to the right that defined the 1980s.
Both Clinton and his Vice-Presidential pick, Senator Al Gore of Tennessee, offered a more
centrist, moderate image of the Democratic Party as economically conservative yet still
dedicated to the pursuit of social justice. For example, one of Clinton’s most popular policy
proposals with the majority of Americans was rooted in “ending welfare as we know it,”9 which
he, with the aid of a Republican House and Senate, eventually turned into successful welfare
reform legislation.
As a candidate, Clinton somewhat eschewed the Left’s slavish devotion to the Keynesian
tactics of deficit spending and strongly advocated for a balanced budget. In doing so, he actively
sought out the Reagan Democrats who had previously abandoned the party of Franklin Delano
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Roosevelt in reaction to the increasingly liberal policies of candidates like Michael Dukakis,
George McGovern, Walter Mondale, and Ted Kennedy. Clinton never did win over a majority
of voters, mostly due to a quite successful run by a quirky third party candidate in Ross Perot,
who received almost nineteen percent of American support. However, Clinton’s efforts to
provide voters with a “Third Way,”10 where capitalism and a widened social safety net could coexist, proved successful against Bush, whose broken pledge on tax increases served as the neckstrangling albatross from which the incumbent could not escape.
Many voters questioned the dedication of candidate Clinton to this more centrist,
moderate path, primarily due to his image as a draft-dodging, pot-smoking Baby Boomer with a
wife who lacked his inescapable charm, but certainly not his ambition for power.11 However, he
eventually overcame these obstacles and sold a majority with his promise to usher in a “New
Covenant”12 with America. Clinton’s New Covenant featured a laser-like focus on domestic
issues, such as balancing the federal budget, decreasing government bureaucracy, and nurturing
free trade and American entrepreneurship. This vision was certainly different from those put
forth by his more liberal colleagues and predecessors. However, Clinton also spoke of
environmental concerns, a woman’s right to abortion, and universal access to healthcare. The
idea behind the New Covenant was a renewed social compact between Americans and the
political class, and centered around “a solemn agreement between the people and their
government based not simply on what each of us can take but what all of us must give to our
nation.”13
Bush’s popularity, which stood at an eighty-nine percent approval rating after the Gulf
War, began to decline due to his backtracking on an infamous “Read My Lips”14 pledge in
opposition to tax increases. It hovered in the forties during the 1992 election season. However,
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one must look further into the attitudes of the American people, and those in leadership during
this time, to see the changing dynamic that catapulted Clinton, whose personal reputation and
character were under constant assault, to victory in the three-man race.
Compared to Bush, Clinton’s resumé on the international stage was thin. Bush’s service
in World War II is well-documented. Bush also served as the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), as well as Vice-President for two full terms under President Reagan. He oversaw
and guided the peaceful break-up of the Soviet Union, and is rightly credited with orchestrating
the quick and almost total destruction of Hussein’s Iraqi Army on the pretext of saving the oilrich state of Kuwait. Though he criticized President Bush in certain areas of foreign policy
during the campaign,15 once elected, Clinton mostly stayed in his lane when it came to
challenging the global actions of the elder statesman. He instead concentrated intently on his
domestic legislation proposals. This circumvention inevitably resulted from the realities of the
many global crises staring him down once inaugurated. Clinton essentially continued Bush’s
policies, particularly with regards to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the escalating war in
Bosnia. Even given the US role as de facto leader of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), which had yet to be called upon in the Balkans despite its enhanced position in the
wake of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Clinton still lacked any cohesive, clear policies of
his own.
Perhaps an additional reason for this hesitancy to plunge into the world of international
conflict is due to Clinton being the first Baby Boomer to secure the top spot on a major party
ticket and win. His past actions with regards to Americans fighting overseas and vocal disdain
for American policies in war were discomforting to many voters,16 especially those of the Silent
Majority, seen as vital to Republican control of the Executive Branch for twenty out of the
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previous twenty-four years. In fact, prior to Clinton, no Democrat since FDR was ever elected to
a second term. Only Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson served longer terms, due to their
positions as Vice President upon the deaths of FDR and John Kennedy, respectively.
Clinton would be the first president to have actively protested against American military
endeavors overseas, specifically those in Vietnam, and he did so most conspicuously on foreign
soil while studying at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.17 He also went to great lengths to avoid
serving in the military at the height of the draft,18 and misled Americans regarding his actions to
evade his fate as a lottery pick. These suspicious activities were made public during the
campaign, and the Bush team suggested he was a “draft dodger.”19 This label provoked deepseated animosity from many veterans’ groups and those who supported them.
Clinton’s triumph offers a student of the era an interesting perspective. For the first time
since Truman’s 1948 election, the Cold War and anti-Communism were largely ignored, if not
absent, from the list of priorities Americans held dear. In terms of foreign policy, Bush fell
victim to his own success. Clinton would capitalize on this seismic shift in what Americans felt
were more urgent concerns, which, fortunately for him, sat uncomfortably in their pocketbooks.
It was a changed world.
The following examination into the Clinton Administration’s reaction to such change
provides an example of how the US initially took on its role as the global leader, and analyzes
the results yielded both at home and abroad under the direction of the forty-second president. As
noted in The Art of Intelligence by former CIA operations officer Henry Crumpton, who served
as US coordinator for counterterrorism with the rank of Ambassador at Large, “the world was
transforming rapidly, not least in terms of the nature of conflict, risk, competition, and
cooperation.”20 With an emphasis on espionage and the activities of the US clandestine service,
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Crumpton decries the doubts held by many respected political leaders as to the continued need
for “robust intelligence”21 after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. In the
1990s, and at the urging of the political class, including the much-admired Senator Daniel
Moynihan, Congress “cashed in the [so called] ‘peace dividend’ and slashed intelligence budgets
to the bone.”22 In a time when international affairs were becoming progressively unstable,
removed from the, however ignoble, stability of the Soviet-American feud, these budgetary
decisions would have a devastating effect on worldwide covert operations and networks. Many
agents and leaders quit outright, stations closed, and confidence in intelligence agencies
plummeted. The illumination of traitorous actions within intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies, such as those of the CIA’s Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), added to this decrease in morality and confidence, both within the
community and outside of it.23 Crumpton refers to the early 1990s particularly as a “prosperous
calm” after the Cold War, when America was enjoying a “delusional respite, in an imaginary
world without serious threats and deadly enemies.”24 America was wrong. Nothing proved this
mistake more vividly and painfully than the attacks of September 11, 2001, which occurred not
even one year after Clinton left office.
What Crumpton illuminates, along with many others who were active participants in high
level government positions during this period, is a dubious state of comfort that permeated the
US and many of its allies, particularly those in Europe and other democratized, First World
nations. What actually occurred was a rise in decades and even centuries' old conflicts, mostly of
a tribal or ethnic nature, and previously checked by the rigid stand-off between the two rival
superpowers either by use of force or even the mere threat of force. The breakup of Yugoslavia
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in 1991, and the subsequent chaos and horror that followed, provides an excellent example of the
power wielded by the Cold War leash.
Many exceptions to this bifurcated deterrent exist. Vietnam is a glaring example, and the
one with the most powerful legacy with regards to the use of American military might. The
Korean War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the decolonization and independence
movements in Africa are also prime indicators that outbreaks of violence forged on despite the
threat of nuclear war, as did continued tensions in the Middle East and civil unrest in Latin
America. But what makes the post-Cold War violence unique is that it was, in most cases,
unexpected, and even downplayed. The 1993 comprehensive review of the nation’s defense
strategy conducted by Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, and known as the Bottom
Up Review (BUR), illuminated the possibility of “new dangers,”25 but lacked clarity with
regards to the circumstances in which military deployment may be necessary. Many of the
foreign entanglements which would call for the use of US forces, even with regards to
peacekeeping and intelligence, were vague. In the context of the Clinton Administration, and the
manner by which it approached foreign conflict and threats to American security, it is brutally
ironic that the so-called “Decade of Peace [and Prosperity]" would usher in the most destructive
and pivotal attack to ever occur on American soil.
The purpose of this study is to highlight the paradox in and consequences of the fact that
at the same moment when America achieved its status as the world’s superpower, it also began
the process of retreating from a position of active leadership, and looked more towards
international bodies, specifically the UN, as the answer to keeping peace around the globe.26
This shift began under Bush, but accelerated under Clinton. Several examples found in this work
emphasize how supplanting the efficiency and speed of clearly-defined American action with
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slow-moving, intensely bureaucratic leadership can yield unthinkable results. Ethnic cleansing
in Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, and the increased threat arising from rogue states in Africa
and the Middle East provide the strongest illustrations of what can occur when the US hesitates
to lead or challenge international bodies, and even allies.
The following cases under examination clarify the unintended results generated from the
lack of a clear American foreign policy or objectives, particularly when the nation is asked to
carry the brunt of the financial and military burden in UN peacekeeping efforts or NATOdirected missions. The country’s detachment from crises where decisive foreign intervention
was greatly necessary, yet avoided, such as those in Africa, came to hurt America’s credibility as
an unbridled force for humanity and justice in the eyes of those who suffered around the globe.
It also gave the green light to a man determined to attack Americans whenever, and wherever,
they could be found; a man who would view the Battle of Mogadishu, and the subsequent retreat
of US forces, as proof that his nemesis was a “paper tiger.”27
To be fair, and as noted by Samantha Power in her analysis of global genocide,28 as much
as American leaders swore to prevent horrors such as the Holocaust from ever occurring again, a
policy of non-intervention in Third World feuds during the Cold War years, particularly when
speaking of direct military intervention, carried the day with virtually every US president since
FDR. Additionally, the UN often failed to embark on missions of peacekeeping if the region in
need aligned itself with either the US or the USSR. Power refers to the years between 1956 and
1987, when the UN launched a total of only eleven interventions for the purpose of maintaining
ceasefires or preventing further conflict in certain regions. However, from 1988 to 1994, as the
USSR succumbed to its mortal injuries, the UN Security Council launched sixteen missions, with
many more to follow.29 The Soviet-American threat of nuclear confrontation and Mutually
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Assured Destruction (MAD) served as a powerful deterrent for administrations from both
political parties in the US, and for UN member nations. For this reason, Hungary was on its own
in 1956, the Prague Spring succumbed in 1968, and a blind eye was turned to a multitude of
murderous rampages by Third World dictatorial rulers, many of whom filled the power vacuum
left specifically by the absence or withdrawal of US power or policing. One of the most obvious
cases is the Cambodian genocide in the post-Vietnam War era, which unfortunately grew out of
the abandonment of the American pledge “Never Again” in relation to the Jewish Holocaust.30
American policy makers opted to avoid further negative political consequences, and left their
South Vietnamese allies and millions of Cambodians alone to meet their tragic fate.
History is currently repeating itself, as it often does. Regardless of what one may feel
about the 2003 Iraq invasion, or Vietnam for that matter, even the most war-weary Americans do
not wish to doom a region to chaos and carnage as a result of a premature exit, particularly after
military successes on the ground. It shows a consistent lack of political will when, in the postVietnam era, and now, in Iraq, those abandoned in the wake of an American war, or even a US
humanitarian or diplomatic presence, are left in the most precarious of positions. Additionally, it
is this same absence of principled decision-making, sacrificed at the altar of the public poll, that
often prevents most American presidents, Clinton among them, from intervening in conflicts
outside of their borders; even if these conflicts include unspeakable atrocities committed against
civilians.
What makes this study unique is that the Clinton Administration’s calculations with
regard to the use of American force, or even strong-armed US leadership, falls in between the
two most controversial military interventions in US history: Vietnam and Iraq. Therefore, those
in charge during this time period had both something to learn, and something to teach. But with
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a president whose foreign policy experience was limited, and whose focus and strengths
remained heavily on domestic affairs, anything resembling a “Clinton Doctrine” simply does not
exist. A scholar can easily look to the Truman Doctrine, and the policy of containment, to
analyze the American-led effort, in concert with a UN force, in the Korean War. The
Eisenhower Doctrine, and its vow to protect the independence of regimes threatened by
communist influence, even to the dismay of French, British and Israeli allies during the Suez
Crisis of 1957, offers a direct line to understanding US primacy in the Middle East. The Reagan
Doctrine provided a significant change in Cold War policy, as his administration issued a
Presidential National Security Directive to not only contain, but reverse the advances made by
communism in the Third World; this move forced the USSR to keep up with an arms race
Reagan understood his adversaries could never win.31
However, when examining President Clinton, it is up to the historian to examine the most
challenging, and urgent, foreign policy questions faced by his administration, and determine
what motives drove the president and his team towards the decisions made and the actions either
taken or deferred. As this work highlights, Clinton’s policy proposals, or calls for the use of
force, were consistently born out of reaction. Outside of occasions of tough rhetoric, his record
presents neither an ideological nor policy-driven “doctrine” with a coherent and distinct agenda
for foreign affairs. Instead, it was a constant battle between national interests and humanitarian
ones, often with no discernible, concrete basis for US involvement, with the exception of direct
terrorist attacks on US interests. For this reason, his foreign policy can be viewed as lacking
cohesion and direction, which may account for his vacillation when the world, and American
allies, refused to cooperate. A Washington Post article that appeared during Clinton’s search to
replace his first Defense Secretary after merely one year, quoted an unnamed advisor who
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asserted, “[the Administration] really just wanted to get the Pentagon off the screen. Every time
it was on, it was trouble that interfered with the President’s agenda. Their attitude was, if they
could subcontract out the Pentagon, they would.”32
For the purpose of concision, as well as the supremacy of an issue faced in relation to
other foreign policy exploits during the president’s eight-year term, this study focuses on five
main areas of international testing for the Clinton Administration: UN Peacekeeping efforts in
Somalia; UN Peacekeeping operations and NATO intervention in Bosnia; the Rwandan
Genocide; Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti; and the rise of Osama Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda. With the exception of the uptick in both the frequency and destruction of Islamic
extremist attacks under the direction of Osama Bin Laden, the bulk of these challenges arose
during the president’s first four years in office, and almost led to the public’s denial of his second
chance.
The starting point for this endeavor relies heavily on both Clinton’s personal views on
American leadership and intervention, and, just as valuable, on the outlook of those who held the
most influence during his presidency. Especially during Clinton’s first term, his national
security and diplomatic apparatus fell into two categories: those revealing a “Vietnam
Syndrome,” and those revealing a “Munich Syndrome.”33 Vietnam Syndrome involves the fear
of committing forces to an open-ended conflict, or in the context of a civil war, due to the legacy
of the controversial conflict in Vietnam. Politics play heavily into decisions made with this
anxiety in mind. Munich Syndrome afflicts those who look to the Munich Conference in 1938 as
the worst diplomatic decision made by world powers in modern history. Infamously, at Munich,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler by allowing him to annex the
German-speaking portion of Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland, after a mere promise from the
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dictator for no further territorial advancement. Hitler quickly reneged on the agreement, and in
the face of British and French passivity, continued his devastating march through Europe.
Clinton himself is a product of “Vietnam Syndrome,” as was his first National Security
Advisor, Anthony Lake, and his first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. Lake served in
Vietnam, but as a Foreign Service Officer with the State Department, and not with the military.
In 1970, Lake resigned in protest when President Richard Nixon began bombing Cambodian
strongholds, which housed ammunition to be used against American forces and protected North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers.34 Lake deemed this action to be an escalation of the
unpopular war, and wanted out. He also worked within the Carter Administration’s State
Department. When Clinton chose him to be his National Security Advisor, Lake quickly
determined that the new president would not risk political capital on foreign matters, and at least
for the first few months of the administration, yielded most of his influence to Christopher.35
Clinton’s new Secretary of State, Christopher, who also served under President Carter, had a
reputation of being “obsessed with negotiations…[and had a] fear of the use of force, and lack of
intellectual firepower.”36 As illustrated in this author’s analysis of Bosnia, Christopher’s
weaknesses with regards to the power of influence and persuasion, specifically when it came to
relations with allies, often led to further indecision within the Clinton national security apparatus.
One could argue that Colin Powell, a holdover from the Bush Administration as Clinton’s
first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also fits the category of those with “Vietnam
Syndrome,” but for very different reasons. Where Clinton and many of his advisors feared
committing troops thanks to a distrust of military intervention and the possibility of escalation,
which could lead to political fall-out, Powell revealed his own personal experience as a Vietnam
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Veteran. He consistently refused to commit his troops to an ill-defined mission with no clear
political or military objective.
The most influential advisor to exhibit “Munich Syndrome” was Madeleine Albright. As
a Czechoslovakian refugee herself, forced out of her home with her family as a child during
World War II, with her father declared a dissenter once the nation fell under communist control,
Albright viewed the appeasement of the West during the Munich Conference as the most
devastating diplomatic failure of the twentieth century.37 For this reason, she often favored
multilateral action and the confrontation of authoritarian dictators initially in her role as
Clinton’s UN Ambassador, and then as the first female Secretary of State during the president’s
second term. Although she was a vocal opponent of using force to remove Saddam Hussein’s
troops out of Kuwait, Albright earned a hawkish reputation while at the UN, as she eagerly
pushed for the use of American military power in world affairs, and particular in areas of
humanitarian crises.38
In her autobiography, Albright explains how the increased number of peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions accepted by the UN greatly enhanced her position. According to
Albright, “Because the UN was embroiled in so many issues, I was involved in shaping and
implementing U.S. foreign policy to a greater extent than any of my predecessors.”39 Due to this
unparalleled new status, she adds, “I knew not only how the [UN] Security Council worked, but
how to work it.”40 Albright’s statement becomes especially important when one examines her
vocal support of humanitarian intervention. She often spoke and acted in a manner that reflected
her personal history with regards to WWII atrocities and genocide. Her stance during the 1994
Rwandan Genocide is therefore quite surprising. As the leading international representative of
the US, and given her weight at the UN, one would assume she would be the foremost proponent
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of putting a stop to the systematic slaughter that occurred. But Albright towed the line for the
Clinton Administration. Instead of using her voice to advise the president on what she
increasingly felt was the wrong move, she parroted Clinton’s position, and essentially betrayed
her own instincts. Albright would not be the champion for the security and safety of the
Rwandan people as she was for those in Eastern Europe.
The first national security team put together by Clinton was not hindered by their lack of
experience, but rather, by the manner in which their experiences led to unrealistic proposals and
goals. Again, Powell is an exception, due to his position as one who designed the military
response to political objectives, should they exist. Most of Clinton’s foreign policy advisors
believed strongly in the pursuit of more humanitarian aims, the expansion of democracies,
advancement of human rights, and the use of collective security, even if US interests were not
directly at risk.41 They advocated for the idea of moral principles, instead of self-interest, and
believed that a policy worked only if both the international community and American public
agreed upon its implementation.
An examination into the mindset of Clinton with regards to military action supports the
assertion that foreign policy and, particularly, the use of American force, were rarely at the top of
his list. Many of the examples which paint Clinton as a disengaged, or at least reluctant,
Commander-In-Chief on the international stage come from critics who are either former or
current members of the Armed Forces. However, even an analysis of Clinton supporters and
staff yields evidence of the low prioritization given to the question of American involvement in
crises such as the break-up of Yugoslavia and initial European apathy; the Rwandan genocide;
and the build-up of radical Islamic terror groups and their attacks during the 1990s and 2000.
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It is quite understandable that many veterans of the Vietnam War, and a majority of the
military serving at the time of his campaign and subsequent win, viewed Clinton in a negative
light due to his draft deferment and history as a vocal critic of forceful American intervention.
However, one account of Clinton's alleged detachment from his responsibility in global conflicts
involving American power abroad serves as a credible and persuasive source for anyone
interested in the Clinton Administration's circumspect approach to military engagement. In
Dereliction of Duty, Lieutenant Colonel Robert "Buzz" Patterson, who served Clinton as a
military aide from May of 1996 to May of 1998, describes the rare honor he held of carrying the
"nuclear football," a briefcase whose contents include, most importantly, the country's nuclear
launch codes.42 This proximity to power gave Patterson a unique insight into the workings of the
Clinton Administration, as well as Clinton the man. Patterson not only holds a distinguished
record of service in the Air Force, participating in endeavors from Grenada to Desert Storm, and
Somalia to Bosnia; he also provides an honest yet almost hesitant critique of Clinton, whom he
believes often shirked his primary responsibility of keeping Americans safe and protecting
American interests abroad.
In Patterson's own words, his book "is not a personal attack on President Bill Clinton,"43
as he often describes the president as someone who treated him well and was personally quite
likable. Patterson also does his best not to delve into Clinton's well-publicized personal failures,
unless the scandal in question affected Clinton's decision-making or distracted the administration
from immediate issues of national security. However, the book does criticize the president for
what its author describes as "his [Clinton's]...failure to lead our country with responsibility and
honor."44 Speaking mostly of American impotence towards the rise of Radical Islam in its
formative years, Patterson suggests that Clinton "left huge areas of vulnerability" in the nation's
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security apparatus, and treated foreign policy "as an afterthought...a distraction that was
important only insofar as it impinged on domestic politics and the media."45
The author's justification for his ultimate condemnation of Clinton will be further
illuminated throughout this work, but his main point should be mentioned now. Patterson
accepted his position with a military officer's commitment to his mission, and a "professional
devotion" to both his beloved country and the president he would serve.46 As he states in his
preface, upon his final days as Clinton's military aide-de-camp, feelings of disillusionment and
dejection replaced his original sentiments of dignity in his assignment, and devotion to and
admiration for the man who held the highest office in the world. It is for this reason that
Patterson chose to write about his experiences, stressing his motivation as non-political.
While Patterson's account of the Clinton Administration's lack of focus on foreign affairs
comes from someone with first-hand knowledge of military intervention, another source provides
a relatively similar admission, though not by design. In a memoir of his years working with the
Clinton campaign and consequently, as one of the president’s most trusted Senior Advisors
during his first term, George Stephanopoulas describes the strengths and weaknesses of his boss
with a strong, and almost cynical foundation of political intrigue. All Too Human is a first-hand
telling of a young, idealistic aide from the liberal northeast whose hunger for power and success
led him to an unlikely, serendipitous encounter with the Arkansas Governor; an encounter that
would make the young Stephanopoulas notorious in his own right.
The value of Stephanopoulas's work to this particular historical analysis lies more in what
is left either unsaid, or said in passing. Stephanopoulas recounts with neurotic zeal his role in the
1992 election, the passing of Clinton's tax and deficit reduction plan during his first term, and the
various scandals that plagued the administration even prior to the Monica Lewinsky affair. 47
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What is notable about Stephanopoulas's record is what is either missing, thrown in as an
afterthought, or presented as just one more thing he had to spin. Events such as the bombing of
the World Trade Center in 1993, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the systematic
murder of almost one million people in Rwanda, are largely presented as an aggravation, or
unwelcomed obstacle, to an administration where domestic policy was the key to polling success
and an eventual second term. Issues of global conflict were often considered solely the purview
of the United Nations, regardless of the impotence of the international body when dealing with
urgent and horrific occurrences that required decisive US leadership and a quick, powerful,
resolute answer.
Some of Clinton’s more notable foreign policy achievements, or at least, his attempts at
improving the global landscape, are not included in depth within this study. For example, one of
the most marked actions during his presidency is the passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico. NAFTA did not come without
controversy, and received criticism from one of Clinton’s main constituencies, labor unions,
which is most certainly why he did not commit to supporting the proposed deal during the 1992
campaign.48 At the time it passed, the legislation achieved bipartisan support. Since NAFTA is
primarily an economic agreement between peaceful neighbors, it does fall not into the category
of foreign conflict or involve debate over the use of American military might.
Another foreign policy challenge not under significant scrutiny within this work is the
continuing problem of North Korea, which did not escape the attention of the Clinton
Administration. Nor did continued diplomatic efforts in Russia. Clinton often met with Boris
Yeltsin. He supported the Russian president during attempted coups, and listened to Russia’s
concerns over the proposed expansion of NATO to include certain former Soviet-puppet states of
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Eastern Europe. In point of fact, when coupled with his intense supervision over negotiations
between Yasser Arafat and the Israelis, it appears as though Clinton almost preferred to dedicate
his time to colossal, historically insurmountable challenges, to the detriment of immediate
problems which required quick, steadfast decisions and the gamble of political capital. While
this undertaking is noble, and quite necessary, diplomacy is often a slow, painstaking process,
and neither the situation in North Korea, nor the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presented the
administration with the demand for immediate decision-making, particularly with regards to the
use of US military force.
One vital point to be made concerning this analysis of Clinton’s foreign policy is the
absence of any detailed coverage of some of the domestic scandals surrounding his presidency.
Whitewater, the White House FBI files controversy, Travelgate, and the suicide of Deputy White
House Counsel Vince Foster receive no significant attention.49 The only relevance of these
scandals to this work is how they too often diverted attention away from the multitude of
pressing challenges facing the president and his staff. As stated by Clinton’s FBI Director Louis
Freeh, “I spent most of the almost eight years as director investigating the man who appointed
me.”50 In a time when Islamic terrorism was not only intensifying, but also classified as an issue
for law enforcement, this admission by Freeh is noteworthy. Another exception is the Lewinsky
Affair, but its notability within this study is merely due to its serving as a precursor to a
suspiciously-timed and ineffective retaliatory strike against Al Qaeda targets for the August 1998
American Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Since virtually
every comprehensive history of the Clinton presidency includes intense coverage of his personal
escapades, there is no need to belabor them here.
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The ebbs and flows of a constantly changing foreign policy, from administration to
administration, specifically upon the relegation of the Cold War-era containment policy to the
annals of history, requires that historians seek out motives, expose a cohesive worldview (or lack
of one), and evaluate action. Because a look at each successive administration’s approach to
international conflict mirrors a pendulum swinging from one side to the other in post-Cold War
foreign policy, it is vital to provide context for future endeavors, or simply, to analyze what
worked, what did not work, and why. The Clinton Administration looked to the international
community in a period of increasing globalization, and engaged in a primary strategy of
multilateral intervention, with American policy largely based on decisions made at the UN.
After 9/11, the George W. Bush Administration, even with its multinational coalition for the Iraq
War, embarked on a more unilateral route. With a defiant, self-determined voice, the younger
Bush declared to the world, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either
you are with us, or you’re with the terrorists.”51 The Bush Doctrine evolved from the preemptive
use of force against foreign terrorists and those who shielded or funded them; it then expanded to
include the spread of American democratic values through nation-building. Many analysts claim
this alteration compromised the positive gains Bush made in using the full power of the US and
its international allies to dismantle terror networks.52
President Barack Obama withdrew from this heavily-criticized position of heavy-handed
American leadership, and, like Clinton did early on, relinquished most issues of international
conflict, many which demanded strong US power, to the global community, and the UN in
particular. With the exception of NATO’s mission to remove Muhammar Qaddafi from Libya,
Obama’s adherence to his campaign promise to end the Iraq War, along with his anti-imperialist
ideology, led to many unintended, often disastrous consequences. The rise and spread of the
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Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which recently made its way into Libya amid the power
struggle that followed Qaddafi’s ousting and subsequent death at the hands of his own people, is
the most notable. ISIS maintains a comfortable presence in the chaotic, broken nation, as well as
others throughout the Middle East.53 Its success in Libya was preceded by the controversial
deaths of four brave Americans during a terror attack on the US Diplomatic Compound and CIA
Annex in the city of Benghazi by the hands of Islamic extremists. The attack went essentially
unanswered by the administration, with only one suspect currently in custody.
Obama retreated from what is viewed by many critics to be an overly aggressive Bushera foreign policy, which both Americans and international affairs experts deem to be primarily
comprised of a nation-building concept. The Bush Doctrine is seen as an attempt to disseminate
the much-debated ideal of American exceptionalism by means of an occupying force. However,
whether one agrees with the Iraq War or not, which now surpasses Vietnam in terms of
unpopularity, Obama’s hasty removal of troops against the advice of his Joint Chiefs and
generals on the ground undoubtedly led to a power vacuum. The ruthless and barbaric remnants
of a previously struggling Al Qaeda in Iraq filled that vacuum as the newly-formed Islamic State,
whose goal is to create an Islamic caliphate in the wake of the American exodus.54 On paper,
President Obama kept his campaign promise to end the war, but the fighting continues. Violence
has intensified and spread, much like what occurred in Cambodia following the fall of Saigon in
1975; only on a larger scale and with far greater consequences for the security of both US
interests abroad and Americans at home.
So, what happens next? President Donald Trump was elected in November of 2016, after
defeating President Clinton’s wife and President Obama’s former Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, in a surprising upset. Trump campaigned with an amalgamation of foreign policy
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positions put forth by previous administrations. Many talking heads assert he has proposed an
unclear vision developed out of a promise to both avoid committing troops in overseas
operations, but also defeat enemies, ISIS chief among them, quickly and decisively.55 His ideas
on foreign affairs include both a verbal denunciation of Bush and the Iraq War, as well as a
continued assault on Obama’s fecklessness against the violence committed by Islamic extremists.
Trump’s wild card status in the realm of foreign policy comes from his statements regarding how
he would utilize American forces effectively if a decision to intervene in some way is made. He
campaigned on eradicating Radical Islamic Terror, yet also focused heavily on internal security,
and not wasting American blood and treasure overseas. His “America First” promises hearken
back to the days of American isolationism prior to World War II,56 though he also vows to
dedicate substantial funds to the rebuilding and modernization of the military, solidifying an
unrivaled readiness of US troops should the need for war arise.57 Trump has also been critical of
the UN, and he has demanded more support, both financial and in terms of forces, from NATO
members, which some criticized as his threat to pull out of the alliance altogether.58 With
humanitarian issues such as the Syrian refugee crisis, and the emboldened stature of enemies in
Iran, Russia, and many terror-dominated regions in the Middle East and Africa, it is incumbent
upon the new president to understand the policies of success and failure over the past twenty-five
years, and present a coherent vision for America’s role in an increasingly dangerous world.
The following examination into Clinton, and the cases under consideration, provide an
overarching view of foreign policy decisions made during a period when US leaders believed
America could achieve physical security through economic security, and thus turned inward,
punting its leadership role to the notoriously bureaucratic UN. Currently, the UN Security
Council consists of five permanent members: Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and the US.
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It also includes ten other nations elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. Its
resolutions require a three-fifths majority, but can be vetoed by one of any of the five permanent
members.59
For reasons of social justice and a more equal means of representation, many UN
member nations have advocated for the addition of permanent members from Third World
countries to serve on the Security Council. The Clinton Administration supported this move, but
it was never undertaken. More permanent members mean more opportunities for vetoes, and
thus, gridlock.60 It would also dilute American influence. It was not in the best interests of the
US to supplant its authority to the UN when its global role was virtually unchallenged in the
1990s. In the increasingly anti-American climate emanating from the body’s headquarters in
New York today, many national security analysts view this proposal as a detriment to US power.
Though this study illuminates the often sluggish and contentious nature of the UN when
it comes to taking action, it is not the author’s intention to demonize the organization altogether.
Nor is it the goal to maintain that Clinton’s aim of engaging in multilateral rather than unilateral
pursuits involving aggression is wrongheaded. George H.W. Bush himself encouraged the
notion of collective security to combat aggression, though he envisioned this development as
emerging under American leadership. This idea served as the foundation for confronting the
crisis in Kuwait. After the success of the coalition war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein, Bush
noted:
We can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is a very real
prospect of a new world order…a world where the United Nations—freed from
Cold War stalemate—is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a
world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all
nations.61
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The main point is whether Clinton’s consistent dependence on UN mandates, as well as the
varied stances of US allies, in his decision-making served the nation and its interests well during
his two terms. The UN acts in the guise of neutrality when it intervenes. As a result, acts of
genocide and ethnic cleansing often pass without interruption unless troops, not aid workers, are
specifically deployed under a mandate to use force. As one can easily assume, the construction
of a multilateral force by a body comprised of individual nations, each acting in their own selfinterest, does not generate the most efficient means of quick intervention and protective action.
In order to adequately support the conclusions drawn in this work, and present a
comprehensive portrait of each area under examination, the following compilation of research
features a combination of both traditional and non-traditional references, including online
government documents, media publications, and personal memoirs. When an historian
investigates more recent events, particularly those involving issues of national security and
foreign policy, a traditional dependence on archival sources is insufficient. Matters of
declassification and limited access steer the research process in a direction that warrants the use
of materials outside of those official documentary records which remain largely out of reach.
The application of these findings helped to construct a persuasive and accurate historical
description of what occurred during the time period under consideration. Though the use of
online sources includes some opinion pieces, mostly derived from newspapers or research
institutions, the majority are primary records from the digital collections of government
institutions, such as the CIA, the US State Department, and the UN. These materials provided
much of the credible evidence necessary to strengthen the legitimacy of the overarching
argument. Given the advancements made by several of these entities with regards to digitizing
their records, as well as the challenges involved with investigating contemporary subjects, past
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methods of gathering historical records had to be manipulated in order to achieve a
comprehensive, insightful evaluation.
Often, an analysis of foreign policy within a particular administration leads the historian
to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which offers a beneficial
compilation of significant documents relating to decision-making and activities centered on
foreign affairs. Since the subject of this work is President Clinton, and the most current FRUS
records are those of the George H.W. Bush Administration, the FRUS series was not utilized.
Presidential libraries can also serve as a valuable resource for those who seek to unlock the inner
workings of a particular administration. However, due to Clinton’s emphasis on domestic
policy, as well as the availability of evidence regarding his foreign policy from alternative
reserves, little research from the William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Library and Museum is
included in this analysis. For information not included in its archived records, the Clinton
Library directs the researcher to supplementary sites, including The American Presidency Project
at the University of California-Santa Barbara, the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Reading
Room, and the United Nations’ released documents, all of which were heavily consulted for this
analysis. When merged with personal accounts offered by those closest to the president, in
addition to news coverage and historical context, the motives and considerations fundamental to
decisions made by Clinton and many key officials within his administration achieve greater
clarity.
The significance of this work is the challenge it presents to past comprehensive analyses
of Clinton’s foreign policy approach, which cover both of his presidential terms. While similar
in historical record and in some cases, interpretation, particularly for those overseas conflicts
which arose during his first four years, the difference between this study and more prominent,
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past accounts published on the subject is in the suggestion that an evolution occurred. Two
books which specifically put forth this narrative are Clinton’s World, written by former Foreign
Affairs editor William Hyland, and journalist Richard Sale’s Clinton’s Secret Wars.62 Both are
excellent sources of information regarding the president’s challenges in international affairs, and
are often referred to throughout this work. However, each draws a conclusion that Clinton
lessened his focus on domestic issues as he became better acclimated to his position as
Commander-in-Chief in the global arena after learning from some initial mistakes. Sale, for
example, argues in Clinton’s Secret Wars that after a series of unsuccessful foreign policy
ventures in the early 1990s, Clinton became a “tough-as-nails world leader” who “narrowly
missed getting Osama bin Laden” during his second term.63 He also maintains that Clinton was
guided by “exceptional moral strength, tactical dexterity, and strategic skill,” and displayed an
“inner steel” when and where it counted.64 Sale points to Clinton’s handling of the Balkans as
one example of the president’s resolute, steadfast leadership, but by most accounts, this
characterization is simply not supported by sufficient evidence. It took Clinton two years and
numerous missteps in devising and selling a plan to his European allies before he was finally
willing to exert US influence and power to stop the ethnic cleansing occurring in Bosnia.
While Clinton exhibited some aspects of growth and confidence in his decision-making
on foreign affairs, such as his 1998 bombing of Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s failure
to comply with UN weapons inspectors, as well as his decision to intervene in Kosovo, the
president’s unwillingness to go on the offensive against direct threats to US security interests
complicate the evolution narrative. This hesitancy is best illustrated by his reluctance to engage
in any significant action against the Taliban-protected Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan.
As the radical terror group increased in size and scope, and its attacks became more frequent and

25

destructive, Clinton either launched symbolic and ultimately ineffective air strikes, or neglected
to act whatsoever, as in the case of the bombing of the USS Cole.
With the exception of working tirelessly with the Israelis and Palestinians throughout his
entire presidency on an ultimately thwarted peace settlement, which reached its demise at the
Camp David Summit in 2000, Clinton faltered in many areas where concrete US leadership, even
if unilateral, could have halted actions and even stopped them before they began. Leadership, as
described in this work, does not automatically imply that the introduction of US troops was the
guaranteed solution to a particular problem. In fact, in many cases, even when military action
was taken, it was not done so effectively, and more importantly, it was not timely. It is up to the
historian to determine whether or not Clinton’s well-documented tendency to delay was more the
result of a changing worldview after the end of the Cold War, a simple lack of experience, an
innate distrust of American military intervention abroad, or too much trust in international
coalitions. Evidence suggests it was a combination of these factors. The post-Cold War
hesitancy for strong US intervention and the commitment of troops is the most persuasive,
especially in terms of political calculations. But the other obstacles to Clinton’s lack of decisive
action in foreign policy rival one another in a close race for second place.
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama wrote a book entitled The End of History and the Last Man,
which argued for the emergence of a new era of peace and security brought about by the triumph
of liberal democracies over rival forms of governance. Loosely based on an article written by
Fukuyama in 1989, and published in the wake of the collapse of Soviet communism, its premise
offers a unique assessment of the trajectory of competing ideologies regarding the role of the
state in society. Fukuyama suggests that the superiority achieved through the foundation of
liberty and equality in a modern liberal democracy, regardless of whatever social ills and
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instabilities may result from imperfect implementation in certain regions, serves as proof of its
achievement as the “final form of human government.”65 His work cites the beliefs of
philosophers GWF Hegel and Karl Marx that the evolution of human society was not without an
end. Fukuyama notes that for Hegel, the “liberal state” would bring about “a form of society that
satisfied [mankind’s] deepest and most fundamental longings.”66 For Marx, of course, it was
communism. But for both Hegel and Marx, the winning form of governance would bring about a
halt to further development, because the question of which institutions and ideas best serve
society would be answered. In the early 1990s, communism lost this battle. Also, the inherent
weaknesses and failures of totalitarian regimes with varying ideologies at their base enhanced the
stature of Western, democratic political systems as the premier form of government.
At the time of the book’s release, Fukuyama did not assert that the dominance of liberal
democratic institutions meant a stop to all political violence afflicting the world. However, he
suggested a victory belonged to democratic, capitalistic societies, and argued in part for a
possible cessation to the wartime horrors of the twentieth century due to the unrivaled military
prowess and technological advancement held by free nations.67 Though it received a healthy
dose of criticism, and regardless of whether one accepts it as accurate or not, Fukuyama’s thesis
reflects a far-reaching, common sentiment permeating the globe after the end of the Cold War.
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and conversely, the strengthening of NATO, initiated a
widespread state of enthusiasm for a break in hostilities and a chance for global peace. It is in
this context that President Clinton assumed the office of the presidency in 1992. This pervasive
outlook cannot be overstated when it comes to analyzing Clinton’s outlook on international
affairs within its proper historical framework. As described by historian Carole Fink:
The remarkably peaceful demise of the Soviet Union touched the entire world: in
Eastern Europe the former satellite states gravitated towards the West, and
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Moscow’s previous clients Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and the Palestinians—
already living on reduced subsidies—were set adrift. China, the world’s last
remaining major Marxist state, pressed forward with economic liberalization
under the direction of its Communist Party (which Vietnam would emulate), and
in the Third World India and other socialist-leaning countries also moved toward
a market economy. Moreover, the removal of the Soviet threat dealt a blow to the
right-wing governments in Africa and Latin America that had gained US support
based on their anticommunism.68
It appeared as though the world were entering a new age of peace and prosperity through
interconnectedness, particularly due to technological advances and open markets. Fink
succinctly sums up the 1990s by stating “’Globalization’ became the catchword of the post-Cold
War decade.” However, as President Clinton would discover, history marched forward with no
concern for the positive aspirations held by so many leaders worldwide, he being the most
prominent among them. The spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the re-emergence of
violent nationalism, and warring ethnic rivalries ultimately damned the “peace” portion of the
“Decade of Peace and Prosperity” to its status as a rather elusive ideal.
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Chapter 2. OUT OF THE COLD: THE DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE PROPOSED FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE
“NEW DEMOCRAT”
Beginning in the 1980s, in the midst of intense financial hardship in the USSR,
exacerbated by an ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan, a number of occurrences of civil unrest and
reform movements arose in Eastern Europe in response to harsh Soviet repression and economic
strangulation.1 Starting with the Solidarity Movement in Poland, which garnered both overt and
covert support from President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and the
Polish Pope John Paul II, the mostly peaceful revolutions of 1989 in the Eastern Bloc began a
process that reduced the Berlin Wall to a pile of rubble. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union
was peacefully dissolved.2
The US president who oversaw this climactic world event was George H.W. Bush.
Instead of punishing this long-time adversary, Bush delicately controlled the disintegration
process to dissuade hard-liners within the USSR from launching a last-minute assault against the
agreements being arranged by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The two leaders finalized a
treaty reducing nuclear stockpiles and the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)
in both nations. Known as START I (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of July 1991),3 this
agreement was the culmination of almost a decade of ardent diplomatic work. Bush then
continued this approach with the democratically-elected leader of the new Russian Federation
(Russia), Boris Yeltsin. Overall, under Bush’s direction, the fall of the Soviet empire became the
triumphant removal of a foreign policy adversary that menaced Americans and their Western
allies since the end of World War II.
President Ronald Reagan is rightly credited with financially crippling the Soviet Union
when he forced the struggling power to keep up with the US in a futile arms race. As a result, he
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delivered the fatal wound.4 However, supporters and critics alike recognize the steady hand of
diplomacy brought to the tenuous situation by his successor, President Bush. The US opened
embassies in the new Russia and former Soviet puppet-states, and focused its energy on
upholding the legitimacy of Yeltsin in Moscow.5 The Cold War was finally over.
With this immense foreign policy win in his opponent’s corner, Democratic Presidential
Candidate Bill Clinton had to delicately choose which world crisis he could utilize to land the
most punches during the 1992 campaign. Clinton suffered from his lack of support for another
successful foreign intervention by President Bush: the Gulf War. During the 1992 VicePresidential Debate between Al Gore, Vice-President Dan Quayle, and Perot’s running mate,
retired Admiral James Stockdale, Quayle attacked Gore by repeating statements made by Clinton
against the war, which were viewed either as an example of equivocation, or a significant lack of
perspective.6
As Bush obtained congressional approval for the Gulf War resolution, then-Governor
Clinton was asked by the press how he would have voted if he stood in their positions. He now
maintains that he supported the resolution, but his public statements on the matter at the time
conflict with this sentiment. He answered, “I guess I would have voted with the majority if it
were a close vote.”7 This reply motivated Clinton’s campaign critics, who maintained that the
governor was nothing more than a slick, poll-driven politician. In his autobiography, Clinton
attempts to explain his awkward response by stating, “At the time, I hadn’t thought I would be
running for President in 1992.”8 This excuse does little to mollify Clinton opponents, who
continue to promote the narrative that he is a purely political animal. Clinton made matters
worse by admitting that both of the senators from Arkansas influenced his decision, when each

35

voted against the war’s authorization. This appeared to Bush surrogates as a clear example of
political pandering.
After Clinton delivered four campaign speeches laying out a more “internationalist
vision” for US foreign policy, which blended “idealism and pragmatism, internationalism and
protectionism, [and] use of force and reliance on multinational institutions,” the Bush campaign
and many in the media judged his muddled foreign policy as trying to be all things to all people.9
The Bush White House decried the governor as “a closet dove masquerading as a hawk,” and
sarcastically charged that his “experience in world affairs is limited to the breakfast at the
International House of Pancakes.”10 Indeed, Clinton had no foreign affairs record of his own on
which to run; his vision was disjointed. Idealism in foreign affairs can be quickly shattered; one
is better armed with a realistic outlook and ability to problem-solve. Helping Clinton, foreign
policy remained a footnote in the campaign. The economy was the key issue.
Once elected, Clinton held a reception for diplomatic representatives following his
inauguration where he laid out a broad, somewhat vague conceptual framework for his approach
to world affairs. He included “three pillars” upon which his vision rested: “economic security at
home, restructuring the armed forces to meet new challenges of the post-Cold War globe, and
support for democratic values across the globe.”11 As an overarching thematic presentation, these
ideas sounded credible. Pressing challenges, however, demanded greater specificity.
The most significant foreign policy issue confronting the candidates during the 1992
election was the situation in the Balkans region of Eastern Europe, which the Bush
Administration had yet to adequately confront. Clinton criticized Bush for not taking decisive
action in Bosnia.12 He advocated lifting an arms embargo put in place by the United Nations, and
supported by the US and the rest of Europe. He also encouraged the use of coordinated airstrikes
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by NATO.13 The Democratic nominee stated “I specifically would not foreclose the option of the
use of force on that issue [Bosnian conflict], because I’m horrified by what I’ve seen.”14 Once in
office, his rhetoric softened. At one point during a televised town hall meeting, Clinton
answered a question on his administration’s immobility on the Bosnia dilemma with a rather
weak explanation. He stated, “I’m doing the best I can.”15 Clinton realized that so far, his
European allies were not willing to send their own forces to secure a ceasefire. They preferred
diplomacy and sanctions. Clinton had yet to fully understand that US commitment, historically
comprised of money and firepower, often served as the carrot to lure and secure faltering allies.
Once the American media began to bombard its viewers with images reminiscent of Nazi
concentration camps, Clinton began to feel the pressure.16 It is always easy to make foreign
policy decisions on a campaign tour bus to New Hampshire or South Carolina. It is entirely
different when one sits in the Oval Office, faced with daily intelligence briefings, uncooperative
allies, and an adversarial press, all waiting for a definitive, workable solution.
A typical Clintonian address exhibited little in terms of foreign policy. A look at his
acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in New York provides context, and
highlights Clinton’s initial outlook as to what he expected to face on the world’s stage. He
noted:
We meet at a special moment in history, you and I. The Cold War is over. Soviet
communism has collapsed and our values—freedom, democracy, individual
rights, free enterprise—they have triumphed all around the world. And yet, just
as we have won the Cold War abroad, we are losing battles for economic
opportunity and social justice at home. Now that we have changed the world, it’s
time to change America.17
Clinton’s proposed foreign policy approach centered on fostering economic strength, and
achieving peace through the spread of free trade and democratic values. For this reason, he
included a promise to make deep defense cuts, which in theory, would put more dollars into
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creating jobs at home. He delivered this promise along with a commitment to keep the military
strong, “ready and willing to use force if necessary.”18 Once president, this pledge proved rather
difficult to keep.
Two telling illustrations of Clinton’s inexperience in military affairs, and with military
leaders, occurred immediately after his inauguration. One concerned heavily-debated budget
decreases; the other resulted from a campaign promise to lift the ban on homosexuals openly
serving in the armed forces. On January 25,1993, the Joint Chiefs demanded a meeting with the
new president to discuss their strong opposition to what that they viewed as encouraging social
experimentation within the military.19 Then-Chairman Colin Powell relayed the objections of his
fellow officers. Powell also offered Clinton, who felt discrimination against gays and lesbians in
the armed forces was akin to the segregation of African-American soldiers decades earlier, a way
to temper the situation and temporarily please both advocates and critics. Powell suggested that
the president wait until he appointed his Secretary of Defense, and offer the public a six-month
timeline for a full assessment of whether the ban should be lifted, and how. The general stressed,
“Don’t make the gay issue the first horse out of the gate with the armed forces.”20 While Powell
acknowledged the bravery of homosexuals who undoubtedly had served in the military since its
inception, it was an entirely different, and much more controversial, step to allow them to serve
openly. The officers making these decisions claimed they were not so much concerned with
their own personal views, but more “with maintaining morale and good order.”21
Clinton respected Powell, and decided against pursuing the issue with real vigor until he
earned some credibility as Commander-in-Chief. But the president’s agreement with Powell did
not sit well with staff members who believed his campaign promise to solve the issue in favor of
lifting the ban. Clinton describes the White House staff during his first term as “talented, honest,
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and dedicated,” but also admits “most of them came out of Arkansas, and had no experience in
working in the White House or dealing with Washington’s political culture.”22 After initially
agreeing to Powell’s advice on how to address the ban with military leaders, Clinton held several
more meetings on the issue, including one with the Senate Armed Services Committee, which
eventually accepted the six-month timeline. This proposal upset many Clinton staffers. The
negotiations leaked to the media, and the House passed a resolution against lifting the ban,
followed by the Senate. As the chief executive, Clinton could veto any legislation introduced,
but Congress held enough votes to override it.
To military officials, the issue was a frivolous one, especially when the Pentagon faced
daunting questions over existing, and escalating, foreign conflicts. It did not even attract much
attention during the campaign, as all Democratic primary candidates supported lifting the ban,
and Republicans did not significantly address or exploit it for political gain. Several old-school
Democrats, such as Robert Byrd of West Virginia, whose own history towards civil rights was
not always one of tolerance, were very much against Clinton. Ironically, the president gained
some Republican support; most notably, from Barry Goldwater. Nevertheless, Clinton’s first
interaction with the Armed Services was the exact one Powell urged him to put off.
A struggle developed between civil rights advocates and military personnel. Military
leaders felt that lifting the ban threatened unit cohesion and combat readiness. Gay and lesbian
activists saw the ban as blatant discrimination. The conflict provided rich subject matter for
journalists and pundits alike. Finally, after six months of collaboration between the new
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the Joint Chiefs, an unpopular compromise appeared which
neither satisfied civilian activists nor military detractors: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell [DADT].”23
This Department of Defense Directive allowed homosexuals to continue to serve, but only if
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their private lives, and sexual orientation, were kept secret. DADT also prohibited military
personnel from investigating the sexuality of a service member without sufficient evidence of an
open violation of the policy. Powell was disappointed in the new president when he lost control
of the objective, and allowed what was essentially a social issue to become the administration’s
first priority with regards to working with the Armed Services. President Obama officially
overturned the unpopular policy in September 2011, and issued a Defense Department Directive
to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly. By this time, it occasioned little controversy.24
Clinton’s second misstep with regards to principal military policy and interaction with
members of the Armed Services was the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). According to its author,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the BUR’s purpose was to “provide a comprehensive review of
the nation’s defense spending, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.”25
The BUR was the second assessment of defense requirements conducted within a two-year
period. The first, known as the Base Force assessment, was completed by the Bush
Administration in January 1992. Widespread agreement existed on both sides of the aisle to
reduce the size and budget of the military after a massive build-up during the Reagan
Administration. The aim was to do so without sacrificing military readiness or modernization.26
Problems with Aspin’s BUR arose immediately due to the release of Clinton’s proposed
defense cuts in February 1993,27 prior to the completion of the review and recommendations. As
a result, many in the military and Congress viewed the exercise as one in which Aspin outlined
defense requirements within the confinements of his boss’s budget. Though budget
considerations certainly provide a range within which national security policy makers work, they
should never infringe upon an honest evaluation of what is militarily necessary to protect the
nation and confront international crises. Bush’s Base Force already included a $3 billion dollar
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cut for Fiscal Year 1994, which would begin on October 1st. Aspin multiplied these cuts by
four, which the military feared would lead to “faster cuts in troops, less training time, and fewer
ships than President Bush had envisioned.”28 Military leaders also feared a drastic reduction in
American military personnel stationed in Europe. The Cold War had ended, but American forces
on the European continent were vital both to the nation and the world. Ultimately, Aspin
delivered an assessment that challenged Clinton’s proposed cuts, which would later create a huge
spending discrepancy.29 The damage Clinton inflicted with regards to optics deepened the
suspicion among military leaders regarding the president’s goal of reducing force capabilities to
bare bones.
The BUR also included several other deficiencies. Even with recommendations for
drastic cuts in each branch of service, it was full of overly ambitious claims of the new role
American forces would play in the post-Cold War world. The three most notable points for
criticism arising from the BUR were:
A.) The assumptions underlying the strategy of planning to fight and win two
nearly simultaneous regional conflicts;
B.) The force levels recommended to carry out that strategy; and
C.) The funding proposed for such recommended force levels.30
Basically, Aspin vastly overstated the capabilities of his proposed BUR force. Under his troop
level reductions, if one major regional war broke out, the US would not have enough reserves
should another conflict emerge. The largely unforeseen, massive growth in UN peacekeeping
operations and limited military interventions also threatened this readiness. The uptick in the
frequency of deployments for these lesser operations cut into regional contingency forces, which
were already stretched thin.31 By his own account, Aspin needed a military with the ability to
fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously. But the BUR challenged the traditional
definition of engagement. Force reductions appeared alongside an increased tempo of operations
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and opportunities for deployment due to greater participation in multilateral peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations.32
Clinton’s defense budget fell around $70 billion short of the requirements for the BUR
force, which projected funding through 1997.33 He refused to provide the funds for his own
defense secretary’s proposal. Every American president faces the problem of meeting the basic
needs of the military amid budget restraints. However, Clinton launched too early, and too
aggressively, in order to fulfill his campaign promises to elevate spending at home. By 1998,
Clinton increased domestic spending by $300 billion, while cutting defense by $100 billion.34
He made the right move in directing Aspin’s review, but the BUR had virtually no effect on the
defense budget. This action angered the rank and file within the Armed Services. The BUR also
reduced much of its spending on modernization programs and technology, including satellites
and imagery, which would prove burdensome for his successor.35 The messages sent by Aspin’s
BUR, Clinton’s massive budget reductions, and the focus on social issues heightened fears
among military leaders regarding the president’s readiness to lead them into battle.36
A major concept behind Aspin’s military assessment was Clinton’s emphasis on
international cooperation and faith in the UN. This proposed course relied upon the idea of
“aggressive multilateralism.”37 The concept behind this strategy is a combination of multinational forces aimed at providing collective security and humanitarian intervention during
world crises. Aggressive multilateralism was the brainchild of UN Ambassador Madeleine
Albright. During the confirmation hearings for her ambassadorship, Albright advocated for a
“new beginning”38 for the United Nations, presumably with American leadership and power at
the forefront of the venture. Barely six months into her position, she expanded her views on the
subject, advocating for “preventive diplomacy…[where] Americans would have to ‘open their
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minds to broader strategies in multilateral forums.’”39 In Albright’s mind, humanitarian aid and
the sponsorship of UN peacekeeping, combined with collective security entities like NATO,
were not only vital to the internal safety of US citizens, but to American interests overseas.40
Aggressive multilateralism, combined with the concept of “democratic enlargement,”41 which
sought to use American democracy and market economics as a means of diplomatic influence,
formed the basis for the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy during his first term. Events,
however, dictated that the president change course, especially in the realm of UN peacekeeping
operations.
The few pronouncements introduced by Clinton regarding a more internationalist foreign
policy initially did not provoke criticism. Similarly, the inclusion of the idea of a UN Rapid
Deployment Force, which would involve “a standing UN army and…permitting putting U.S.
forces under various UN commands,”42 also met little resistance while in its conceptual stage.
After the crises faced by the administration within its first year, and what most Americans
viewed as the failure of the UN to serve as a competent force for humanitarian or peacekeeping
purposes, these proposals took some well-deserved hits.
In his study of the changing world Clinton encountered, and the manner by which the
new president attempted to “remake” American foreign policy, former Foreign Affairs editor
William Hyland notes: “the era of multilateral foreign policy and collective security, centered on
the United Nations, had finally dawned.”43 But the challenges stemming from the Clinton
Administration’s approach to foreign entanglements looked more like crisis management.
Hyland’s view of Clinton’s responses to foreign conflict during his first term is succinct and fair.
Some of his findings are referenced in this work. Hyland gives an accurate portrayal of Clinton
as impatient, preoccupied with his domestic agenda, and only sporadically involved in foreign
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affairs.44 He also describes the president’s national security advisors as idealists, whose utopian
proposals of global cooperation and America leading merely by principle did not match the
problems they faced. According to Hyland, when these concepts “clashed with the real world,
they needed the support of their president.”45 Clinton often found it difficult to support, or sell,
these grandiose goals of multilateral peacekeeping, collective security, and humanitarian
intervention, and rarely expended the political capital to do so.
Hyland also claims an evolution in took place as Clinton gained more experience on the
world stage. Clinton showed some signs of maturation. He was far more willing to mobilize
NATO forces in Kosovo when in 1998, Slobodan Milošević made his second attempt at ethnic
cleansing. But evidence of overall growth is not apparent. With regards to collective security
and multilateral cooperation, particularly within the UN, Clinton failed to use American
leadership in a manner that gave credibility to his own original aims. When one examines
Clinton’s response to terror attacks, his approach to foreign affairs remained a reactive one
throughout his eight-year term. Examples of an absence of foresight for pre-emptive decisionmaking in areas such as Bosnia, Rwanda, and later, in Afghanistan, seem to indicate the primary
driver of the president’s call to action resided in the old journalistic mantra of “If it bleeds, it
leads.” In the new age of global communications and the widespread, almost instantaneous
dissemination of news stories and powerful images, Clinton often followed in the media’s
footsteps.
Kathryn Olson echoes this idea of improvisation by Clinton when it came to the eruption
of foreign conflict, and especially when the military option was on the table. Olson suggests that
the Clinton Administration’s early vision of democratic enlargement, which used the expansion
of market democracies as a post-Cold War means to influence the conduct of international
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actors, essentially “named chaos as the global enemy to an ideal order.”46 In her review of
Clinton’s rhetoric on foreign affairs, Olson argues that chaos gave the president not only an
enemy, but the opportunity to avoid confining himself to a specific agenda. By combining
“economic, environmental, security, and social issues”47 and presenting them ambiguously
during eight foreign policy speeches in 1993, the Clinton national security team gave itself more
latitude in determining which fights to pick. The result was the complete absence of any pattern
when responding to international threats or crises.
Tony Lake, who authored the proposals for democratic enlargement, attempted to replace
Cold War containment with a more Wilsonian notion of spreading American ideals and power,
only with an emphasis on international trade and domestic economic growth.48 Humanitarian aid
and collective security were included in this framework, but quickly fell out of favor following
the peacekeeping challenges of Clinton’s first year. The main problem with democratic
enlargement was its naiveté. During a time when foreign conflicts involved ancient rivalries and
struggles for power, fundamentalist-inspired terrorism, and authoritarians in search of nuclear
capabilities, an obscure policy based on the spread of American values would not suffice.49
When making the decision to send American troops into harm’s way, the containment of chaos
could not serve as a foreign policy objective.
Several global challenges awaited Clinton upon his arrival in office. The focus he
applied to non-urgent matters supports the view of his giving low prioritization to issues such as
the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the crisis in Somalia, both of which reached disastrous levels
during the first year of his presidency. These two events were present during the campaign, so
Clinton understood the demands awaiting him. Haiti, too, falls into this category, though the
Caribbean island did not receive the global media attention generated by the human suffering
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taking place in the Horn of Africa and the Balkans. Soon, Clinton would have to embrace his
role as Commander-in-Chief, and confront these international crises head on.
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Chapter 3. “BLACK HAWK DOWN”: UN PEACEKEEPING AND
THE LEGACY OF A TRAGEDY
On October 3, 1993, a team of US Joint Special Operations forces embarked upon a
mission to hunt down and capture two lieutenants of Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aideed,
part of a UN-designated, American-led command to cripple and capture Aideed himself.1
Heading into the center of ancient rivaling tribes in the city of Mogadishu were nineteen aircraft,
which included surveillance AH-6 and MH-6 Little Birds and eight Black Hawk helicopters.
Ground assault forces consisting of Humvees and five-ton trucks carried additional Army
Ranger, Delta Force, and SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) Special Forces troops. Their job was to escort
both the prisoners and the assault forces back from the unstable area once the operation was
complete. In total, 160 American servicemen were in place to launch a formidable snatch and
grab offensive against loosely formed, warring tribal factions who served as the only obstacle to
the success of their mission.2 The US forces expected their assignment to last one hour.
It was the middle of the day, and the soldiers undertaking this task understood, and
respected, the dangers of being sent to an ill-defined, volatile area. They were familiar with past
conventional forces, on similar missions in other regions, that encountered unexpectedly
effective resistance from locals. But they were prepared. After sitting around in their compound
on the outskirts of Mogadishu where they had arrived five weeks earlier, these elite soldiers, by
all accounts “heavy metal avengers, unstoppable, invincible,” looked forward to “finally going in
to kick some serious Somali ass.”3 While the overarching target was achieved with the capture of
Aideed’s lieutenants, the operation ended the next day after an intense urban firefight. The fierce
encounter culminated in two UH-60 Black Hawks shot down and destroyed, eighteen elite US
soldiers dead, seventy-three wounded, and an American helicopter pilot held hostage. The tragic
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clash would become known as the Battle of Mogadishu, and later as Black Hawk Down thanks to
the success of Mark Bowden’s book and subsequent film.
Back home, Americans were presented with the horrifying consequences of US attempts,
made necessary by UN security resolutions, to economically and politically reconstruct chaotic
nations with no central government, but merely violent clans vying for power. Nothing brought
this truth home more effectively than the televised images of a dead US soldier being dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu.4 To comprehend how and why the US intervention in Somalia
escalated from a humanitarian aid mission to one of peacekeeping with the approved use of
force, one must look at Somalia’s disintegration, and the roles of the UN, and Presidents Bush
and Clinton, in the decision to dispatch troops to the region. As the first major foreign policy
defeat under the new Clinton Administration, it served as baptism by fire, and put under scrutiny
when and how to utilize American troops, and risk their lives, in peacekeeping operations
sanctioned by the UN.
In 1960, Somalia achieved its independence as a nation after being held as a UN trust
territory. This status meant the land was held under the protection of another UN member nation
as it prepared for independence and worked to establish democratic political institutions.5 In
1969, a socialist faction, backed by the Somali Army, led a coup to bring the commander of the
Somali Armed Forces, Mohamed Siad Barre, to power. Barre first aligned himself with the
Soviet Union, but after he invaded Ethiopia, which also received support from the USSR, the
Somali president turned his attention towards the US.6 Barre’s goal was to gain assistance from
the Americans in order to maintain power.
Somalia is made up of rival clans, consisting of those who supported Barre, and those
who suffered from his ruthless acts of repression and violence. In January of 1991, the clans not
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aligned with Barre joined forces to overthrow him. Forced into exile, Barre later died in Nigeria
in 1995.7 The conflict with Barre and his removal from leadership in Somalia exacerbated
existing internal chaos and led to a shocking humanitarian crisis, as the warring factions
continued to strive for power in the vacuum left in Barre’s absence.8 Savage clashes occurred in
a state with no central authority, stable economic system, or democratic institutions; innocent
civilians were often caught in the crossfire.
The most notable consequence of the instability that plagued the region was famine, so
the UN stepped in to provide assistance. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 733,
which noted the “rapid deterioration of the situation…and the heavy loss of human life and
widespread material damage resulting from conflict in the country.”9 Newly-elected UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, under the guise of maintaining international peace and
security, increased humanitarian assistance and sought to persuade conflicting parties to agree to
a ceasefire. Under UN Security Resolution 746, passed on March 3, 1992, a ceasefire agreement
took place in Mogadishu; yet the resolution admitted that the “factions have not yet abided by
their commitment to implement the ceasefire,” which caused a halt to the reception of life-saving
assistance to the emaciated Somali people.10
The Security Council also issued another resolution, UNSR 751, which formally
established the UN operation as UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia).11 During this
time, the two primary warring factions, with one headed by a notorious and charismatic killer,
Mohammad Farah Aideed, continued to fight for control of the region as the populace starved.
After televised images of “the gaunt faces of frail withering small children”12 spread worldwide,
the UN, and at the time, the Bush Administration, realized the need for quick action.
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The UN dropped tens of thousands of tons of food and other supplies to the malnourished
Somalis. The US also sent aid through Operation Provide Relief, under the direction of
President Bush, as part of the UN humanitarian mission. The deliveries were often intercepted
by members of the rivaling clans. Security was necessary. As a result, the UN enacted Chapter
VII of its charter, which allows for the use of force to maintain peace. Under Article 43, all UN
member nations “undertake to make available to the Security Council…armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.”13
In December 1992, President Bush dispatched a small group of US Marines to protect the
food drops and ensure the aid reached their intended targets. Prior to this humanitarian action by
the UN and Bush Administration, 300,000 Somalis perished either from war or starvation.14 This
endeavor, known as Operation Restore Hope, included the US taking the reigns as head of
UNITAF (United Nations’ United Task Force) in Somalia. In this originally clear, limited
leadership role under Chapter VII, the actions taken proved to be an initial success. However,
the UN changed its goal when increasing violence by Aideed and his supporters interfered with
the operation. Even with almost 30,000 soldiers on the ground, housed in compounds directly
outside of urban areas, the situation deteriorated due to the altered initiative, with UNITAF
peacekeeping troops now encouraged to capture Aideed under the designation UNISOM II.15 In
response, Aideed ramped up his efforts at disrupting UN activities and attacked UN and US
forces.
Clinton’s UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright contended in August of 1993, when the
situation in Somalia quickly deteriorated due to a lack of coordination among peacekeeping
forces, “By seeking to disarm Mr. Aidid, the U.N. is fulfilling its mandate in Somalia.”16
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Albright may have been morally just in her comments about the responsibilities of the UN, but
Americans, including those in the Democrat-led Congress, had little to say in the matter. As a
result, the public was ill-prepared for what would occur in October.17
Clinton showed little fear as to the change in the UN mission and the escalation of
hostilities that followed. While the Bush Administration resisted the expansion of the role of the
US military, the Clinton Administration’s ideas of assertive multilateralism mirrored UN
concepts of peace enforcement and possible nation-building.18 However, as noted by the chief
author of the Cold War-era containment policy, George Kennan, “the very prerequisites for a
democratic political system do not exist among the people in question.”19 The region was mired
in violent conflict, and showed no signs of developing a stable, centralized government without a
lengthy commitment by US forces. Any negotiations for peace or democracy-building between
clans had to involve Aideed, due to his powerful position in the region. Even if the Battle of
Mogadishu had not occurred, Americans planned to exit Somalia after fulfilling their mission to
feed and provide security for peacekeeping forces. Without any governmental authority, the
conditions would return to where they were prior to UNISOM intervention.20 Clinton himself
spoke of these challenges in his speech to the nation following the Battle of Mogadishu. The
difference lies in the president’s promise that continued US involvement, even for a mere six
months, and only to protect aid distribution and UN peacekeepers, would provide stability and
sustainability for the Somalis once the American forces departed.21
The Clinton Administration’s support for the UN’s authorization to hunt down Somali
chieftains evolved from a shoot-out with Aideed’s loosely-formed militia that killed two dozen
Pakistani soldiers during the summer of 1993.22 This shift changed the nature of the
commitment. The UN was now taking sides in the middle of a civil war, and the US was
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expected to lead. Clinton’s top military advisor at the time, Colin Powell, who oversaw the
initial troop deployment aimed strictly to protect humanitarian aid during the Bush
Administration, contends Somalia remained first for him at this time.
Powell describes the manner by which the situation escalated, and the lack of interest
shown by the administration in the security of American troops. As the raids by the Somali
warlords continued, Powell viewed the mission as “quicksand that the UN ‘nation-building’
mission had sucked us into.”23 In his autobiography, Powell also angrily describes Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin’s casual refusal to provide Major General Tom Montgomery, who led the
mission, “US helicopter gunships and AC-130 strike planes to attack Somali strongholds.”24
Powell hated the idea of allowing the entrance of US soldiers into ancient clan rivalries. Once
American troops were on the ground, Powell wrote, Aspin should have granted them what they
needed. Clinton agreed with Powell’s assessment, and Major General Montgomery’s request,
but failed to direct Aspin to fulfill the equipment demands of the mission’s commanders. Just
days prior to the October 3 battle, Powell told the president how he really felt about the
confusion of the mission. He advocated a quick departure. Clinton responded with an admission
that he had not paid much attention to the UN resolution to capture Aideed.25
It is not the aim of this analysis to place the blame for the deaths of American soldiers on
Clinton. However, he was quite stubborn in his views regarding the efficiency of the UN,
especially when placed in the unfamiliar position of deploying US forces. Clinton’s unwaivering
support of UN peacekeeping efforts, especially when they involved US troops, is somewhat
surprising, given his detachment from both the actions taken by the UN and the new mission it
forged. The president seemed to place too much trust in the capabilities of the international
organization, even when the lives of American soldiers were at stake. As noted by former UN
55

Ambassador under George W. Bush, John Bolton, “The Bush Administration [George
H.W.Bush] sent U.S. troops into Somalia strictly to clear the relief channels that could avert
mass starvation. It resisted U.N. attempts to expand that mission.”26 Essentially, the problem
was the almost stealth manner by which the initial Bush mission to protect humanitarian aid
deliveries transformed into one of peacekeeping, and then manhunting, with no explanation
offered by the president until it was too late. Limited intervention slowly evolved into “mission
creep,”27 where the presence and purpose of American forces changed, and the prospect of a
timely exit without serious incident evaporated.
According to a Washington Post article after the Battle of Mogadishu, “Clinton and his
aides viewed Somalia as a laboratory where their theories of a new kind of ‘peacemaking’
mission would be proved.”28 Several statements made by Clinton and his advisors support this
accusation. In July of 1993, when speaking to reporters, Clinton claimed that the goal of the UN
was to fulfill its humanitarian mission and “continue to work with the Somalis towards nationbuilding.”29 Just days after the October 3 tragedy, Clinton denied this statement in a report to
Congress. During a June 1993 press conference, the president upheld the UN’s purpose “to
undermine the capacity of Aideed to wreak military havoc in Mogadishu.”30 In the same
conference, he also refused the statement that US forces included getting rid of Aideed as one of
their primary objectives. The seemingly apathetic administration asserted as late as September
1993 that the humanitarian mission was a stunning success. Two weeks later, eighteen
Americans and hundreds of Somalis were killed.
After the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton conducted a policy review of what went
wrong, and introduced a plan to withdraw all US troops from Somalia within six months.31 This
decision did not come without an unintended, and disastrous legacy. It haunted the Clinton
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Administration. It served as a cautionary tale regarding what could likely occur when the
president sent US soldiers into areas of foreign crisis, even under the pretense of peacekeeping.
The losses in Somalia led to Clinton’s refusal to commit to any significant US aid during the
Rwandan Genocide in 1994, and increased his hesitancy to commit to substantial military
support in Bosnia. Another unforeseen consequence involved radical Islamic militants, who
were paying close attention to what they believed would be a long, drawn out fight between the
US military and a small group of Muslim renegades in Africa. When Clinton announced a sixmonth withdrawal date, it did not go unnoticed.
Here is where foreign policy, especially in an age of few conventional wars, gets tricky.
Only a small percentage of Americans understand the brutal realities of war. In the age of
counter-insurgency warfare, which essentially defines Vietnam as well, the public has little
patience for what it sees as elite US soldiers losing their lives to Third World criminals with no
justification. The images of American bodies being dragged through war-torn streets by a mob
of criminals, along with the widely-distributed hostage video of Blackhawk pilot Michael
Durant, confirmed public fears of utilizing military force with unclear objectives in unknown
places.32 They were unaware of the heroics involved in the fifteen-hour firefight that followed
the downing of US helicopters and the attack that ensued.
Ignorance as to what occurs on the ground during combat is why the Commander-inChief makes decisions regarding the use of force, sometimes against the wishes of the American
people. How many movie-goers wanted US troops to rush back in and exterminate the enemy
after watching Black Hawk Down? Does this question oversimplify the choice Clinton faced?
Perhaps. He had to decide whether to accept defeat, and abandon the ill-conceived operation, or
avenge the lives of those lost by “going in with ‘decisive force’ to defeat the Somali warlords.”33
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As presidential advisor George Stephanopoulas notes, Clinton worried he would take public heat
from the Democratic House and Senate if he decided to retaliate.34 To make matters worse,
media outlets such as USA Today published articles suggesting Clinton’s national security team
was not paying attention in Somalia. Behind closed doors, the president vented his anger
towards his foreign policy advisors, whom he felt made him look bad. Image-driven aides like
Stephanopoulas worried that his discontent was being leaked to the press, which did indeed make
the president look bad.35
While the administration worried over how to navigate the fall-out, the daunting question
of whether to retreat, or allow US commanders to outline a more concise mission to protect
humanitarian aid while simultaneously bringing the warlord Aideed and his cohorts to justice,
had long passed. After a long public explanation of what US forces were initially put there to do,
and to justify the continuance of the peacekeeping mission for another six months, with an
expressed prohibition against “vengeance,” Clinton left the military engaged in the fruitless
venture; only this time with a resolute call to reduce troops from 28,000 to 5,000.36
US military actions are not ignored by America’s enemies. Investigative journalist
Gerald Posner describes how Osama Bin Laden, while in Sudan, viewed the American-led relief
operation as proof of the constant need for the US to assert influence. Posner asserts that Bin
Laden “dispatched Muhammad Atef, the second-in-command of al Qaeda’s military unit, to
Somalia to meet with local militants.”37 Al Qaeda members in Africa instructed Somalis on how
to use mortars and trained them in explosives. Bin Laden did not initially take credit for what
occurred in Somalia; in fact, he would not admit his role for another four years. However, he
learned that a lack of public support and principles of leadership quickly leads to the removal of
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the legendary US soldier off the battlefield. He decided that Americans had no stomach for
casualties in war.38
Clinton, and many in the intelligence and defense communities themselves, knew little
about Osama Bin Laden at this time. It is unfair to use hindsight in order to condemn the
administration’s decision to pull out of this fight based on information it did not have. However,
precedent does exist with regards to US military endeavors, whether successes or failures, and
the messages they send to enemies lying patiently in wait, who often base their next move on
American action or inaction. Western media coverage of the Tet Offensive, for example,
inadvertently brought a nearly vanquished Viet Cong (VC) rival back from the brink of death,
who then exploited widening rifts within the American public to gain time to rebuild and
relaunch. The VC, along with their North Vietnamese Army (NVA) allies, utilized American
politicians’ lack of understanding as to military strategy. The enemy understood the American
public, the America media, and American leaders, and used this knowledge to its devastating
advantage.
During the Clinton administration, Bin Laden publicly called for Muslims worldwide to
drive American soldiers from their lands.39 Specifically with regards to Somalia, the terrorist said
in a 1998 interview with ABC News that at the time of the Battle of Mogadishu, he and his
followers were gearing up for a lengthy struggle in the Horn of Africa. Bin Laden gained
revolutionary status among Islamic extremists after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in
which he embraced reports of his supposed heroic actions as a participant in “a ragged army of
dedicated Muslims…[who overcame] a superpower.”40 Although his actual role is disputed,
mostly among those in the US-supported Afghani Northern Alliance, who alone fought the
Taliban until US forces entered Afghanistan in October of 2001, Bin Laden’s carefully
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constructed image spread throughout the Muslim world, and inspired extremists to join his
deadly cause.
Bin Laden confirmed that the Battle of Mogadishu showed him that the US would not act
as the USSR did in Afghanistan, when the Soviets fought against the Mujahedeen for almost a
decade. He stated, “the United States rushed out of Somalia in shame and disgrace.”41 Seeing
himself as the messenger to “bring the world to Islam”42 through acts of war against the world’s
foremost superpower, it only confirmed his arrogant delusions of self-worth when the US pulled
out of Africa without finishing its mission. Bin Laden would later taunt American viewers, “you
left the area [Somalia] carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you.”43
Somalia altered Clinton’s idealistic foreign policy objectives with regards to multilateral
peace operations and the UN. In response to the catastrophic events that occurred in Mogadishu,
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) on May 3, 1994.44 The policy put
forth strict requirements which must be adhered to upon considering international peacekeeping
operations. It includes a statement confirming that US participation in these missions “can never
substitute for the necessity of winning our own wars.”45 Although Clinton asserted that UN
support can often serve as a “force multiplier,” the US would use its vote as a member of the
Security Council to “take the lead in calling for them [multilateral peace operations], when
member states are prepared to support the effort with forces and funds.”46 The Clinton
Administration issued this national security policy directive at a time when the debate over the
use of force under a UN mandate in Bosnia raged. The PDD-25 policy also had a devastating
effect on Rwanda and UN immobility during the genocidal acts of 1994. In PDD-25, Clinton
advocated for a policy that directly conflicted with his internationalist aims of humanitarian
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intervention and the prevention of human rights abuses, and ironically, UN Ambassador Albright
was his chief salesperson for the new directive.
Clinton affirmed that the US alone would decide whether or not an operation’s “political
and military objectives are clear and feasible; and when UN involvement represents the best
means to advance U.S. security interests.”47 In this national security directive, the president
argued that although peace enforcement and UN cooperation will remain part of American
security and military strategy, these operations cannot substitute for “unilateral or coalition
action when that is what our national interest requires.”48 Clinton’s goal here was to advocate for
reform, and clarity, when it comes to UN operations. However, he also mandated a US
leadership role; when large scale operations were conducted, they would fall under US command
and operate in accordance with more competent regional organizations, such as NATO. These
written objectives break with his past ideas of internationalist cooperation and intervention.
Somalia taught Clinton a valuable lesson; one that his military advisors struggled to teach their
heretofore inflexible commander. Clinton’s visions of assertive multilateralism and dreams of a
UN Rapid Deployment Force were now less clear.
Even Albright began to dismiss the phrase “aggressive multilateralism,” which she
essentially created, and truly favored, particularly with regards to civilian crises or acts of
genocide. Less than two months prior to the Battle of Mogadishu, she wrote a New York Times
op-ed in favor of tracking down and punishing Aideed. She had a great stake in ensuring this
new policy of working through the UN could succeed. But even prior to the tragic events in
October, Somalia challenged this narrative. Up against heavy criticism over the logic of the
changing mission, she stressed “Failure to take action [against Aideed] would have signaled to
other clan leaders that the U.N. is not serious…For Somalia’s sake, and our own, we must
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persevere.”49 After the deaths of American soldiers, public cries against sacrificing US
sovereignty to the corrupt, incompetent power of the UN rang wide, especially from
Republicans.50 Albright and others within the administration could not proceed unimpeded in
their internationalist visions of multinational humanitarian missions and collective security. This
study’s findings on Rwanda only further illustrate the challenges facing proponents of this
policy. The legacy of Black Hawk Down completely encircled the administration when faced
with an even deadlier humanitarian crisis.
After Somalia, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake contended that the White House
was “misinformed” about the situation in Mogadishu and, therefore, did not press for a political
compromise.51 But as noted by Powell, even Clinton himself admitted he did not pay a
significant amount of attention to the UN change in policy, when peacekeeping morphed into a
combat mission. Also, any diplomacy expended towards creating a peace agreement between
factions, or supporting a central authority, would legitimize Aideed and other warlords
responsible for raiding food and medicine drops and attacking UN peacekeepers. This option
was not popular prior to October 3, 1993, and reached a level of impossibility after. With no real
opportunities for European-style diplomatic negotiations, the condition of the Somali people,
regardless of the six-month commitment of US forces, would remain dire. In the past few years,
the nation has experienced modest improvements in its economic and political institutions, but
still suffers from both internal and external conflict. It is currently a well-known haven for
Islamic terror groups intent on attacking the US at home and abroad, such as the violent and
ruthless Al-Shabaab.52
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Chapter 4. BOSNIA AND THE “EUROPEAN PROBLEM”
Few Americans hold a firm grasp of knowledge with regards to the collapse of
Yugoslavia and the eruption of violence that followed, which led to almost 300,000 deaths and
two million refugees between the years of 1991 and 1995.1 The Balkan region in Eastern Europe
existed under Soviet rule during the Cold War, though Yugoslavia was unique in one respect.
Under the dictatorial rule of Marshall Josip Bros Tito, who earned revolutionary status as the
head of a communist-led resistance movement against Nazi occupation in WWII, a socialistinspired nationalism served as a uniting force for the previously unstable state, mired in ethnic
and territorial conflict.
After World War II, Yugoslavia was essentially recreated under Tito’s leadership; he
often acted on his own accord to the frustration of many in Moscow. The basis for the postwar
government, known as the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia,
advocated for a federal state that would be “a voluntary union of separate peoples.”2 With this
notion of unity in mind, Tito advocated for a Marxist state consisting of six equal republics, each
with its own president and parliament to ensure fair representation. Tito also created two
autonomous regions within the Republic of Serbia. All states were to exist under his blanket
leadership, first as Prime Minister, then as President for Life. The six republics included:
Slovenia; Croatia; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Serbia; Montenegro; and Macedonia. The two
autonomous provinces within Serbia were Vojvodina in the north, and Kosovo in the south.
Gale Stokes, a specialist on Eastern Europe and the Balkan region, argues that Yugoslav
Communists often looked to the unquestioned authority of Tito to preserve the multinational
federation and suppress ethnic conflicts that existed among its Roman Catholic Croats, Bosnian
Muslims, and Orthodox Serbs.3 In his richly-researched work on the Eastern European
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revolutions of 1989, Stokes effectively explains the foundation upon which the civil wars of the
1990s raged. During WWII, Tito’s resistance movement, The Partisans, emerged victorious in a
Yugoslav civil war that occurred in concurrence with the fight against Nazi Germany. As Hitler
marched across Europe, Croatians initiated a violent killing spree against its ethnic rivals, and
forced the removal of “Serbs, Communists, Jews, Gypsies, Muslims, and others they defined as
non-Croatians” from their territory.4 Upon achieving power and legitimacy in 1945, Tito’s
Partisans murdered tens of thousands of Croats, while imprisoning many others.
The memories of these savage acts, in which no group could claim innocence, seethed
under the surface and would later erupt. According to Stokes:
Instead of permitting the Yugoslavs to face this unpleasant past, the Communists
simply condemned the horrors of the wartime experience as an extreme outburst
of bourgeois society and proclaimed that such things could not happen in the new
order. Any effort to confront the issues directly was forbidden…The wounds of
World War II were covered over, but they never healed.5
Although these tensions were contained, Tito’s death in 1980 served as a destabilizing event for
the region. His authoritarian rule, though repressive, kept his Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia united; he was loved by a majority of the Yugoslav people. He also commanded the
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which remained dedicated to a united Yugoslavia even after his
demise. To make matters worse, economic hardships plagued the country at the time of his
death.6 As a result, the 1980s passed under a dark cloud of political, social, and financial
instability. As the end of the decade approached, Yugoslavia’s historical scores began to seek a
settlement.
The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s began when three of its six republics—Slovenia,
Croatia, and Macedonia—declared independence in 1991. These acts of secession were mirrored
by Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia) in 1992.7 The situation in Macedonia remained mostly
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peaceful, with a dispute between the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians over the newlyindependent state’s name being the most notable development at the time. Therefore, it remains
a separate issue from the topic under consideration in this particular study.
Serbia, under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, along with the Republic of
Montenegro, strove to become the inheritors of the federal system, now in disarray, and formed
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).8 In 1990, Milošević officially came to power in
Serbia by stoking ethnic hatred towards Croatians and Muslims among ethnic, Orthodox Serbs.
He did so not only within his own republic, but also among the minority Serb populations in
neighboring states, particularly Croatia and Slovenia.9 Similarly, Croatia’s president, Franjo
Tudjman, utilized the memories of past atrocities and conflict to demonize the Serb minority
among Roman Catholic Croats. Although Tudjman’s hands were not clean with regards to the
persecution of Serbs within an independent Croatia, it is Milošević who embarked on the most
vicious crusade from the federal capital of Belgrade, located within his Serbian republic. With
the JNA and its Serb members throughout the former federation willing to align with him,
Milošević set out to recentralize Yugoslavia under a communist-inspired, yet nationalist
ideology, concentrated within Serbia. However, Milošević’s intent to destroy rival groups from
areas both inside and outside of his direct authority eventually caused many non-Serbian
members of the JNA to defect, and exposed his calls for a reunited Yugoslavia as a guise upon
which to create a Greater Serbia.
During the early years of the break-up, American intelligence agencies relayed their
findings of an impending fissure. A November 1990 New York Times article reported that “US
intelligence is predicting…that civil-war in the multi-national Balkan country is highly likely.”10
The article offered up an eighteen-month timeline before open hostilities would arise. However,
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with the situation in the Middle East and Soviet disintegration top of mind, the Bush
Administration did not view the crisis as one of urgent, vital interest to the US. Most Europeans
agreed.
When fighting broke out in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, countries such as Great Britain
and France remained apathetic. To many Western Europeans, this violence was nothing new. In
the words of British historian Tony Judt, the Balkans were viewed as “a hopeless case, a
cauldron of mysterious squabbles and ancient hatreds.”11 Judt contends, “What happened after
[the Eastern European revolutions of] 1989 was simple: the lid having been removed, the
cauldron exploded.”12 Although the West expected unrest, and even bloodshed, it was illprepared for the inhumane horrors that occurred. The only firm response in the early days of this
crisis, made by both the Bush Administration and its allies in the newly-declared European
Union (EU), described the Balkan Wars as a “European problem.”13
The wars began with an attack on Slovenia by the federal Yugoslav army in 1991, but
this attempt to halt the republic’s secession barely lasted two weeks, and its independence was
retained. A far more intense situation arose in Croatia soon after, with the JNA backing Serb
rebels, who were a minority in Tudjman’s republic. In January 1992, the UN directed a ceasefire
between the independent Croatian state and the federal army, largely managed by Milošević out
of Belgrade.14 Earlier in 1991, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the entire
region in an attempt to diminish the number of casualties should the fighting escalate. After also
applying sanctions, the UN deployed a multinational peacekeeping force. The troops, known as
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), were to oversee the ceasefire and monitor
the escalating situation in Bosnia.15 UNPROFOR, barred from using force even in self-defense,
would prove largely ineffective in the face of escalating violence among the Serbs, Croats, and
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Bosnian Muslims, as well as against Milošević’s nationalist aims. Many Bosnians mocked the
impotent UNPROFOR as “the UN Self-Protection Force (author’s emphasis).”16
The ethnic composition of Bosnia, which was the most diverse of the Yugoslav republics,
was approximately forty-three percent Muslim, thirty-five percent Serbian, and eighteen percent
Croatian.17 When Bosnia made its move for independence under its Muslim president, Alija
Izetbegović, the Bosnian Serbs strongly rejected it. But they were still in the minority, despite
their significant numbers. With Serbia now virtually leading what was left of the Yugoslav
Federation, the Serbs in Bosnia wanted to remain part of a larger, Serb-dominated nation rather
than become a powerless minority in a smaller republic led by their ancient rivals. Conversely,
Bosnian Muslims and Croats rejected the idea of their own marginalization by remaining part of
a now Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation. With Milošević’s blessing and backing, and
supported by the JNA, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces began what would come to be called
“ethnic cleansing”18 of Muslims and Croatians who shared their homeland. For many critics of
US ambivalence on Bosnia, the term “ethnic cleansing” is seen as a less offensive, less urgent
description of what occurred, which was outright genocide.
With only the UNPROFOR standing in the way, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its capital city
of Sarajevo, became the site of the most savage atrocities committed against civilians since
WWII. Upon the passing of the secession referendum put forth by Bosnian President
Izetbegović in the spring of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs launched a campaign of murder, rape,
torture, imprisonment, and expulsion under the orders of politician Radovan Karadžić, but with
the guiding hand of Milošević.19 In response to Bosnia’s move towards independence from the
Yugoslav Federation, Karadžić led a political movement among Bosnian Serbs to formerly
detach from the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina government and establish its own entity within
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Bosnia, known as Republika Srpska (Serb Republic). The Bosnian Serbs saw Sarajevo as their
stated capital, and under Karadžić’s leadership, opted to remain part of the Yugoslav Federation
of Serbia and Montenegro. The JNA covertly enlisted Serb paramilitary forces to combat what
Milošević and his followers viewed as an attempt by Bosnian Muslims, as well as Bosnian
Croats, to decrease Serbian influence within a new nation comprised of heavily populated Serb
territories.20
Violence broke out in April of 1992, when Serb snipers fired into a crowd of anti-war
demonstrators in support of an independent, multi-national Bosnia. From the top of a Holiday
Inn, the gunmen shot at thousands of peaceful attendees, without concern for who they maimed
or killed. Soon after, the Serb paramilitary forces “pounded the city” of Sarajevo with heavy
artillery.21 These militia members, who would form the Bosnian Serb Army, expected to take
Sarajevo within days, and Bosnia proper within months. The JNA was not officially responsible
for the attacks, but only according to Milošević. Those JNA members who did exit the region
left their weapons and artillery behind for the Bosnian Serb militia. This move, directed by
Milošević, aimed to prevent international claims of a centralized Serbian directive with
pronounced JNA intervention.22 However, former Yugoslav Army officers took control of those
Serbs willing to fight in Bosnia. Most of them were Serb army officers within the JNA who
Milošević ordered to “return and organize.”23 In a move that would have disastrous
consequences, former JNA Lieutenant Colonel Ratko Mladić placed himself in charge of the
Bosnian Serb forces to oversee the brutal attacks.24
Mladić did his job with devastating precision. To ensure the complete removal of
Muslims in particular, the Serbs forced Muslim men to rape their own daughters, mothers to
watch their children’s throats being slit, and erected concentration camps reminiscent of the
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Holocaust as a means to imprison their rivals prior to their inevitable executions.25 The Serbs
aimed to ensure the Bosnian Muslims who did survive would never want to return to their former
homes. Many of these relayed incidences were based on stories told by those who escaped the
rampage, or aid and human rights workers on the ground. It was not until journalists were able
to document some of the atrocities with visual confirmation, specifically mass graves and images
of the detention camps, that international pressure for action built.26 Towards the end of the 1992
election, the issue gained some ground in the US, and in retrospect, registers as a negative in the
waning days of the Bush Administration. From 1992 through 1995, the war in Bosnia loomed,
with evidence of genocidal actions frequently reaching the highest levels of the US government.
From the moment of his inauguration, President Bill Clinton and his administration’s “day-today crisis management approach”27 to the publicized atrocities displayed an absence of
willpower, even when they finally devised a credible strategy.
The UN arms embargo had the greatest impact on Bosnian Muslims. The JNA had its
own arsenal prior to the ban on the sale of weapons to the region, and the Bosnian Serb Army
were the recipients of this advantage. Milošević presented any violence committed by the
Bosnian Serbs as the actions of an autonomous entity, and attempted to detach them from any
associations with his Serbian republic or the JNA.28 However, he later admitted that his public
pronouncements to the international community on the supposed independence of the Bosnian
Serb Army was a ruse to “reduce the severity of the sanctions”29 put in place by the UN against
the Yugoslav Federation and Serbia. From his Belgrade capital, illegal arms were sent via trucks
and unauthorized flights between Serbia and Bosnia.30
Those targeted by the Serb attacks had little with regards to any significant means of
protection or possible countermeasures. Although the Croatians benefitted somewhat from arms
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illegally purchased by neighboring countries, such as Hungary, the well dried up, and they, too,
were at a significant disadvantage. For this reason, during the 1992 campaign, Clinton argued in
favor of lifting the ban in order to level the playing field and put a halt to the slaughter.31
In his attempt to alter voters’ opinions, Clinton “took on a somewhat more aggressive
tack than President Bush”32 with regards to Bosnia. During the 1992 campaign, Americans were
bombarded with televised and printed images of the horrors committed by the Bosnian Serb
Army, particularly its consistent shelling of heavily populated areas in Sarajevo. As noted, the
Bush Administration viewed the issue as a “European problem,” and tried to settle the dispute
diplomatically. Candidate Clinton rebuked the president’s approach as lacking any action, and
encouraged the US to “consider using military force to open Serbian detention camps
and…lifting the arms embargo.”33 However, once president, Clinton ignored his own advice,
even as the number of deaths reached 100,000. He thus reneged on the only foreign policy
criticism of the Bush Administration that held real weight.
Clinton understood upon his taking the oath of office that Serb forces used mortars to
shell innocent civilians in cities, raped women and young girls, executed entire families, and
destroyed homes.34 Secretary of State Warren Christopher issued a statement listing the many
atrocities committed by the Serbs as early as February of 1993, but his solutions were quite
weak, and did not echo those put forth by his boss prior to the November 3rd election.
Christopher tepidly swore to “bring the full weight of American diplomacy to bear on finding a
peaceful solution.”35 He gave no ultimatum, and offered no threat of using military force. For a
group responsible for “mass murders, systematic beatings…prolonged shellings of innocents in
Sarajevo…forced displacements of entire villages, [and] inhuman treatment of prisoners in
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detention camps,”36 Christopher’s words relayed the stalemate occurring both within the
administration and among its allies.
At this time, the death toll continued to rise. It was open season. By 1993, Bosnian Serb
forces held the capital city of Sarajevo and its Bosnian-Muslim government under siege.
According to Samantha Power, who most recently served as President Obama’s UN
Ambassador, “Saving Bosnian lives was not deemed worth risking U.S. soldiers or challenging
America’s European allies who wanted to remain neutral.”37 At the very moment Clinton gained
the most powerful position in the world, he diluted this power by miring himself in international
intransigence, internal indecision, and a subservience to polling.
One of the primary reasons for the absence of US leadership in Bosnia came from
debates within the administration. Colin Powell, who held onto his Bush-appointed position as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for nine months into Clinton’s first term, and thus served as the
president’s paramount military advisor, expressed concern over US intervention. His distrust of
assuming a “limited” role, particularly one engaged in civil warfare, was shaped by his
experiences in Vietnam. As noted by Power in her book on America’s history with regards to
genocide, “The one-word bogey ‘Vietnam’ became the ubiquitous shorthand for all that could go
wrong in the Balkans if the United States became militarily engaged.”38 This association
certainly remained top of mind for the highly-decorated Vietnam Veteran. When speaking to a
New York Times reporter in 1992, while still working with the Bush Administration, Powell
stated, “As soon as they tell me it’s limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a
result or not. As soon as they tell me ‘surgical,’ I head for the bunker.”39 Powell’s criticism of
confining US military strength to ineffective, constrained air strikes and an ill-defined presence
is understandable. Neither Bush, nor Clinton, would present a clear objective.
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Powell set the stage for the dissent that would occur among Clinton’s national security
advisors. Representing the men and women who would be asked to enter into harm’s way,
Powell echoed some European sentiments regarding the ancient ethnic rivalries at the root of the
violence. But he also vowed to repeat the overwhelming military effort he put forth in Desert
Storm should the president firmly decide to go in; again, only with a well-defined strategy in
place. In the absence of this directive, and instead presented with civilian suggestions for “a
little surgical bombing or a limited attack,” Powell noted how history betrays those who present
an approach of increased escalation once the “desired result [of limited intervention] isn’t
obtained.”40 Again, Powell referred to Vietnam.
Powell’s voice on this matter angered those who supported the US taking on a more
active role. The most notable confrontation arose between Powell and UN Ambassador
Madeleine Albright. Albright contends that Powell was intractable when it came to a bombing
campaign or the possible interjection of ground troops. She describes how the much-admired
general consistently asserted that he viewed the proposal of intervention as an open-ended
commitment. Therefore, he would not even consider entering the region without a decisive
force, including thousands of troops. Albright notes his answer to her many suggestions as a
repetitive “No can do.”41 Albright exploded: “What are you saving this superb military for,
Colin, if we can’t use it?”42 Powell similarly describes this altercation with Albright, and notes
his reaction to her sarcastic question as one of infuriation. He felt as though the UN Ambassador
and others who supported her position viewed America’s military force as “toy soldiers to be
moved around on some sort of global game board.”43 His lack of enthusiasm for what was being
proposed on Bosnia, specifically, angered him because no diplomatic objectives existed to
warrant a sufficient military commitment.
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Powell could not, and would not, present a battle plan without clarity in stated political
goals to accompany whatever military presence the US agreed upon. In this respect, National
Security Advisor Tony Lake backed up Powell. As noted, Vietnam Syndrome often came in
direct conflict with Munich Syndrome. Lake told Albright, “the kinds of questions Colin is
asking…are exactly the ones the military never asked during Vietnam.”44 In the experienced
mind of Powell, a civilian, Washington-directed “war” with limited engagement and a confused
political strategy could not proceed without the voicing of his stern objections. When Clinton
asked Powell soon after his inauguration what could be done through airpower, the president
made sure to stress the caveat of “something not too punitive.”45 The general rightly interpreted
the president’s naïve question as “let’s not hurt anybody.”46 He gave Clinton the same answer he
would repeat endlessly until he retired at the end of September in 1993. Powell’s replacement as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, slightly improved on the
relationship between the military and Clinton. However, upon his succession, Shalikashvili
remarked “What took place at that moment (Bosnia) was what I would call a holiday from
leadership.”47 The Clinton Administration’s unwillingness to lead their hesitant European allies
towards a proper, effective solution surprised the new chairman. To him, the traditional role
played by the US did not exist during this crisis.
Lake himself offered no real alternative either. Although most of his time as Clinton’s
National Security Advisor was spent on Bosnia, Lake’s position seemingly involved holding
endless meetings where high-level officials within the administration would vent or pontificate
on the matter, then leave with no significant progress having been made. Lake favored
intervention, but given his status as a civilian, he refrained from pushing his viewpoint. In these
meetings, he often opted for humanitarian aid and diplomacy. One high-level official
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complained, “It wasn’t policy-making. It was group therapy—an existential debate over what is
the role of America.”48
According to Strobe Talbott, an old friend of Clinton’s from his Rhodes Scholar days and
another critic of the Vietnam War who served in the administration, the president was frustrated
by what he deemed “incoherent” strategies from his foreign policy team.49 Secretary of State
Christopher worried about Bosnia weighing down Clinton’s domestic achievements with a
human rights disaster overseas. The president’s domestic agenda was so broad, and demanded
so much time and effort, he had little insight into what was required to confront the escalating
situation in Europe. In response to the televised images of the siege of Sarajevo, Clinton angrily
told Talbott: “Some people are saying don’t just stand there, do something, but others are saying
don’t do something, just stand there.”50
Christopher was not known to be a stern, forceful diplomat, nor was he considered a man
of action. In May of 1993, when he embarked on a task to convince European allies to endorse a
“lift and strike” proposal put forth by Clinton, which consisted of finally lifting the arms
embargo and initiating NATO air strikes against the Serbs, Christopher could not sell it.51 A
NATO official present during a meeting between Christopher and the NATO secretary-general
Manfred Woerner noted the Secretary of State’s “singular lack of enthusiasm” for lift and
strike.52 When he returned, Christopher described the meeting as a “healthy exchange of ideas”53
between his European counterparts and himself. Also in tow was the allies’ outright dismissal of
the president’s proposed course of action. A little over a year later, Tony Lake traveled to
Europe to present an enhanced version of this plan himself, but with determination and the
promise of a US troop presence behind it. This time it sold, but only after tens of thousands
more innocent Bosnian civilians lost their lives.
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In his assessment of the war in the Persian Gulf, Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les
Aspin, along with ranking Republican Member of the House Armed Services Committee,
Representative William Dickinson, published one important finding, which is applicable to any
discussion of the use of military force in a particular arena. They found, based on the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which in essence
assured that all services of the military were fighting the same war, “There was a single chain of
command with a clear-cut distinction between military and civilian roles with the theater
commander in chief in unmistakable control over combat forces.”54 Aspin, who was surely no
hawk, notes that “The decisive factor in the war with Iraq [Operation Desert Storm/ Shield] was
the air campaign, but ground forces were necessary to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.”55 During his
tenure, Aspin advocated for committing US-led NATO forces in Bosnia under similar
conditions, though on a smaller scale.56 However, he remained Secretary of Defense under
Clinton for less than a year. Aspin resigned due to his inadequate response to equipment
requests from his commanders in Somalia and the tragedy that followed. But the point made in
his Gulf War assessment compliments Powell’s mindset. Even though the confrontation in
Bosnia was a bit more complex, and unconventional, it nevertheless required more than just
sporadic NATO airstrikes. It would take Clinton until 1995 to learn this lesson.
In February 1994, Bosnian Serbs utilized heavy artillery to shell a Sarajevo marketplace,
which killed sixty-eight innocent shopkeepers and patrons, and severely wounded hundreds
more.57 The Clinton Administration forcefully condemned the aggressors, with tough talk about
the resolve of NATO. In April, after a brief respite in the shelling of the Bosnian capital, the
NATO allies punished the Serbs “with ‘pinprick’ air strikes—usually a single strike against aged
Serb military hardware delivered with plenty of warning.”58 Due to the typical Serb response to
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any NATO activity, which often involved raising the frequency and gruesomeness of attacks
towards Muslim civilians, and even taking UN peacekeepers as hostages, the US and NATO
members always capitulated. Karadžić, the political leader of the Republika Srpska, even went
so far as to brazenly announce to international decision-makers his directions to shoot down
NATO planes and capture UNPROFOR troops if strikes persisted.59 It was this consistent
Serbian response to limited and often inconsequential airstrikes that prevented any increase in
military intervention. Ironically, it was out of concern for the lives of UN peacekeepers on the
ground that hundreds of thousands of Bosnians lost their own. The peacekeeping force either
needed to be protected by ground troops, or removed from their mission to pave the way for
actual military intervention.
One example of Clinton’s ineptitude on the Bosnia issue comes from his attempt to
persuade French President Jacques Chirac to present an argument to the US president’s own
Congress against lifting the ban; a ban he himself opposed while a candidate in 1992. Clinton
also wanted Chirac’s help with the legislature to raise funds for the increased protection of the
rather ineffective UN peacekeeping troops in Bosnia. After keeping the French leader occupied
for almost two hours in a meeting with Republican Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and House
Speaker Newt Gingrich, who each favored lifting the ban and arming the Bosnian Muslims,
Chirac sarcastically announced “the position of leader of the free world was ‘vacant’.”60
After a short ceasefire in the first few months of 1995, the situation reached the point of
no return in the late spring months and into the summer. The president had to act, though it
would take him months to implement a policy that would yield any ramifications for the primary
Bosnian aggressors and deliver a ceasefire. Some in his administration even excused the delay
as a response to reports of equivalence between Muslims, Croats, and Serbs with regards to the
80

atrocities committed. The CIA fought back against this false assessment of Serb cruelty with
intelligence reports that confirmed approximately ninety percent of the genocidal actions were
committed by the Bosnian Serb Army and Serb militias. In a statement by CIA Deputy Director
John Gannon, reports of “rape, torture, and murder”61 in UN-designated “safe areas,”62 such as
Srebrenica,63 a small village near the eastern border with Serbia, further warranted the need for
American power. Gannon notes:
The Bosnian Serb assaults have displaced tens of thousands of Muslims [from the
supposed UN-protected “safe areas”], led to the detention of perhaps several
thousand more, and resulted in the apparent purposeful deaths of at least several
hundred—a number that could increase to thousands as we learn more.64
The report also confirms the mysterious absence of almost 6,000 Muslim refugees from
Srebrenica, mostly men and boys, most of whom were assumed dead. This number would rise to
approximately 8,000 murdered Muslim males as more evidence poured in. These UN-designated
safe areas, set up in 1993 by the Security Council and protected by UNPROFOR, were
considered by the international community as off limits with regards to Serbian aggression.65
The Serbs, apparently, finally crossed the line.
Political calculations also played a role in Clinton’s decision to finally intervene with
actions he championed while a candidate. Much of the White House staff were obsessed with
political fallout, such as George Stephanopoulas, David Gergen, and Dick Morris. Morris, the
president’s primary pollster and political advisor, opposed Clinton taking any action in Bosnia,
advising “You don’t want to be a Lyndon Johnson…sacrificing your potential for doing good on
the domestic front by a destructive, never-ending foreign involvement.”66 In 1994, Morris’s
polling solidified Clinton’s worries regarding public support for military intervention. About
forty percent of Americans reflected an isolationist mindset, with just thirty-seven percent
supporting the idea of the US acting as a peacemaker to resolve disputes.67 But as the bloodshed
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continued, particularly in UN safe zones like Srebrenica, public opinion made a slight shift in
favor of US military action.
To add to Clinton’s political concerns, Republican Senator Bob Dole of Kansas became
an outspoken proponent of using force to stop the carnage. After Secretary of State
Christopher’s fruitless trip to Europe in an attempt to sell the president’s “lift-and-strike” policy,
Dole noted that Clinton “finally came up with a ‘realistic’ Bosnia policy,” but then abandoned it
“when [European] consensus did not magically appear on his doorstep.”68 Dole fought tirelessly
to convince Congress to force the president’s hand. As Senate Majority Leader in the summer of
1995, he sold the Senate on a bill ending American support for the arms embargo, while giving a
timeline for the UN to remove its peacekeeping forces out of harm’s way. Since the Bosnian
Serbs often took UNPROFOR troops hostage in response to air strikes, this action would clear
the way for NATO attacks as well.
In a bipartisan measure, both the House and Senate voted to revoke the ban on arms sales
to Bosnia in an attempt to aid the Muslims under attack. In August of 1995, President Clinton
vetoed Dole’s successful legislation to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. As noted, Clinton’s
reluctance arose from the presence of UN peacekeepers, and the Serbian willingness to take them
as hostages or even harm them physically in retaliation for NATO military intervention. But
given the attack on UN-designated safe areas and peacekeepers in the summer of 1995, the UN
mission was already heading towards total failure. Clinton believed differently. He promised to
lift the embargo “in the event the United Nations mission failed and withdrew.”69 Apparently,
Clinton set a low bar for success. He also warned that “unilaterally ending the United States role
in the embargo would damage mutual security agreements with allies.”70 Since the argument
against the embargo, and significant NATO air strikes, was built upon the danger it would
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present to peacekeepers on the ground—mostly Canadian, French, British, Spanish, and Dutch
forces—Cinton held out.
Here is where undaunted, principled American leadership in world affairs must come in
to play. Particularly at this time, Clinton should have been the one forming the agreements and
setting the tone for multilateral participation. He should have sold lift-and-strike to his European
allies in 1993. In 1995, when he ran out of new ways to stall, Clinton actually did persuade
European leaders to follow a similar plan, and gave it credibility with the addition of US forces.71
As noted, he sent Tony Lake to do the job Secretary of State Christopher could not, or would not,
do. But prior to the atrocities of 1995, Clinton punted. Instead of leading, he followed.
However, once Senator Dole positioned himself as Clinton’s probable Republican opponent for
the 1996 election, the president’s stance began to change. The change could not come soon
enough.
On August 25, 1995, the Serbs launched another mortar attack on a Sarajevo
marketplace, killing dozens of civilians.72 In response, NATO launched Operation Deliberate
Force, which was a concerted air campaign attacking Serbian military positions. Prior to this
point, NATO intervention consisted of three years of satellite monitoring, securing a no-fly zone
over Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight), and limited air strikes aimed at military targets, such as
Serb ammunition depots.73 By the summer of 1995, the Serbs became especially adept at
responding to the air attacks by threatening UN peacekeepers. In May, Mladić took 350
UNPROFOR troops hostage and held them as human shields in order to put a halt to any
additional bombing of his artillery positions from which he launched mortar attacks and held
Sarajevo, along with its airport, under siege.74 Out of frustration for this repeated, dangerous
game played by the Bosnian Serbs, Clinton finally pressured the UN to authorize NATO to
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conduct a twelve-day air campaign accompanied by NATO ground forces. These punitive
actions severely weakened the Serbs, who were at this point also fighting against a united
coalition of Croatians and Muslims.75
On August 30th, “more than sixty aircraft, flying from bases in Italy and the aircraft
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the Adriatic, pounded Bosnian Serb positions around
Sarajevo…[with] French and British artillery joined in.”76 As the mission’s chief hawk,
Madeleine Albright notes how the “psychological balance” of the conflict changed almost
overnight.77 The Bosnian Serbs could no longer act without severe consequences. Operation
Deliberate Force softened the earth for a ceasefire agreement.
The man charged with the diplomatic challenge of bringing a close to the brutal war that
left almost 300,000 dead was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard
Holbrooke. Holbrooke held a unique stake in the matter. He visited Sarajevo for the first time as
a nineteen-year-old in 1960, and in 1992, returned for the first time in over thirty years during
the early stages of “ethnic cleansing” brought about by Bosnian Serbs. During this second trip,
Holbrooke witnessed the city he once saw as a “cosmopolitan combination of Muslim, Catholic,
and Eastern Orthodox cultures,” even while under Soviet rule, condemned as a “desperate
hellhole, under heavy mortar, artillery, and sniper attacks.”78 In the summer of 1995, when he
was tapped to head negotiations towards a ceasefire between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croatians
at war in Bosnia, he understood his task as a pragmatic yet imperfect one,79 with the
multicultural existence of the past eviscerated by unimaginable evils.
Holbrooke’s determination to bring an end to the violence increased dramatically when
three of his American colleagues were killed during a diplomatic visit in August. As part of a
US delegation sent to promote a peace initiative, the three diplomats, along with a French
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soldier, perished when their armored personnel carrier fell 400 yards off of a dangerous road into
a ravine.80 Holbrooke briefly returned to the US to escort the bodies of his friends home, and
then quickly resumed his work in their honor.
Since the earliest days of the war, Holbrooke argued against the decision to turn the issue
over to Europe and the UN instead of NATO.81 With NATO finally making progress in the
region, and Serb losses on the ground, he felt he could achieve a settlement on an issue that
consumed his attention for three years. Yet, given the level of atrocities committed during the
war, it was highly unlikely he would reach a ceasefire if demands for justice and territory made
against the Serbs were met.82 He feared a Serb reprisal, because they remained indignant when
presented with the atrocities they committed.
After several meetings with representatives from the three ethnic groups within Bosnia,
Holbrooke held a diplomatic conference in Dayton, Ohio, a neutral site in the US. The
conference included Alija Izetbegović, the president of the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman; and Milošević, who represented Karadžić’s Republika
Srpska. The November meetings produced a peace agreement officially signed by all parties in
Paris in December 1995, which Clinton and his European allies welcomed. However, the Dayton
Accords, as they came to be called, served as a tenuous ceasefire which essentially partitioned
Bosnia, and transformed the man considered most responsible for the genocidal actions of the
Bosnian Serb Army into a credible statesman.83 According to journalist Richard Sale, the Clinton
Administration considered it vital that Milošević remain in power. Clinton felt he needed some
central Serb authority figure with whom to deal. The president would come to regret this
decision when Milošević once again struck out against the Albanians in Kosovo during his
second term.84
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The most notable consequence of the Dayton Accords was the creation of two selfgoverning entities within Bosnia: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation.
The Serbs received forty-one percent of Bosnian land, with the Croat-Muslim Federation
receiving a fifty-one percent majority.85 Each republic retained its own president, parliament, and
army. The agreement also created a US-led NATO operation to preserve the ceasefire. As noted
by Holbrooke, the broker of the peace settlement, “belatedly and reluctantly, the United States
came to intervene and…brought the war in Bosnia to an end.”86 Also, the UN lifted the sanctions
put upon the Yugoslav Federation (Serbia and Montenegro) when it followed through with
elections one year after the agreement was signed.87
In a speech on the Dayton Accords, given in November of 1995, Clinton announced the
commitment of 20,000 US troops to preserve the shaky ceasefire agreement between the
Muslims, Croatians, and Serbs of Bosnia.88 The settlement initially arranged in Dayton, and
negotiated by Holbrooke, consisted of a commitment to peace and to the preserved unity of
Bosnia as a single state. Included in the Dayton Accords was a mandate to prosecute war
criminals, which exposes its hollowness, as one of the signatories was Milošević himself.
The words spoken by Clinton undoubtedly brought little comfort to victims of Serb atrocities, or
the surviving family members of those slaughtered. He stated:
Implementing the agreement in Bosnia can end the terrible suffering of the
people, the warfare, the mass executions, the ethnic cleansing, the campaigns of
rape and terror. Let us never forget a quarter of a million men, women, and
children have been shelled, shot, and tortured to death. Two million
people…were forced from their homes and into a miserable life as refugees. And
these faceless numbers hide millions of real personal tragedies. For each of the
war’s victims was a mother or daughter, a father or son, a brother or sister. Now
the war is over. American leadership created the chance to build a peace and stop
the suffering.89
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The president was exactly right. American leadership did bring about peace. It did put a halt to
the killing, to the rape, and to the systematic violence. And American soldiers would, at least
temporarily, protect that peace…now that the slaughter was over. Clinton’s second Secretary of
Defense, William Perry, openly criticized the president on his hesitant commitment to the pursuit
of peace in Bosnia. In his statement in favor of calling on NATO early on, Perry argued, “we
should have been prepared to use or to threaten to use military force from the beginning.”90
Under the terms of the Dayton Accords, NATO deployed an Implementation Force
(IFOR) comprised of approximately 60,000 troops from member as well as non-member
nations.91 As stated by Clinton, the US contributed 20,000 American soldiers. US Admiral
Leighton Smith, who served as head of the US Naval Forces in Europe as well as commander of
the Allied Forces in Southern Europe, led the NATO occupation force. The goal of IFOR was to
preserve the ceasefire outlined at Dayton, and monitor the armies and weapons of all parties
within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR also oversaw the safe transfer of
territory and return of refugees. After one year, in 1996, a NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR)
replaced IFOR, and the troop size was reduced.92 Under Admiral Smith, NATO expanded its role
to included providing security for elections and assisting in the apprehension of war criminals.
However, Smith took heavy criticism for the hands-off manner in which both the IFOR and
SFOR troops engaged in peacekeeping, which many felt allowed too much freedom and
opportunity for mischief by the Serbs.93
Holbrooke himself chastised one aspect of the Dayton Accords, which he determined to
be “insufficiently aggressive.”94 The deficiency, according to the diplomat, was the failure to
capture Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb political leader, or Ratko Mladić, who orchestrated
the massacre in Srebrenica, both of whom the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide. Karadžić was finally
imprisoned and charged in 2008. He was convicted in 2016 of committing war crimes and
genocide. He is currently serving a forty-year sentence.95 Mladić, too, evaded justice for almost
sixteen years after the war. Arrested in 2011, the man known as the “Butcher of Bosnia”96 began
his trial in 2012, primarily for the incomprehensible actions he took during the 1995 massacres in
Srebrenica.97 Milošević himself, who was essentially given immunity by the Dayton Accords,
would not be arrested until 2001, after his second attempt at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo failed.
The international community finally had enough when, as president of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Milošević forced the removal of almost 800,000 Albanians from the autonomous
province of Kosovo, and killed thousands more, including women and children.98 Unlike Bosnia,
Clinton met Milošević’s actions in a more timely manner, perhaps due to the lessons the
president learned during his first term. The UN finally brought Milošević up on charges of war
crimes leading back to the conflict with Croatia and his role in the Bosnian slaughter. In 2006,
he died of a heart attack while imprisoned at The Hague awaiting trial.99
One of the primary reasons for the improvements in this Eastern European region was the
prolonged presence of US and NATO forces. After Clinton removed the time limit for the
departure of US troops,100 the American role in Bosnia would not end until December 2, 2004.
For nine years, the NATO-led SFOR, consisting of over 500,000 members from 43 nations,
including 90,000 Americans, delivered stability to the former Yugoslavia.101 This contingency
brought back economic and political ties to Bosnia, and prevented the existence of “a Korea-like
demilitarized zone between the Serbs and Muslims,”102 which many of Holbrooke’s critics
feared. Today, only a small force of Americans remain in Sarajevo at the Bosnian capital’s USled NATO headquarters.
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Some analysts refer to Clinton’s actions in 1995 as proof of his capability as a leader on
foreign policy. To his credit, he did announce the deployment of American troops and sent them
into harm’s way on the eve of an election year, which could have cost him his re-election bid had
the intervention gone sour. However, according to Morton Abramowitz, a former State
Department official and President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace during the
Clinton years, “It’s wrong to say something is a success when there was massive ‘ethnic
cleansing’ and two million people displaced.”103 Abramowitz contends that the intervention of
NATO and the ensuing Dayton Accords merely “suspended the war for the election; it didn’t
create a peace.”104 It is unclear just how much of a role the 1996 election drove Clinton’s sudden
jump to action, but it is not out of line to suggest politics played a decisive role.
Abramowitz’s harsh criticism over the possible politics of Clinton’s move on Bosnia does
not stand alone. But more objective assessments of the president’s actions, or rather, his
reluctance to act in this particular case, emphasize his initial abandonment of a well-structured
policy idea in “lift and strike” due to European and UN entrenchment. The US president must
persuade. He or she must lead, especially in world affairs. This reality also rings true when it
comes to internal infighting within a presidential administration. Advisors are present to advise.
The president makes the ultimate decision. Inexperience is one reason Clinton took as long as he
did to understand the situation, challenge the UN and European allies, and make the right call.
His focus on other issues, mostly domestic in nature, and his inattention to the continuing crisis
in Bosnia is another. The specter of Vietnam and Somalia also figured into his thinking.
Clinton’s worries about damning US forces to an open-ended commitment in a country mired in
civil war undoubtedly affected his judgement. However, the president would not make the same
mistake when tensions once again flared in Kosovo in 1999. To the historian, it appears as
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though Clinton became more pragmatic and confident, and learned a valuable lesson from his
delayed reaction to human tragedy. Through his immediate deployment of NATO to once again
stop Milošević, one can deduce that he finally understood how American capabilities to right the
ship can be efficiently unleashed. But the narrative of the president’s supposed evolution in
foreign affairs becomes complicated when examining other national security issues that arose
during his tenure. Clinton’s absence of resolve with regards to direct attacks on US interests, and
his indifference to the rising tide of terror, tops this list.
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Chapter 5. RWANDA: A GENOCIDE IGNORED
During a visit to the Central African nation of Rwanda in 1998, President Bill Clinton
addressed Rwandese government officials and survivors of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide with a
somber admission: “We did not act quickly enough after the killing began.”1 In what is now
regarded as one of the most chilling human rights disasters in modern history, the world and its
foremost superpower refused to answer the door when decimation knocked. In a span of three
months, almost one million Rwandans lost their lives in a premeditated, gruesome act of
genocide which stunned the global community.2 Nations with the greatest capacity to intervene,
most notably the US, claimed ignorance as the reason for the vacancy of any attempts to impede
the mass murder engulfing Rwanda either before or after its springtime start.3 But evidence of
American knowledge and capability betrays this excuse, and illustrates what can occur without
resolute US leadership on the international stage.
To understand what occurred during approximately one hundred bloodstained days in
1994, one must first grasp the underlying divisions separating those who committed the
barbarous acts from those on the receiving end. Rwanda is located within Central Africa,
bordered on the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Uganda to the
north, Tanzania to the east, and Burundi to the south. It is primarily comprised of two ethnic
groups: the Hutu, who form the overwhelming majority, and the Tutsi, who before the genocide,
accounted for about seventeen percent of the population.4 Prior to the colonial era, when
European nations participated in the late nineteenth-century “Scramble for Africa,”5 and imperial
ambitions overcame the sovereignty of many African nations and territories, the Hutu and Tutsi
lived within a Tutsi-ruled kingdom. The majority Hutu were agricultural, and worked the land,
while the Tutsi were nomadic cow herders. The Tutsi eventually settled into the Hutu-populated
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region of Rwanda, given its proximity to the Central African Great Lakes region, and adopted
Hutu language and customs.6
The foundation of differences between the two groups relies heavily on economic factors
rather than any variations in ethnicity or culture. The Tutsi, who represented a minority of the
population, raised cattle, which granted them a higher status in comparison to the Hutu, who
were overwhelmingly farmers.7 As journalist Ryszard Kapuszinski explains, “The more cattle
one had, the richer one was; the richer one was, the more power one had. The [Tutsi] king owned
the most cattle, and his herds were under special protection.”8 For this reason, the Tutsi held onto
a prominent position of wealth and privilege, regardless of their significantly smaller numbers.
In a sense, the relationship between the Hutu and the Tutsi was reminiscent of Middle Ages
feudalism, even though daily interaction and even intermarriage was commonplace. The Tutsi
landowners allowed the Hutu to work the land in exchange for security and food, thus placing
the Tutsi into a position of superiority.9
The elevated stature of the Tutsi continued once Rwanda and its southern neighbor,
Burundi, fell under Belgian control in 1916. Belgium gained the territory, which it held as a
combined state, from Germany after its defeat in World War I. Like Somalia, Ruanda-Burundi,
as it was known, would later become a UN trust territory under continued Belgian authority.10
Hutu resentment of Tutsi wealth and political power stewed as the Belgians treated the Tutsi
with advantages denied to the lesser Hutu. With a move that only worsened relations, the
European colonizers demanded their subjects carry identification cards meant to distinguish the
two groups, which labeled their carriers as either Tutsi or Hutu.11 While under colonial rule, the
identification cards served the Tutsi quite well, but antagonized the Hutu. As a result, during the
transition period leading up to the end of Belgium rule, when both Rwanda and Burundi would
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gain independence as two separate nations, the Hutu not only sought to assume greater influence
within the new Rwandan state; they sought revenge.
Beginning in 1959, the Hutu initiated a brutal overthrow of Tutsi dominance, and gained
control of the now sovereign nation of Rwanda. Many Tutsis fled to surrounding states, like
Uganda, which had its own problems with violence and chaos.12 Others were murdered. Several
subsequent Tutsi attempts to reclaim their authority were met with continued bloodshed. In the
years immediately following independence, the Hutu killed approximately 20,000 Tutsi and
forced 300,000 out of their homes and into neighboring countries.13 After decades of Rwanda
existing under sole Hutu control, Tutsi refugees in Uganda, many of them who were the children
of those either killed or displaced during the cruel transition period, created the Rwandan
Patriotic Army (RPA) to take back their former lands by force. Operating alongside its political
arm, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi rebel military invaded Rwanda in October of
1990.14 The RPA clashed with Hutu-led forces under Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana,
and a civil war commenced.
Habyarimana gained dictatorial power in Rwanda after he orchestrated a military coup in
1973 and established the Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le
Développement, or the National Republican Movement for Development and Democracy
(MRND). The MRND existed as the nation’s sole political party, and ruled largely from its hub
of power located within the northwest region of Rwanda. As the fight with the RPA intensified,
two groups whose Hutu members would play significant roles during the upcoming genocide
formed out of the MRND. In 1992, Hutu hardliners within the MRND created a radical branch,
known as the Coalition pour la Défense de la République, or the Coalition for the Defense of the
Republic (CDR). The MRND also encouraged the development of the youth wing of the party,
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which would come to be known as the much-feared Interahamwe.15 Both the CDR and
Interahamwe were considered militia organizations, and their increasingly extremist members
viewed any mercy displayed towards Tutsi invaders as acts of betrayal.
But the minority Tutsi force was neither inept nor weak. After years spent in Uganda,
where the Tutsis lived in exile in the midst of civil unrest amongst the Ugandans themselves,
guerrilla forces trained many RPA members. The guerrillas prepared the Rwandan Tutsis to
assist with a coup against their own Ugandan government in 1986.16 For this reason, the Tutsi,
though smaller in size, gained significant ground in their fight against Habyarimana’s Rwandan
Armed Forces (FAR) despite heavy losses. In the minds of hopeful peace brokers within the
international community, this advantage increased the possibilities of securing a ceasefire once
exterior diplomatic forces intervened.
While the bloody internal war raged on, many human rights workers, specifically from
the International Red Cross and Human Rights Watch, consistently urged for outside
intervention. In 1993, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), along with France and the US,
orchestrated the Arusha Accords, which ushered in a tenuous ceasefire.17 The Arusha Accords
attempted to deliver a political solution not only to the immediate hostilities under way, but also
to the centuries’ long resentment and division that fomented the outbreak of combat. The
document required its signatories to reaffirm “their unwavering determination to respect
principles underlying the Rule of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, [and]
the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual.”18 To anyone with the slightest
knowledge of history regarding the Hutu and Tutsi, this agreement, though officially certified by
both parties, amounted to a fool’s errand. Regardless, its intent was to put an end to the
Rwandan Civil War and eventually establish a democratic system with fair representation.
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Signed on August 4, 1993 in Tanzania by representatives of both the RPF and the Hutu
Government of the Republic of Rwanda, the most notable element it contained was an
“Agreement on Power-Sharing,” which attempted to bring together the rivaling ethnic groups
through political reconciliation.19
While other political parties emerged during the three years leading up to the proposed
ceasefire, the “power” up to this point remained firmly in Hutu hands. Habyarimana opposed
weakening his own executive authority in any form, but the leader explicitly rejected the
recommendations for promoting Tutsis to positions of leadership within a Rwandan
parliamentary system. However, as a result of the military advances made by the Tutsi RPA
forces, and intense international pressure, Habyarimana reluctantly signed and agreed to the
proposal of shared power.20 He may have done so with his fingers crossed behind his back.
In an effort to monitor the proposed peace and implementation of Arusha’s power sharing
agreement, the UN passed Security Resolution 872, which demanded the urgent deployment of
an “international neutral force in Rwanda.”21 The UN Security Council established the “United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” or UNAMIR, to provide an international military
presence and oversee the process for an initial period of six months, with a proviso for an
extension should the council’s review find it necessary. The original UNAMIR mandate was to
secure the capital city of Kigali; assist in humanitarian and relief operations; monitor the
ceasefire; establish demilitarized zones and assist with the demobilization of armed forces within
Rwanda; aid in the clearance of mines; and to prepare the warring parties as they each
transitioned towards free elections.22 UNAMIR established an arms-free zone in Kigali on
December 24, 1993, but those working in Rwanda towards a ceasefire had little faith in its
successful implementation. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda
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was Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon, and many considered him to be far too friendly
with Hutu government forces, who adamantly opposed the agreement.
As noted in the introduction, the UN intervenes in a region under the rules of neutrality.
It is expressly forbidden to take sides while in the role of peacekeeper, and therefore, it is also
not allowed to militarily confront an aggressor without proper authorization via a mandate. Self
-defense, or working alongside a country’s official policing operation, are the only possible
exceptions. Unless the Security Council votes to enact Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the use of
force to maintain peace equals action taken outside of the peacekeeping mandate. To reiterate,
under Chapter VII, Article 43: All UN member nations “undertake to make available to the
Security Council…armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary
for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”23 In other words, the evocation
of Chapter VII would allow UN peacekeepers to flex their military muscle in their efforts to
promote security. It is important to restate this legal exception, because it played an integral role
in multinational discussions on intervention in Rwanda once the genocide began. Once brutal
forces within one party set out to exterminate members or even mere associates of another,
UNAMIR’s position of neutrality came into question. UNAMIR could not uphold its
peacekeeping mandate on this particular mission if it remained in its non-aligned, pacifistic state.
The arbiter of the “civil war” quickly became the only obstacle to one group’s systematic
slaughter of another; due to UNAMIR’s confining rules of engagement, the word “obstacle” in
this instance is an overstatement.
To protect the fragile ceasefire outlined in the Arusha Accords, the UN chose Canadian
Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire to lead the UNAMIR force, which included Bangladeshis,
Ghanaians, Tunisians, and about 225 soldiers from other nations.24 Ironically, the most solid and
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well-trained soldiers came from Belgium, which once held Rwanda as a colony. Compared to
the others, who were unarmed, shabbily dressed, and lacked basic military skills, the Belgians
represented the UNAMIR force well. However, their numbers were insignificant for the task at
hand, even under the limited peacekeeping mandate. Once on the ground in Africa, Dallaire,
whose knowledge of Rwanda was especially narrow before his assignment, realized he was in
over his head.
When Dallaire landed in Rwanda in October of 1993, he immediately determined he was
ill-equipped in terms of troops and supplies. The UNAMIR force he led was insufficiently
staffed to confront the realities on the ground. Although the well-orchestrated genocide would
not occur for months, Dallaire noticed many early signs of Arusha’s impotence. Once debriefed
by aid workers and Rwandans on the ground, he knew he needed more support. As mentioned,
UNAMIR’s mission involved overseeing the ceasefire, monitoring the political agreements of
Arusha, and also, demilitarizing and demobilizing both the RPA and the FAR in order to prevent
further bloodshed.25 The UN soldiers had to keep the region stable for the ceasefire and political
agreement to work. But reports of Hutu extremists, most notably the CRD and Interahamwe,
stockpiling weapons, such as guns, grenades, and machetes, rushed in; as did evidence of their
outright dismissal of the power-sharing arrangement with the despised Tutsi. The disclosure of
these suspicious actions caused great concern among those on the ground who felt Booh-Booh
was “blinded by his ties to the President’s [Habyarimana] circle.”26
Prior to both the Arusha Accords and Dallaire’s arrival, Human Rights Watch, led by its
most accomplished champion in the region, Alison Des Forges, and in concert with
representatives from eight countries, conducted the International Commission of Investigation to
interview Rwandans regarding realities in state, and hopefully, reach a conclusion that would
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prevent further violence.27 Completed in March of 1993 at the urging of the executive director of
the Rwanda Association for the Defense of Human Rights, Monique Mujawamariya, the
commission found a multitude of atrocities committed by extremist Hutus. The subsequent
Arusha Accords attempted to halt these human rights violations, but the ceasefire arrangement
was viewed unfavorably among the Hutu militia groups and thus mostly ignored.
Even prior to the blatant nonobservance of Arusha, the international commission
cautioned the UN of the likelihood of a potential genocide.28 Its warnings included evidence of
public, racist denunciations of Tutsis; mass Tutsi gravesites; nighttime grenade attacks; an
increase in non-governmental militias; death lists containing the names of Tutsi politicians and
moderate Hutu; and the build-up of weapons, particularly machetes, within the capital city of
Kigali.29 Armed with this information, and spurred to action by an unexpected discovery,
Dallaire sent what is now regarded as the single most important document relating to the
Rwandan massacre: the “Genocide Fax.”30
On January 11, 1994, Dallaire immediately cabled his superiors at the UN Headquarters
in New York after speaking with a credible informant who worked as an intermediary between
the MRND and the Interahamwe. The double agent, now known as Jean-Pierre Abubakar
Turatsinze,31 came from a half-Hutu, half-Tutsi family, as did so many other Rwandans.
Turatsinze was able to work on both sides of the conflict, but found himself in a precarious
position once he discovered the true intent of the Rwandan government’s more extreme allies,
which he firmly believed was to kill all Tutsis. With a Tutsi mother and wife, three children, and
twins on the way, Turatsinze sought political asylum and protection for himself and his family in
exchange for information.32 What he relayed to Dallaire was chilling, and compelled the UN
commander to take swift action and warn his bosses of an impending crisis of unimaginable
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proportions. The memo, entitled “REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT,”
vouched for Turatsinze’s credibility by listing his post as trainer of an Interahamwe militia, his
former position as security detail for President Habyarimana, and his location within the
Rwandan capital.33 Dallaire had to ensure his warnings held weight.
Dallaire’s transmission detailed the Hutu extremists’ initial plans to assassinate all Tutsi
and moderate Hutu political opponents. He also informed the UN of the Hutu intent to murder
Belgian UNAMIR troops in order to guarantee their full withdrawal from Rwanda. Turatsinze
had orders to register all Tutsi in Kigali for “extermination,” and asserted that his militia
members could “murder 1000 Tutsis within twenty minutes.”34 Dallaire noted the informant’s
promise to lead UNAMIR forces to the Interahamwe’s weapons cache in Kigali, which included
grenades and AK-47s. Aware of the magnitude of what he was hearing, the UNAMIR leader
sought permission from the UN to raid the cache, and also safely evacuate Turatsinze and his
family out of Rwanda.35 Dallaire realized the Hutu were in the process of conducting “an
outright slaughter and elimination of the opposition.”36 He wanted to stop it.
In his effort to signal the UN with regards to Hutu plans, the Canadian received support
from an unlikely source in Booh-Booh. Dallaire and Booh-Booh often clashed due to each
man’s different interpretation of the developments in the region. Booh-Booh felt his personal
relationship with Habyarimana and the FAR aided the UN in securing a peace and ensuring the
government’s commitment to Arusha. Conversely, Rwandans, particularly Hutu, viewed
Dallaire as far too sympathetic to the Tutsi, and Booh Booh agreed. However, once Dallaire
discovered the information provided by Turatsinze, Booh-Booh “vouched for the informant” and
supported his military counterpart.37 Dallaire’s request for slightly extending UNAMIR’s
mandate in order to raid the weapons cache, which he proposed to do within thirty-six hours,
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reached the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Its head, Kofi Annan, who
would become UN Secretary-General in 1997, refused Dallaire’s request due precisely to the
commander’s move towards mission expansion. Annan even directed Booh-Booh and Dallaire
to discuss the matter with the MRND, who as mentioned, held deep connections with the more
extremist Hutu elements in the Interahamwe and other radical groups. Annan also denied
protection to Turatisinze and his family.
Armed with Dallaire’s dire warning, as well as numerous other similar notifications by
UNAMIR and human rights organizations, Annan maintained his position until it was too late.
The information provided by Dallaire was also transmitted to the American, French, Belgian, and
Tanzanian ambassadors in Kigali, but to no effect.38 Turatisinze’s admission, along with several
other reports of large Hutu rallies against the Tutsi and an increase in the knowledge of death
lists and widespread killings, led to an outcry from humanitarian activists, diplomats, and UN
workers on the ground.39 But the UN’s focus remained on securing a ceasefire and fostering
healthier diplomatic relations; any calls to put a stop to the murderous rampages that signaled an
even further, cataclysmic loss of life were ignored.
One of the most adumbrated aspects of the “Genocide Fax” is Turatisinze’s belief that
President Habyarimana “does not have full control over all elements of his old Party/ faction.”40
Although Habyarimana did not entirely act in accordance with the Arusha Accords, and
downplayed the document’s significance in private, he publicly agreed to them. He signed them.
To the dismay of many Hutu within Habyarimana’s Presidential Guard and other radical
factions, the Arusha Accords served as the catalyst for UN intervention through UNAMIR. As a
result, many anti-Tutsi zealots within his own party, the MRND, and primarily the Interahamwe,
lost faith in his leadership. Adding to this tension was a simultaneous civil conflict between
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Hutu and Tutsis afflicting Rwanda’s southern neighbor, Burundi. In November of 1993,
Burundian Tutsis assassinated the democratically-elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye,
which caused a violent outbreak of anti-Tutsi attacks and a dramatic increase of Tutsi refugees
fleeing into Rwanda.41 Dallaire noted this development as an additional cause for concern, as
Hutu avengers in both states became even more emboldened.
Before Dallaire’s arrival in Rwanda, the UNAMIR commander estimated his need for a
force of at least 5,000 to effectively perform his duties. With Americans already weary of UN
peacekeeping due to the escalating situation in Somalia even prior to the Battle of Mogadishu,
the Clinton Administration rejected this appeal from its position of power within the UN Security
Council. According to one US official, “Anytime you mentioned peacekeeping in Africa…the
crucifix and garlic would come up on every door.”42 Reluctantly, the US agreed to half of
Dallaire’s proposed troop numbers. Dallaire had to settle for a UNAMIR force of 2,500 soldiers
to uphold the Arusha Accords’ hollow directives and protect a non-existent ceasefire.
For the first few months of 1994, warnings of genocide flooded the world’s foremost
international body. But Rwanda remained low on the list of priorities at the UN, which at the
time, posted 70,000 peacekeepers on seventeen missions worldwide.43 Dallaire constantly fought
with his superiors over inadequate equipment and a severe shortage of food and medicine.
Annan’s DPKO, along with its rejection of UNAMIR’s arms raids, consistently pointed to the
October 3 tragedy in Somalia to shut down any recourse regarding mandate expansion. Dallaire
found himself powerless as he witnessed increases in political assassinations and blatant
weapons procurement. To add to this inadequacy, his full force of 2,500 did not arrive in total
until April 1994, only days before the genocide began. UNAMIR’s mandate for the security of
Kigali and the prevention of a widespread violence proved overwhelmingly deficient from its
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start. Unfortunately, the multinational coalitions with the most influence, such as the UN and
OAU, did not adequately respect the devolving situation.
An incident that occurred in early April inspired the OAU and other African Heads of
State, who later reviewed the genocide, to assert in 2000: “The rockets that brought down
President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6, 1994, became the catalyst for one of the great
calamities of our age.”44 While returning from a meeting in Tanzania regarding the declining
status of Burundi and a possible strengthening of the Arusha Accords, the plane carrying
Presidents Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntarymira of Burundi, both Hutu, was shot
down in Rwandan air space. Within an hour of this event, a combination of FAR and
Interahamwe forces initiated the fastest and most organized slaughter of the twentieth century.45
In the span of a few days, any individual seen as holding power or influence against the Hutu
aggressors within Kigali, along with their families, lost their lives in a blur of brutality. The
Hutu forces set up roadblocks to prevent any attempts to escape, and handed out lists peppered
with names of those to be eliminated. The perpetrators also utilized an extremist radio station,
Radio Mille Collines, to out Hutu opponents, incite ethnic hatred, and inspire Hutu supporters to
join them and “weed out the cockroaches.”46 What began in Kigali quickly spread throughout the
country. The plane crash signaled the official start to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Prudence Bushnell, who worked as the Deputy Assistant at the State Department’s
Bureau for African Affairs, remembers her reaction to the news of the plane crash with vivid
detail. Immediately upon being notified, she exclaimed, “Oh shit…Are you sure?”47 As one of
the few Americans with any real appreciation for what faced the Rwandan people as a result of
this event, Bushnell sent an urgent memo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s office. In
what is now cited as “The Bushnell Memo,” she alerted America’s top diplomat to the probable
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deaths of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira and the consequences that lie ahead. Bushnell warned
top State Department officials of the Rwandan military’s disarmament of the mostly Belgian
UNAMIR troops, who hurriedly rushed to the scene. After taking away their arms, the FAR
forces prevented the UNAMIR soldiers from inspecting the crash site.48 As an aside, the crash
was almost certainly caused by elements within Habyarimana’s own presidential guard who shot
it down. It remains officially unsolved, though most observers, including the CIA, agree it was
an inside job.
Bushnell understood Habyarimana’s open seat of power would not only cause a
succession crisis due to the absence of any political assembly (a National Assembly had yet to
form under the Arusha Accords), but also, widespread atrocities. She visited the region as late as
March 1994, and registered “deep concern over the mounting violence in Rwanda,” as well as
the “distribution of arms and arms caches.”49 In her memo, she mentioned that FAR forces
informed Booh-Booh of their intention to temporarily take over. Booh-Booh challenged this
plan, and encouraged them to follow the “framework of the Arusha Accords.”50 But due to
FAR’s resistance to working with the moderate interim Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana,
this request was made in vain. All of this information reached the highest levels of the State
Department the night of the plane crash, and mere hours before the well-planned genocide
became a reality.
In a 2003 interview for PBS’s Frontline, Bushnell recalls learning of barricades being
erected around the airport in Kigali on the evening of the crash. Due to her familiarity with
Rwanda and the Presidential Guard, she knew instantaneously that “civilians…were being
rounded up and killed.”51 On previous visits to Rwanda, RPF members warned her of Hutu
plans. They adamantly cautioned against ignoring the CDR and its intent to kill Tutsis. Bushnell
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admits that due to the State Department’s focus on political reconciliation and its reliance on
Arusha, she did not lend her full ear. But as soon as the news hit her on April 6, the RPF’s
emphatically-stated concerns rushed back. They were right. She describes receiving information
within hours of the crash, and affirms the fact that “it [reports of murders] didn’t let up.”52 From
the genocide’s starting point, Bushnell understood the bloodshed was not confined to political
upheaval, and she communicated this fact to her superiors. She knew that for the Hutu, it was
not mere politics. It was mass slaughter. She states, “It just kept getting worse and worse and
worse.”53 But she had to do her job. Bushnell’s primary responsibility was to account for US
personnel on the ground, and safely evacuate them. She would later learn the horrors witnessed
by her American colleagues, who each made it home unharmed, but forever scarred.
Some of the more telling accounts of the ruthlessness of the genocide are included in
Power’s detailed analysis. In “A Problem From Hell,” Power describes the helplessness felt by
American diplomats, and in particular, Joyce Leader, who was second in command under the US
Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson. Leader lived in a home owned by the US Embassy, and
located next door to the moderate Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. Upon learning of
Habyarimana’s fate on the night of April 6, Dallaire immediately informed an eerily calm group
of Hutu FAR forces of the proposed line of succession under Arusha, which would make
Uwilingiyimana the lawful head of state. The men were indignant about their army assuming
control, despite Dallaire’s admonitions. Hours later, on the morning of April 7th,
Uwilingiyimana called Leader in a panic, begging the American to hide her and her family.
Leader describes her own mindset as one of complete shock. Leader recounts, “She
[Uwilingiyimana] was prime minister…I was just a lowly diplomat.”54 UNAMIR troops
assigned to protect Uwilingiyimana made several attempts to thrust her over a wall into Leader’s
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compound, but sporadic gunfire stalled this effort. She eventually made it into another
compound with her husband and children. Shortly after, more shots were fired. Leader heard
the screams of Uwilingiyimana and her family. She then heard silence.55
In order to achieve free reign to carry out their well-organized mission, Hutu soldiers
knew they had to drive the UN peacekeepers from the region. One of the ways they succeeded
in this endeavor was to murder ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who were guarding
Uwilingiyimana. After the Belgians laid down their arms, the Hutu killed each of them, then
mutilated their bodies.56 This action incensed the Belgian government and confirmed US
attitudes on Rwanda as the equivalent to Somalia. It echoed the soured, post-Mogadishu
perspective American officials held regarding peacekeeping. Almost immediately, Belgium sent
additional troops, but only to safely remove any Belgian soldiers who remained in Kigali. The
strongest UNAMIR troops were gone. Within one week, most other nations followed suit, and
the UN revisited the question of continued intervention. The murders of Uwilingiyimana and her
family, the Belgian peacekeepers, and almost every other moderate politician in Rwanda
signaled to Dallaire that his mission died along with them.57
Over the next few days, Dallaire witnessed horrors that confirmed the deaths were not
just politically-motivated killings; it was the coordinated, intentional genocide he feared. No
Tutsi was off limits. The same was true for any moderate Hutu. Escape was not an option for
most. Ironically, the identification card system put in place during Belgium rule remained, and
served as a bullseye for Tutsi who attempted to pass through a Hutu-guarded roadblock if he or
she chose to flee.58 Additionally, since intermarriage was common among Rwandans, those Hutu
with half-Tutsi, half-Hutu children either chose death, or witnessed the slaughter of their
spouses, sons and daughters before their eyes.
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Those UNAMIR troops who remained did what they could to halt the killings, which
were mostly carried out with machetes. But their deficiency in numbers, lack of equipment, and
most importantly, the neutrality mandate, tied their hands. They witnessed hundreds of children
chopped to pieces outside of a local church. Bodies piled up in the streets, and choked the
Kagera River, which the Hutu used as a dumping site. Most Tutsis evacuated their homes and
fled to places they believed would offer them refuge, such as churches, hospitals, or schools.
Those who did so often put themselves in greater danger, as the Hutu targeted these areas.
Large, centralized gatherings of Tutsi made their job easier. Some of these locations existed
under the watchful eye of Red Cross volunteers, human rights workers, or what was left of
UNAMIR. Though not always a deterrent, the presence of outsiders did protect some potential
victims. For this reason, a significant number of Tutsi in Kigali were alive at the end of April,
which was more than enough time to mobilize international military intervention to put a stop to
the genocide and save those who remained targets. Even so, as reported by Human Rights
Watch, survivor testimonies indicate that in only fourteen days, 250,000 Tutsi were killed.59 In
many cases, the Hutu, especially the young, bloodthirsty Interahamwe, would stand outside of
these supposed safe zones, and wait. Some of the aid workers, and peacekeepers in particular,
often had multiple locations to monitor. As soon as these foreign observers left a certain “safe”
site to offer their services to another, the Hutu would move in and implement their savage
agenda. When the workers would return, they were greeted by the mangled corpses of the
people they were desperately trying to protect.
For most of these peacekeepers and humanitarians, the men, women, and children
mercilessly slaughtered by the Hutu were their friends and co-workers. Bushnell painfully
describes the impossible decision facing Ambassador Rawson and the State Department
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employees who were ordered to evacuate by the Secretaries of State and Defense, under the
direction of President Clinton, just one day into the genocide. Bushnell knew her main objective
was to get her people out of harm’s way, but it also meant abandoning those Rwandans who
worked beside them in the interests of peace. Rawson himself had to leave behind almost 300
Rwandans who gathered at his home seeking refuge.60 The diplomats did not even have the
capacity to save members of their own staff. Power tells of Rawson’s chief steward, who begged
the US ambassador to come to his home and save him during the first wave of killings. Rawson
was trapped in his own residence, and could not aid his friend in any way. Rawson’s steward
and his wife were among those murdered.61
It took about one week to successfully evacuate all Americans, including the ambassador.
The embassy closed, and the American flag was lowered. Bushnell notes of concern for their
“Rwanda team,”62 and the certainty among the evacuated Americans of the fate awaiting their
African colleagues in their absence. She and others in the Bureau for African Affairs knew the
Rwandans had gathered in places they sincerely believed would be protected. But the cavalry
was not on its way. They, unfortunately, knew what was about to occur. Bushnell notes:
I mean, it really would be abandoning people. It’s one thing to say, ‘OK, well,
we’ll hope for the best.’ It’s another thing to know that thousands are gathered in
one locale and to say, ‘Bye, you know, good luck,’ and leave them to the
slaughter. [That] was repulsive.63
Following the successful evacuation of all Americans in Kigali, the genocide quickly fanned out.
Due to the concentration of large numbers of Rwandans in the capital city, most of the killings
took place during the month of April. But these numbers were not known to the international
community at the time. For all it new, a chance remained for organizations such as the UN to
increase support and save lives. The exact number of those who could be protected may have
been small in relation to those killed in Kigali, but it was still significant. In April, the US and
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its fellow UN member nations had ample opportunity to confront the brutality taking place.
From the few resources left on the ground in Rwanda, Dallaire included, UN and US officials
received regular updates on the expansion of the murders, both in size and scope.64 The decision
against active and forceful intervention was made within the first week after Habyarimana’s
death. For the US, it was essentially made on October 3, 1993 in the streets of Mogadishu.
Rwanda was condemned to its fate. The actual number of those killed is estimated at 800,000,
but the true total will never be known.65
In his 1998 speech in Rwanda, Clinton claimed he was not fully aware of the genocide
consuming the African nation at the time it reached its highest levels. He ultimately blamed the
American decision against intervention on ignorance. Clinton attempted to justify his inaction
by asserting:
It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of
your family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices,
day after day after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with
which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”66
The release of classified documents obtained by the National Security Archive at The George
Washington University as a result of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request challenge
Clinton’s move to evade responsibility. William Ferroggiaro, the Director of the Freedom of
Information Project, compiled these materials into a report, which includes a multitude of
evidence to counter Clinton’s pretense of unawareness. Although the report lacks many
materials which remain classified, particularly those of the CIA, it contains substantial
documentation to uphold its summarized view that Clinton’s decision against intervention was
not based on a lack of knowledge as to what was happening in Rwanda. It was a risk-adverse
choice, formed largely due to the political environment, where UN peacekeeping was losing its
credibility.
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The Bushnell Memo is part of this report. The collection largely consists of
memorandums circulated within the State Department, the UN, intelligence agencies, and the
Department of Defense. One significant finding comes from the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR), which acts as the State Department’s intelligence arm. It produces the
Secretary’s Morning Summary (SMS), which is the equivalent of the CIA’s Presidential Daily
Briefing (PDB), but for the Secretary of State. The most notable SMS briefings are from April
12 and April 26. On April 12, INR analysts warned against pulling the UNAMIR mission,
stating it “could lead to a bloodbath involving the civilians UNAMIR is protecting.”67 On April
26, the SMS included that the INR “foresaw in Rwanda ‘genocide and partition’,” and noted “at
least 100,000 Rwandans have been killed.”68 It also cautioned “the toll could be 500,000,” with
an added, ominous comment: “the butchery shows no sign of ending.”69 The use of the word
“genocide” here is notable.
Similar to the SMS, the CIA provides a highly-classified intelligence report to hundreds
of policymakers within the US government. This National Intelligence Daily (NID) is presented
in newspaper format, and distributed six days per week.70 Since the NID often includes much of
the information contained in the PDB, Ferroggiaro states that the release of some NID documents
provides evidence similar to that which would be found in the classified PDBs. If anything, the
PDBs contain greater detail about certain events and threats, so the NIDs released by the CIA
prove the president received daily updates on Rwanda. Of note in this analysis are two NIDs
from April warning of the escalating situation. On April 7, the morning after the plane crash,
CIA analysts predicted the resumption of civil war and the probability of Rwandan military
attempts to assume power. By April 23, the NID included a question of what the RPF could do
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“in an effort to stop the genocide, which relief workers say is spreading south.”71 Again, the use
of the word “genocide” is important.
Documents within Ferroggiaro’s report also show the administration and officials
throughout various levels of the US government knew the plane was shot down by the Rwandan
Presidential Guard, and understood the implications of the power vacuum. For months leading
up to the crash, and after, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted extremist
communications via what it deemed “hate radio.”72 The NSA provided real-time information to
policymakers, and warned of the calls for genocide coming from Rwandan broadcast radio
sources, such as Radio Mille Collines.
The UN also received an influx of reports noting the killing of civilians and affirmations
of early categorizations of genocide. In a briefing memo to the Security Council on April 20, a
Nigerian representative shamed the international body regarding the preferential status given to
the situation in Bosnia. Although reprehensible, the ethnic cleansing taking place in the former
Yugoslavia was only about one third the size of what would occur in Rwanda, and the genocide
in Rwanda took place prior to the Summer 1995 Srebrenica and Markale Market Massacres. The
representative declared, “Nigeria cannot understand how the West could contemplate reinforcing
UNPROFOR [UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia] and withdrawing UNAMIR at the same
time.”73 On April 10, Dallaire requested troop reinforcements. He wanted to double the
UNAMIR force to match his initial estimate of the 5,000 needed for the mission. He desperately
needed vehicles and fuel, ammunition, and communications equipment as well. Dallaire did not
even have sufficient rations of food or clean water.74 While he dictated his demands to UN
officials, it was the US who ultimately controlled their response. The UN Security Council
voted on April 21, 1994 to cut the UNAMIR forces that remained, leaving a token staff of under
116

300.75 Although the UN troop drawdown officially left a force of 270, 503 stayed under
Dallaire’s command. Dallaire later wrote of this defeat:
My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by guttural
moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with
their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies…I found
myself walking through villages where the only sign of life was a goat, or a
chicken, or a songbird, as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by
voracious packs of wild dogs.76
Ironically, it was Madeleine Albright, the Jewish child of Czechoslovakian parents and a refugee
herself during WWII, who carried Clinton’s water at the UN and resisted all attempts to gain US
support. As the American representative at the UN, Albright blocked most efforts to rebuild the
UNAMIR force, or even to adequately equip it once an affirmative decision was made to
intervene. Albright presents her role as one of following orders. However, she also notes how in
her duties as US Ambassador to the UN, she “became increasingly convinced we were on the
wrong side of the issue.”77 Albright recalls how during the early days of the genocide, she had
already cooled to the idea of UN peacekeeping in Africa. Somalia’s legacy tainted all American
decisions on Rwanda. She did not see any practical way for the UN to restore order, and
describes the weeks wasted on a new plan as the product of infighting among UN member
nations and the OAU, who was asked to send troops.78
Albright was not considered someone who held her tongue. During council discussions,
a report by Doctors Without Borders, a non-profit medical relief group working in Rwanda,
revealed that Hutu extremists killed an entire hospital staff and returned the following day to kill
any remaining patients.79 In an astonishing and unlucky coincidence that generated bad optics,
the genocide occurred during the Rwandan UN Ambassador’s two-year term as a rotating
member of the Security Council. Albright asked the Rwandan government representative to
explain the report. After a long period of silence, the Hutu gave the standard, government117

sanctioned answer that it was the Tutsis who were unwilling to participate in peace talks and
implement the Arusha Accords. Albright records her level of disgust that the Rwandan kept his
seat on the council despite the government-sanctioned violence he represented.80 But it was not
enough for her to try to convince Clinton or anyone else in the administration to take corrective
action. Like most other members of the administration during the genocide, Albright only
expresses regret.
In response to the UNAMIR drawdown of troops, Africa specialists from state begged,
“the [remaining UNAMIR] force is protecting 12,000 refugees in Kigali. We should not
advocate…abandoning these people.”81 An April 21 letter from Rwandan human rights activist
Monique Mujawamariya sent directly to Clinton echoed these cries. Mujawamariya, who was
initially thought to have died in the early days of the genocide, demanded the president act
against what she called “a campaign [of]…genocide against the Tutsis.”82 As a prior guest of
Clinton’s at the White House only months earlier, she felt she could get through to him.
According to Des Forges, Clinton was aware of Mujawamirya’s perilous position, and relieved
when he found out she survived. But he did not heed her call to abide by the “moral and legal
treaty obligation to ‘suppress and prevent’ genocide.”83 The “legal” part of Mujawamirya’s letter
undoubtedly refers to the 1948 Genocide Convention.
In his examination into “naming the crime” during the 1994 genocide, Eric Heinze, who
specializes in political science and international studies, argues “conventional wisdom now holds
that Clinton Administration officials avoided using the ‘g word’ for fear that using it would have
obliged them to take action under the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention.”84 US officials
did not use the word genocide until May 21, 1994. Even then, they made sure to define what
was taking place in Rwanda as “acts of genocide,” rather than genocide itself.85 Power
118

authoritatively documents the hesitancy by American officials to accurately describe events on
the ground in Rwanda as deliberate. Disagreement within the UN about the use of the word
plagued the organization, and the US delegation led the fight against it. When Boutros BoutrosGhali drew up a statement referring to the situation in Rwanda as “genocide,” the Americans
shot it down.86 At issue was not only the administration’s fear of public reaction should the US
intervene in Rwanda, but also fear of public reaction for failing to intervene in what was the
clearest case of genocide since the Holocaust [emphasis added].87 Although becoming a party to
the Genocide Convention, which the US finally did in 1988, does not require a nation to commit
military forces in the case of genocide, defining an event as genocide would dramatically
increase both foreign and domestic pressure to stop it. In Heinze’s words, “Since naming the
crime would have pressured the United States to do just this, the crime was not named.”88
The US also argued against changing the UNAMIR mandate to a Chapter VII, which
would allow it to use force against the Hutu aggressors.89 The US denied requests to jam radio
signals so as to halt extremist, racist calls for genocide. The US rejected calls for greater
resources and a new, “beefed up force (UNAMIR II).”90 After weeks of stalling, the Americans,
led by Albright, finally agreed to a version of Dallaire’s request using mostly African troops, but
few of the continent’s nations supplied them. Then came more US equivocation. Towards the
end of May, with the majority of the genocide carried out, further arguments over equipment,
which was to be procured by the Americans, as well as who was to pay for the logistical support
of the revised mission, dragged on. This shuffling resulted in tens of thousands more dead. The
French launched an operation on June 23, and it saved some lives. But it would not be until the
RPA, under the command of RPF leader Paul Kagame, took back Kigali in mid-July that the
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genocide would finally end. Not one additional UN troop arrived in Rwanda between the
beginning of the genocide and the finality of it.
Given this information, the question to ask is whether or not the Clinton Administration
should have undertaken the task and deployed forces to Rwanda, or even used its position on the
UN Security Council to propel the international body into resolute action. As noted by William
Hyland, Clinton’s stated proposals for post-Cold War US involvement on the international stage
introduced a heavy focus on humanitarian missions and the advancement of human rights. Most
of Clinton’s national security advisors viewed the adherence to moral principles as a means to
bolster American interests both overseas at home.91 Though commendable in its goals, the
Clinton team’s foreign policy rhetoric could not keep up with global instability. An ongoing
dilemma which continues to confront and divide Americans is found within this historical chasm
between intent and implementation. Do the costs of acting as the world’s policing power
outweigh the benefits derived from fighting oppression and protecting vulnerable societies
wherever the need arises? After just one test in Somalia, the once idealistic Clinton
Administration answered in the affirmative. It could not afford Rwanda.
It is no question that the US military had the capability to intervene and stop the genocide
either before its start or within the first few days of its progression. However, as pointed out by
Bushnell, the Pentagon fought against her requests for support, largely due to the Clinton
Administration’s preference for intervention elsewhere. The removal of a democratically-elected
president by a military junta in Haiti, which created a massive refugee problem in the US, won
Clinton’s attention, which he did not share even amid the escalating murder rate in Rwanda.
Acting under this authority, the Pentagon repeatedly informed Bushnell of its inability to commit
resources to an area not deemed by the president to be one of “strategic interest.”92 The
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introduction of any US military presence in Rwanda for the purposes of stopping the genocide
would divert too many assets away from Clinton’s chosen mission in Haiti. According to
Democratic Congressman Alcee Hastings of Florida, the Haitian focus took over based on
“megashocks of refugee influx.”93 He suggested that his own complacency towards Rwanda,
which was shared by most in Congress, rested on the idea that “Africa seems so far away, and
there is no vital interest that my constituency sees.”94 Absent congressional or public support,
and amid the simultaneous challenge presented by Haiti, Clinton chose not to act. To provide
even further context, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia overshadowed reports coming in from
Central Africa. Thus, the ideas founded in the administration’s proposals for democratic
enlargement and aggressive multilateralism, which largely rested on a broad latitude given to the
president in his choices of when and where to respond to foreign conflict, proved damning for
Rwanda.
In his comprehensive analysis of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, Alan Kuperman of the
Lyndon B. Johnson School for Public Affairs at the University of Texas argues against critics of
the Clinton Administration, who maintain the president could have acted in Rwanda to stop the
killing, but chose not to. However, Kuperman contradicts his own case by stating it is both
realistic and in the nation’s interest that “an exception…be made for cases of genocide,
especially where intervention can succeed at low cost.”95 Although Kuperman effectively
outlines the options presented to Clinton, as well as the progression of alternatives to the
president’s adherence to noninterference, his defense of US policy in Rwanda hinders on
impersonal statistics. Kuperman concedes that if Clinton made a firm decision in favor of
intervention in Rwanda:
Advance units…could have begun operations much sooner. Approximately four
days after the [presidential] order, a battalion or two of Army Rangers could have
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parachuted in and seized [the] Kigali airport…[and] Follow-on troops could have
expanded outward from the airfield to establish a secure operating base. Within
about two weeks, sufficient troops and equipment could have arrived to halt the
fighting, form a buffer between FAR and the RPF in Kigali and northwest in
Rwanda, and fully police the capital.96
Also notable is the fact that within forty-eight hours, almost 3,000 troops from multiple countries
landed in Rwanda. The US had also stationed 200 US Marines close to the Rwandan border with
Burundi. But the purpose of each of these forces was to safely evacuate their own foreign
nationals.
Many experts on the Rwandan Genocide contend the mere presence of Western forces
with a changed mandate would have served as enough of a deterrent to stall the actions of the
Hutu extremists in the capital. Kuperman challenges this point by assuming this strategy may
have actually encouraged the killers to expedite their mission. But what is most disconcerting
about his article resides in its insistence that due to the genocide’s rapid progression, “such an
intervention would have saved about 275,000 Tutsi, instead of the 150,000 who actually
survived.”97 So, according to Kuperman, the 125,000 who may have stood a chance did not
warrant the risk involved with deploying well-armed American soldiers, or UN reinforcements,
against mostly machete-wielding militia members.
This analysis of Kuperman’s well-researched work does not intend to criticize its findings
as unfeeling. Foreign policy decisions, particularly those which must account for sending US
troops into harm’s way, are often made with a healthy dose of dispassion due to the enormity of
losing just one American life. But even without direct US military intervention, American
diplomatic and economic power would have made a solid impact. Instead, US entrenchment and
stalling efforts in the UN allowed the gruesome process to march on unimpeded. The genocide
ended within the first two weeks of July, but only when RPA troops made significant gains
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throughout the countryside and finally reclaimed Kigali.98 Only then did the Clinton
Administration outstretch its hand.
As described by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson, instead of using
American military prowess to stop the mass murder of women and children, Clinton agreed to
deploy troops to deliver more UN peacekeepers, medical personnel, and supplies to support
refugees under a new UN mandate, issued after the majority of the killings occurred.99 Patterson,
a lifelong soldier, decries how in the wake of Somalia, the administration made it very clear that
the American involvement in Rwanda was “humanitarian support” and not “peacekeeping.”100
He documents the dispatch of 2300 US troops, but also notes their removal within two months.
Patterson criticizes this use of American military might as providing nothing in terms of
significant achievement: “Nothing to stop the genocide, nothing really to justify our involvement
at all…we never had the resolve.”101 David Scheffer, who served as Ambassador Albright’s
senior advisor and counsel during Clinton’s first term, further documents his disappointment in
the American response to Rwanda. He notes that a dedication to humanitarian intervention,
particularly when it reaches the level of ethnic cleansing or genocide, requires that “policymakers have the political will to act on the imperative of human survival.”102
In 1998, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) commissioned a panel comprised of
multiple African heads of state to uncover the reasons for the genocide and the role other nations
and international organizations played in its progression. Known as the International Panel of
Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,
the group’s goal was to “establish the facts about how such a grievous crime was conceived,
planned, and executed; to look at the failure to enforce the Genocide Convention in Rwanda…;
and to recommend measures at redressing the consequences of the genocide and at preventing
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any possible recurrence of such a crime.”103 The OAU delivered its report in July of 2000.
While its findings on the causes of the horrific brutality are presented with a strong anti-Western
tone, its documentation of the UN’s deficient response, and the apathy of other nations with the
power to stop the killings, finds credibility in reports of what outside forces knew and when they
knew it.
Even though the report lays heavy emphasis on European, and in the case of Rwanda,
Belgium colonialism, and its stoking of already tense internal divisions between the Hutu and
Tutsi, the panel agreed: “It is of course true that there would have been no genocide had a small
group among Rwandan governing elite not deliberately incited the country’s Hutu majority
against the Tutsi minority.”104 Therefore, the damning critique of the UN and outside nations lies
more in the years prior to the genocide. Before, during, and after the killings, moves could have
been made. But, according to the OAU, “this terrible conspiracy only succeeded because certain
actors external to Rwanda allowed it to go ahead.”105 The OAU findings reveal a strong bias
against Western powers and the authority they hold at the UN. But African nations themselves
did little to address the problem in Rwanda. This fact, however, does not diminish the
responsibility held by the US, and especially the president, when a crisis of this magnitude is
allowed to proceed unimpeded. American leadership is required to bring along the rest of the
world, whether it is in Europe, the Middle East, or Africa.
Holly Burkhalter from the International Justice System (IJS), who once served as the
Washington Director of Human Rights Watch, blames a “lack of leadership”106 within the
Clinton Administration for its slow response. In her examination of the Rwandan Genocide and
the president’s response to it, Burkhalter makes the oft-repeated and validated suggestion of
Somalia’s influence on the refusal to commit any real American effort towards stopping or even
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slowing the rampage. She emphatically states that the “loss of American servicemen in
Somalia” led directly to a “distrust of peacekeeping in Africa;”107 not only in The White House,
but particularly in the Pentagon. As emphasized throughout this work, military officials
operating under the Clinton Administration suffered from an unwillingness to commit troops to
missions containing murky, if not completely absent, objectives. Insufficient logistical support
often accompanied any suggestions by civilian leaders as to the possible use of US forces.
Bosnia serves as a concrete case, as does Somalia. But Rwanda solidifies the pattern. Even with
all of the rhetoric aimed at an “internationalist vision,” combining the “use of force” with a
“reliance on multinational institutions,”108 Clinton’s growing distaste for the pressures of
committing American lives to endeavors determined by a stretched and inefficient UN served as
a powerful deterrent. In the minds of the once-idealistic Clinton team, humanitarian intervention
and multilateral peacekeeping each lost its status as a moral imperative.
Albright also points to Somalia as the major obstacle to any effective action taken by the
US. She regrets the manner by which American leaders, herself included, viewed Somalia and
Rwanda as too similar in nature for another expanded peacekeeping venture. But she cautions,
“Somalia was something close to anarchy. Rwanda was planned mass murder. Somalia
counseled caution; Rwanda demanded action.”109 Sadly, the Clinton Administration did not have
the patience, nor the foresight, to lead the international community. Albright asserts that a USled coalition of multinational troops under firm orders to stop killings, arrest leaders, and
establish security could have been deployed quickly. She regrets not advocating for this solution
at a time when she held such an influential position with regards to international authority.
Likewise, Bushnell points to the UN peacekeeping failure in Somalia as the primary
culprit for US inaction. She notes that after the Battle of Mogadishu, and the removal of US
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forces, “we didn’t want to put money in something that was not going to be a success, both
politically for President Clinton, and for the United States and the U.N. as a whole.”110 Clinton
somewhat concedes this point in his autobiography. In his own telling of the event, which is
somewhat self-serving, Clinton expresses pride in how quickly his State Department was able to
evacuate all Americans on the ground in Rwanda unharmed. But he also admits:
We were so preoccupied with Bosnia, with the memory of Somalia just six
months old, and with opposition in Congress to military deployments in faraway
places not vital to our national interests that neither I nor anyone on my foreign
policy team adequately focused on sending troops to stop the slaughter. The
failure to try to stop Rwanda’s tragedies became one of the greatest regrets of my
presidency.111
Possibly out of an attempt to gain forgiveness, Clinton mentions the Africa Crisis Response
Initiative put forth by his administration to better prepare Africans to stop wars and prevent other
Rwandas. He also points to his post-presidency creation of the Clinton Foundation, and its work
to reduce the AIDS epidemic in Africa, and Rwanda in particular. These moves, although noble
in effort, do little to assuage a collective American guilt over the nation’s failure to lead, or even
act, during the most significant case of systematic, deliberate mass murder since the Second
World War.
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Chapter 6. WHY HAITI?
“Here we go again,” remarked one of Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson’s
captains at the Travis Air Force Base operations room in California.1 While Patterson’s squadron
watched CNN’s coverage of their next mission, a staff sergeant echoed, “I can’t believe the
president is putting us into Haiti…and for what?”2 Within days, Patterson and his team would fly
to the small Caribbean island with reinforcements, equipment, and vehicles to support a
disproportionally large invasion force. For many members of the military, the rapid increase in
peacekeeping deployments since 1992, along with a decrease in troop strength and above all,
mission clarity, grew tiresome. On September 15, 1994, President Clinton announced his intent
to utilize American military forces to oust a violent military junta that deposed the
democratically-elected president of Haiti in a 1991 coup d'état. With a posture of securing
national interests, and again working under the auspices of the UN, Clinton emphasized the
country’s responsibility to act “when brutality occurs close to our shores.”3 But for many outside
of the administration, including those tasked with carrying out the assignment, the timing of the
event seemed suspicious. With the violence in the Balkans still raging, and in the aftermath of
UN peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda, it appeared to them as though Clinton was in
dire need of a foreign policy success. With mid-term congressional elections looming, the
president publicly issued the orders as the last of the US soldiers stationed in Africa reached
American soil.
On September 19, 1994, the Multinational Force for Haiti (MFH), led by the American
military and consisting of 20,000 US troops, headed towards Haiti as part of a multilateral
mission to restore deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power.4 Under the code name
Operation Uphold Democracy, Clinton ordered US forces to lead the UN coalition in an attempt
135

to solidify the democratic process in Haiti. The problems with this objective were plenty. First,
and foremost, democracy in Haiti remained elusive despite the 1991 elections, as did the
peaceful internal means to protect it should Aristide regain his position of leadership. Second,
the UN-approved mission essentially called for some form of nation-building in order to secure
democratically-elected leaders in Haiti, which the US was not prepared to undertake. The US
again found itself heavily involved in yet another UN peacekeeping mission with vague,
idealistic objectives. But this time, the UN immediately triggered its Chapter VII mandate
sanctioning the use of force, with the US military designated to coordinate and lead the military
action. Just days after many of the soldiers who served in Somalia and Rwanda arrived home,
they were again venturing off to an unstable, violent region under the premise of securing
political reconciliation between two warring factions. Historically speaking, their presence
would do little to solve the problems facing the Haitians, whose past woes with regards to
democratic representation, political corruption, and brutal rebellion were numerous. The
president’s promise to keep the action “limited and specific,” with an emphatic caveat that
American soldiers “will not be involved in rebuilding Haiti or it is economy,”5 left many cynics
questioning the true motives behind the overwhelming force headed towards Haitian shores.
This intervention in Haiti would not be the first for the US. Since it became the world’s
first “black” republic after winning its independence in 1804, democracy had unfortunately
evaded Haiti. Prior to 1991, the country existed under a succession of exploitative, murderous
dictators, who condemned the nation to poverty, famine, persistent violence, and overall societal
disorder for almost two centuries.6 When Haiti won its independence from the French, it was
saddled with a “badly damaged plantation system, a powerful political class composed of former
soldiers and a mixed race bourgeoisie, and a largely illiterate peasant society of five hundred
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thousand former slaves.”7 These innate problems persisted over the course of almost twohundred years, mainly due to a constant flux of political instability and economic strife.
Despite these failures of leadership, Haiti often served as a psychological threat to
Americans, due to their own shameful history with regards to race. During the antebellum years
in the US, slaveholding states feared the impact the successful Haitian Revolution could have on
American slaves. The success of freed black Toussaint L’ouverture, the initial leader of the
rebellion for Haitian independence, relied heavily upon a foundation comprised of the American
revolutionary ideals of individual liberty, self-governance, and the inherent equality of all men.
However, L’ouoverture and his followers also drew from the more radical concepts born out of
the French Revolution, which left many Americans worried that reports on the victorious
uprising may reach those who they themselves still held in chains. Even after the Civil War,
with American slaves technically liberated, widespread discrimination and inhumane treatment,
along with racist societal and state-sponsored codes of behavior, severely hindered the
advancements of newly freed blacks in the US.
At the turn of the twentieth century, when Progressivism began to take hold, a more
paternalistic and scientifically-motivated view of relations between whites and blacks emerged.
Social Darwinism, scientific racism, biological determinism, and Rudyard Kipling’s The White
Man’s Burden all contributed to cultural attitudes regarding “liberal interventionism”8 in foreign
policy in the early 1900s. These condescending concepts are widely apparent when analyzing
the first American occupation of Haiti under Progressive President Woodrow Wilson.
Despite American westward expansion under the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, which
defined “Anglo-Saxons as superior…[and] gave members of the dominant culture in the United
States both a sense of mission and a justification for expansionism,”9 Americans largely viewed
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themselves as anti-colonialists. Most saw the nation as unique to its European counterparts for
its stated rejection of empire, and justified western continental settlement using religious terms,
often referencing an American divine decree. Though some exploits challenge the anticolonialist narrative, such as the US occupation of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and for
some, westward continental expansion itself, Americans rationalized their anti-imperialist claims
by concentrating on economic investment, as opposed to military conquest, to exert influence in
foreign nations, most of which were in close proximity to the US.
Rooted in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which stressed that further European
intervention in the Western Hemisphere would be met with US force, Americans saw their
foreign policy as one which protected the nineteenth-century independence movements in Latin
America from their mostly Spanish and Portuguese occupiers. In the early twentieth century,
Theodore Roosevelt expanded on the Monroe Doctrine through his Roosevelt Corollary, which
designated the US as the sole mediator in disputes between Central/ South American countries
and European powers, often involving the payments of international debts. The purpose for the
policy enhancement was to strengthen America’s global position and stave off European
attempts to intervene in cases of Latin American misbehavior. Many historians view the
Roosevelt Corollary as a means to further solidify America’s leadership role in the Western
Hemisphere, as it compelled the nation to act, militarily if necessary, within countries under its
influence to prevent outside European meddling. It is with these developments fresh in mind that
Wilson invaded Haiti in 1915.
The official catalyst for Wilson’s decision to intervene was the assassination of Haitian
President Jean Sam. Sam was the sixth president in just four years, and along with most of his
predecessors, he met a brutal death.10 Some scholars view Wilson’s concerns over a probable
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Haitian insurrection, along with the advent of World War I, as the overarching reasons for the
deployment of US Marines to the tiny island of Hispaniola. Others point to imperialist
ambitions, based largely on patriarchal cultural assumptions, as well as financial motives. With
regards to WWI, which broke out in 1914, the fear of German influence on Hispaniola, the island
home of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, was a persuasive argument for US intervention.
This line of reasoning pushed forth the possibility of German occupation as a threat to American
interests in Haiti, as well as a danger to Americans at home due to the country’s location.11
Clinton would echo similar concerns in 1994, as he sold the political and social instability in
neighboring Haiti as a direct menace to American national security interests.
US military forces that were deployed to Haiti in 1915 checked some of the chaos
engulfing the country. The US remained in Haiti for eighteen years, until Franklin Delano
Roosevelt withdrew the last of the Marines in 1934. During the time of US occupation, “a series
of puppet presidents” were put into place by the Americans, so Haitians showed little interest in
their own political affairs.12 Their apathy undoubtedly strengthened some of the more
patronizing viewpoints put forth by those, like Wilson, who felt the Haitian people needed
American guidance and leadership, backed by a strong US military presence. According to
Jeffrey Sommers, a specialist on international political economies, developmental states, and
hegemonic transitions, Wilson reconciled his actions in Haiti with the stated claim of antiimperialism as a “US ethos,” and presented America as “a nation whose existence rested on
ethical and moral values from its democratic form of government.”13 Sommers’ assessment of
Wilson’s expansionist endeavor sees its reflection in the subsequent policy of democratic
enlargement put forth by the Clinton national security team. For this reason, as well as Wilson’s
idealism with regards to foreign entanglements, the foreign policy approach initially proposed by
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Anthony Lake, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright in 1993 is often described as
Wilsonian in its foundation. Like Wilson eventually did in 1917, when he committed US troops
to the war in Europe, Clinton often had to eschew idealism when confronted with the realities of
international crises.
The US never did reap much economic benefit from Haiti. Therefore, those charging
Wilson with imperialist actions based on financial concerns stand upon weak ground. The fear
of disorder in the American sphere of influence, combined with World War I, constitutes a
stronger case, as does Wilson’s own progressive, paternalistic views towards the Haitian people
and his attempt to gift them with democratic governance. The Haitians, predictably, deeply
resented the American occupation, seeing it as an impediment to their national sovereignty.
Decades later, the situation remained somewhat similar. As the US had no real economic
interest in Haiti during the 1990s, the only real basis for selling American intervention in Haiti
revolved around humanitarian concerns or interests of national security. Clinton combined the
two, and once again, the US was on its way to bring some form of political stability to Haiti,
using American military strength as the only feasible delivery mechanism. And similar to the
first American venture into Haiti, most Haitians did not condone excessive US interference in
their affairs.
After Americans discontinued their Haitian occupation in the first part of the twentieth
century, the political system within the Caribbean nation further devolved. The US presence
thus had little effect on the implementation of successful democratic institutions. The Marines
oversaw “public works, tax collection, treasury management, and the development of a native
Haitian Constabulary, which was Haiti’s first professional military force.”14 Some of these
actions were beneficial, but one major problem persisted. The Americans often excluded
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Haitians from exuding any real authority on their own. US forces were also accused of
discriminating against the poorer black population in favor of the elite mulatto class, which
deepened existing resentment among Haitian citizens.15 Once the US pulled out of Haiti,
instability persisted, as did the consistent turnover of national leaders, mostly by violent means.
The economic and social status of Haiti showed no significant progress, with only some roads,
public buildings, and medical facilities being built or expanded during the occupation period.16
Then, in 1957, Haitians finally gained a strong leader in Francois Duvalier. But the
implementation of their new president and his dictatorial regime merely ushered in a yet another
violent reign of terror; one that would last for almost three decades.
Duvalier, known as “Papa Doc,” gained power with the backing of the Haitian Army by
promising the country’s “poor black majority, who for years…[were] exploited by a small clique
of mulattoes”17 a more efficient and friendly government to meet their needs. Almost
immediately, Papa Doc reneged on this hollow promise. With the implementation of his secret
police force, known as the feared Tontons Macoutes, which is Creole for “bogeymen,”18
Duvalier utilized imprisonment, rape, torture, and execution to solidify his hold on the Haitian
people. His regime imposed irregular, unofficial taxes, often in the form of tributes, on
businessmen and peasants alike, and often mutilated political detractors, “sometimes leaving a
victim’s severed head on display in a marketplace as a warning to others.”19 The US cut foreign
aid to the nation in the early 1960s, even though Haiti held the status of the poorest nation in the
Western Hemisphere. The population under Papa Doc lived in a perpetual state of brutality and
poverty. Disease, hunger, and random atrocities were the norm. In 1964, Papa Doc declared
himself President for Life, and met little resistance in doing so. He relied on a cult of
personality, based largely on his own successful manipulation of Haitians’ collective belief in
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Voodoo spirits and his supposed possession of supernatural powers, to strengthen his authority.20
During Papa Doc’s rule, “at least 50,000 people were killed, millions were driven into exile, and
many of those who remained were tortured.”21 No significant opposition to his power existed.
When Papa Doc died in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, assumed his father’s role with an
equally vicious ardor, much to the dismay of the Haitian people. Jean-Claude, who went by the
nickname “Baby Doc,” seamlessly continued the Duvalier legacy and avoided any political
upheavals regarding succession. At just nineteen years old, Baby Doc, who ruled with his older
sister, Marie-Denise, at his side, assumed power without disruption. The duo punished their
rivals in a gruesome manner, and ruled “with an iron fist from 1971 to 1986.”22 Baby Doc also
utilized his father’s Tonton Macoute forces, and embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from
his already severely impoverished people. His oppressive rule eventually gained the attention of
international organizations, and he was seen as a flagrant violator of human rights. Both Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International documented cases of his “imprisoning and torturing
hundreds of Haitians, including journalists, and using violent means to silence voices of
opposition.”23 Finally, after fifteen years under Baby Doc’s repressive leadership, a popular
revolt forced the Duvalier regime from power. Baby Doc was exiled, but his legacy of theft,
savagery, and corruption remained deeply engrained in Haitian society. In the period between
Baby Doc’s ouster in 1986 and December 1990, five Haitian presidents were elected, and
deposed. This period of political instability during the late 1980s, which existed largely under
the thumb of the Haitian Army, led to a considerable influx of immigrants fleeing towards the
US. Haiti was once again on America’s radar.
In December 1990, Haiti held what is considered by most international observers and
analysts to be the first truly free and fair elections in its history as an independent nation. The
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contest brought a revered priest, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power. Prior to the
presidential election of 1990, Haitian elections were overwhelmingly fraudulent, especially
during the Duvalier years. Any citizens viewed to be in opposition of Papa Doc or Baby Doc
were often kept from voting, either by means of intimidation or with the use of violence. Even
prior to Duvalier rule, elections were conducted in a primitive and expedient manner, which
often excluded many rural areas from exercising any considerable means of influence.
Corruption was rampant. For this reason, Aristide is deemed the first legitimate, democraticallyelected president of Haiti.
Aristide’s appeal spread largely due to his humble origins, and his position as a religious
figure, which “added a messianic character”24 to the prospects of his leadership. He ingratiated
himself with the majority of the Haitian population, who were largely impoverished and
therefore, held resentment towards previous political leaders from affluent backgrounds.
Aristide also espoused the tenets of liberation theology,25 born largely out of a Latin American
understanding of Christian doctrine that encourages social justice and a responsibility to the poor
and oppressed. These characteristics, when juxtaposed against his political opponents, who
either had ties to the Duvalier regime or the US, inspired a mass movement among those who
believed only Aristide could implement effective reforms in Haitian society.
The US, represented by the CIA, held some stake in the Haitian elections due primarily to
the refugee crisis caused by the unstable political and economic system in Haiti. Aristide was
certainly not favored by most Americans in government. Although the Duvaliers were
authoritarian and cruel, they were not viewed by American foreign policy experts as susceptible
to leftist, or communist, propaganda. During the Cold War, the rise of communist powers within
the American sphere of influence often trumped concerns over dictatorial excesses. Aristide was
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a proponent of land distribution, resisted American intervention with regards to economic
interests, and was a rabid anti-imperialist. With this approach, Aristide won almost seventy
percent of the Haitian vote; but he simultaneously provoked suspicion among many Americans,
and in some circles, outright condemnation.
Aristide self-servingly entitled his inauguration “Haiti’s Second Independence.”26 But the
new Haitian president’s lack of outreach to those beyond his base caused immediate concern and
disruption. Judson Jeffries, a political science scholar and specialist on issues of race, offers a
sympathetic view of Aristide’s election and plans for reform. Jeffries describes Aristide as a
threat to the Haitian business community and US investors due to the president’s promises to
“double the minimum wage, initiate new public works projects, make the wealthy pay their fair
share of taxes,…and support the growth of trade unions.”27 Jeffries also makes note of Aristide’s
proposals to weaken the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH), and argues that improvements to Haiti’s
human rights record took place prior to Aristide’s deposal.
Caribbean specialist Philippe Girard offers evidence that contradicts Jeffries’ assessment
of Aristide’s leadership prior to his forced removal from office, which consisted of a mere eight
months. Girard mentions the feelings among many American foreign policy specialists that
Aristide was no better than other despotic Haitian rulers. In his analysis of Clinton’s 1994
invasion, Girard states that many opponents to US intervention accused Aristide of “advocating
[for] grisly acts of violence during his short tenure of power.”28 A 1993 report conducted by the
Congressional Research Service, and specifically, by Latin American Affairs analyst Maureen
Taft-Morales, provides background for some of the American discomfort towards Aristide.
Morales describes him as a “demagogue,” who “encourages…rampages, known as dechoukajes,
or ‘uprooting’ in Creole, in which Tontons Macoutes are attacked or killed by angry mobs.”29 In
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his advocacy for class struggle, which resonated with his impoverished supporters, Aristide
condoned acts of vengeance against those previously associated with the Duvalier regime.
Ironically, the newly-elected president also held a long record of vocal opposition to democratic
elections in Haiti. Prior to his victory, Aristide contended that “free and fair elections were
impossible as long as Duvalierists still had a hold on economic and political power.”30 His
attitude somewhat changed once he became the beneficiary of the very democratic process he
formerly denounced; though he sometimes acted in an undemocratic manner. Aristide often
stepped outside of the authority given to him by the Haitian Constitution, such as his
appointment of Supreme Court judges without the approval of the Senate. He was also accused
of removing several newly-elected mayors, most of whom spent decades fighting the Duvaliers,
in order to grant members of his political movement, known as Lavalas, local power.31
Following Aristide’s election, popular celebrations often led to mob violence. Aristide
supporters would take to the streets and hunt down members of the Tonton Macoutes and other
political detractors. The Haitian president received outside criticism, mostly from diplomats, for
not only refusing to condemn the violence, but in some cases, for actually condoning it. He was
seen as encouraging the brutal practice of “pere lebrun”32 as a means to spread fear among
Tonton Macoutes and those responsible for their prosecution in Haitian courts. Pere lebrun is the
method of burning someone alive by placing a “gasoline-soaked auto tire,” or “necklace,” around
the victim’s neck and lighting a match.33 Aristide once described this vile mob tactic in an
address to his acolytes by stating:
You are watching all macoute activities throughout the country…We are
watching and praying. If we catch one, do not fail to give him what he deserves.
What a nice tool! What a nice instrument! What a nice device! It is a pretty one.
It is elegant, attractive, splendorous, graceful, and dazzling. It smells good.
Wherever you go, you feel like smelling it. It is provided for by the Constitution,
which bans macoutes from the political scene.34
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Aristide later backed away from these comments while in exile in the US. But these prior
stances, as well as his many attacks upon the Haitian bourgeoisie, overshadow much of the
reforms he proposed.
After tampering his rhetoric prior to the December election, Aristide enthusiastically
returned to denouncing the rich, the military, and the former political elitist class. This increase
in hostile condemnations alarmed his opponents, who quickly tired of his self-righteous claims
against them. For this reason, a military junta, led by General Joseph Raoul Cédras, overthrew
Aristide on September 30, 1991, and forced the president into exile. Cédras solidified his hold
on Haiti through the use of paramilitary death squads, who ruthlessly suppressed the population.
Human Rights Watch estimates that from the time of the coup through 1993, “well over 1,500
people were estimated…to have been killed.”35 Under Cédras, the FADH attempted to eradicate
all political, social, and professional organizations it believed to be in opposition of the junta.
Students, rural activists, members of the clergy, human rights monitors, journalists, politicians
and others seen as supportive of Aristide were often arrested without reason, tortured, or
executed.36 Intimidation and extrajudicial punishment, often gruesome, was widespread.
While awaiting international and American responses to the coup d'état, Aristide
officially resided at the Haitian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Though critical of the military
coup that brought the deposed Haitian leader to the US, members of the George H.W. Bush
Administration also expressed concerns over Aristide’s own record of abuses.37 Although Bush
denounced the actions of Cédras, as well as the escalation of violence and human rights atrocities
that followed, the restoration of democracy, and the return of Aristide via US military force, was
not considered to be in America’s strategic interest.
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During the 1992 campaign, Clinton criticized the ambivalence of the Bush
Administration with regards to Haiti as a means to elevate his foreign policy acumen. Where
Bush vacillated on his support for the ousted leader, Clinton vowed to restore Aristide to his
rightful place as the democratically-elected president of Haiti. He also chastised Bush for his
treatment of Haitian refugees, who fled Haiti either due to their political allegiance to Aristide, or
as a means to escape their impoverishment. Deemed “boat people,” these Haitian immigrants
landed in Florida in large numbers during the 1980s. The volume markedly increased in the
early 1990s. In response, the Bush Administration implemented a policy of denying them entry
or political asylum, which forced most to return home.38 Clinton attacked this approach as
“cruel,” and vowed to grant asylum to those fleeing torture, rape, imprisonment, and murder until
“democracy could be restored in Haiti.”39 But as he did on many other issues involving foreign
conflict, Clinton mimicked the actions of his predecessor once in office, and continued the policy
of intercepting Haitian refugees and sending them back without asylum.
Clinton argues that he only continued Bush’s policy of intercepting and returning Haitian
immigrants because most “were…risking their lives by traveling in makeshift, rickety boats.”40
Indeed, a number of them perished in the process. So, under the auspices of promoting safety,
Clinton agreed to stop the boats and return them to Haiti. With his extension of Bush’s policy,
not only was Clinton backtracking on a campaign promise; he also angered many human rights
groups in the process. As a result, Clinton grew determined to take more aggressive action in
Haiti to stem the tide of refugees and restore Aristide as president. But contradictory evidence
suggests the Haitian immigration problem may not have been the direct result of Aristide’s
removal.
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In a book chronicling his father’s role as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on
Haiti, author Ralph Pezzullo challenges the prevailing notion that Aristide’s removal had a
significant impact on why Haitians headed towards the US. Plunging Into Haiti documents the
Clinton Administration’s struggles with its Haitian policy through accounts offered by Lawrence
Pezzullo, a career diplomat who served as Head of Catholic Relief Services prior to his role as a
Clinton advisor on Haiti. He worked under the Carter Administration and served as US
Ambassador for Nicaragua, where he is credited with convincing the authoritarian Somoza
regime to abdicate its rule after being overthrown by the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) in 1979. The diplomat’s assessment of Clinton’s approach to Haiti is that the president
entered into deliberations under a false assumption. Clinton “believed they [his administration]
could solve in one bold stroke…[both] the refugee problem and the political crisis in Haiti.”41
Like most international crises, the situation was more complex, and would require more of a
commitment than Clinton was willing to extend.
The refugee issue was one of vital importance, particularly due to its impact on the
politically-indispensable state of Florida. Clinton also worried about the optics involved in
refusing entry to black Haitians. Clinton himself referred to Bush’s refugee policy as “racist,”42
so it was no surprise when African-Americans began to make the same claim about him.
Restoring Aristide to power seemed like the only politically viable solution. But some evidence
suggests the numbers of refugees had more to do with US policy than with events in Haiti.
According to Ralph Pezzullo, “the 1,318 Haitians interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard in those
months [during Aristide’s short tenure as president] actually exceeded the 1,132 who were
picked up…preceding President Aristide’s inauguration.”43 He adds that in the months following
the coup, when Cédras brutally cracked down on anyone seen as supportive of Aristide, “only 19
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Haitians were stopped at sea.”44 These numbers challenge the working assumptions of the
Clinton White House, put forth most vociferously by Aristide himself, that refugees would cease
to flee Haiti once the US backed the ousted president’s restoration.
A review of these numbers suggests news reports of America’s Haitian refugee policy
held more influence than Aristide. When word reached Haiti that a group of refugees were
allowed to remain in Florida in October of 1991, Haitians headed towards the US in droves, with
over 6,000 being intercepted by the Coast Guard the following month.45 After Bush issued his
executive order in May of 1992, which essentially banned Haitian refugees, denying them
political asylum should they reach American shores, the influx halted. In June 1992, only 473
Haitians were detained and turned away. By July, this number dropped to 160.46 Despite
evidence challenging the linkage between Aristide’s removal and the refugee crisis, Clinton and
the American public were influenced by the original narrative. But in his promise to end the
refugee crisis, he inadvertently shifted control of the objective out of his own hands. Aristide
would continuously exploit this issue to stall diplomatic efforts made by both the UN and
Clinton, resisting any conciliatory demands on his part. In this case, perception was reality, and
Aristide took full advantage.
On June 16, 1993, the UN voted to impose an oil embargo on Haiti in an attempt to
pressure Cédras into negotiations. This action added to sanctions already put into place by the
Bush Administration, working in concert with the UN and the Organization for American States
(OAS). The UN also froze much of Haiti’s foreign assets. For this reason, Cédras informed the
UN Special Envoy to Haiti, Dante Caputo, that he would agree to take part in negotiations with
Aristide. The diplomatic meetings took place in July on Governors Island in New York. But
political reconciliation would be a difficult task. Aristide demanded his restoration as president
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and the destruction of the Haitian Army, while General Cédras wanted Aristide gone and Haiti
left alone. The Clinton Administration was at the mercy of two maniacal leaders who would not
budge. Repeatedly, Aristide told UN Special Envoy Caputo, “You have to get rid of the
military.”47 But Caputo, understanding Aristide could not allow the international community to
completely solve the crisis in Haiti for him, responded by stating, “No, Mr. President, You have
to get rid of the military.”48 Aristide’s proximity to Washington, as well as his support among
Democratic members of Congress, the press, and some in Hollywood, gave the leader an
arrogant heir of superiority when he entered into the negotiations. But it was up to Clinton, the
UN, and the OAS to implement a diplomatic agreement suitable for all parties. What these
policymakers did not realize was the deep-seated distrust and fear encompassing Haitian politics
for over 190 years.49 One State Department official familiar with Haitian history remarked,
“Haiti is a universe unto itself.”50
Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intra-American Affairs, oversaw
the day-to-day situation in Haiti since the coup unfolded. With a clear understanding of how
both sides worked, he feared the Governors Island meeting would produce little. Anything it did
generate was unlikely to change behaviors. Aronson described the FADH and General Cédras as
“experts at rope a dope,” who would most certainly “procrastinate, procrastinate, and
procrastinate some more” when it came to implementing any diplomatic resolution.51 Aronson
also described Aristide as a “narrow, rigid man”52 who had two sides. In public, he was affable
and agreeable. But Aronson contends that in private, Aristide was quite difficult. He would
agree to certain concessions and then quickly back away from them. Aronson saw a pattern in
Aristide’s approach to diplomacy. The Haitian president worked tirelessly to preserve his image
as a champion for his people, but often acted in ways that lengthened their suffering.
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The UN-sponsored Governors Island Agreement, signed by both Aristide and Cédras,
mandated the return of Aristide to the presidency in exchange for an end to the oil embargo and
the loosening of sanctions. It allowed for a transition period during which the Haitian Army
would facilitate Aristide’s restoration with the help of a small UN contingent. Aristide agreed to
appoint a Prime Minister, install a consensus government, and replace the high command within
the Army. He was given the authority to appoint a new Commander-in-Chief to replace Cédras,
who agreed to an early retirement.53 But the president had to promise that he would take no
retributive action against Cédras or the FADH. The agreement required that he put aside his
demands that the military be brought to trial and punished.54 Sanctions would not be suspended
until the alliance between the Haitian elite and the military allowed the Haitian Parliament to
confirm Aristide’s choice for Prime Minister. They followed through with this portion of the
agreement when on August 25, the Haitian Parliament ratified the appointment of Robert Malval,
Aristide’s choice for Prime Minister. Both Cédras and Aristide described the accord as a
“satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national
reconciliation.”55 But the UN, the OAS, and the Clinton Administration depended on parties who
had a long history of violating previous agreements. Even so, Clinton enthusiastically embraced
what he considered to be a historic moment for Haiti and “for the principle of democratic rule.”56
His celebration was premature.
On October 12, 1993, the diplomatic initiative agreed to by Cédras and his military
apparatus met unexpected resistance, which resulted in another foreign policy embarrassment for
the Clinton Administration. Under the Governors Island Accord, the Haitian Army was given a
target date of October 30 for the return of President Aristide to the presidency. On October 11,
in line with the terms of the agreement, the USS Harlan County headed towards Haiti carrying
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225 US and Canadian members of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to ensure
Aristide’s safe return and clear any obstacles to his resumption of leadership. Under the
Governors Island Accords, and created by UN Security Resolution 867, UNMIH was to assist in
modernizing the Haitian military and establishing a new police force.57 When the ship
approached the Port-au-Prince harbor, it was unable to dock. In the presence of television
cameras and journalists, paramilitary members of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of
Haiti (FRAPH), led by Emmanuel Constant, who had strong ties to the army under the Duvalier
regime, led a violent mob of armed civilians, or attachés, in a demonstration against Aristide’s
return.58 The far-right group surrounded the car of the US Embassy chargé d'affaires, “wielding
machetes” and chanting “remember Somalia.”59 Just days prior to this incident, eighteen elite US
Army Rangers were killed in the Battle of Mogadishu, and the anti-Aristide thugs on the dock
used this tragedy to their advantage. On October 12, the ship’s captain decided to turn around
and head towards Cuba, fearing he would be fired upon. The mighty US Navy vessel was
successfully intimated into retreat by a loosely-armed, ragtag bunch of criminals. UNMIH was
not allowed to carry out its September 1993 mandate. Constant and his FRAPH collaborators
did not act alone; they had Cédras’s approval, thereby justifying concerns over the FADH and its
history of default with regards to international agreements.
The decision to withdraw the USS Harlan County completely undermined the diplomatic
initiative agreed upon under the Governors Island Accords. Largely based on a fear of the
American public equating Haitian intervention with Somalia, the US backed away from initiating
any punishment for the acts of provocation. As a result, Clinton took a massive beating in the
press. An article in The New York Times noted that the US had “seemingly capitulated in the
face of opposition by the Haitian military,”60 and illuminated the frustration of Western
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diplomats involved with the negotiations. Most of the criticism regarding the ship’s turnaround
arose from diplomats among the “four friends”61 of Haiti, a UN group comprised of France,
Venezuela, Canada and the US. The abandonment of the Governors Island stipulations for
Aristide’s return “delivered a serious blow to their efforts.”62 Clinton was criticized for
responding to the incident by dispatching his special advisor on Haitian affairs, Lawrence
Pezzullo, along with Major General John Sheehan of the US Marine Corps, to meet with the
Haitian military leaders in an attempt to salvage the agreement. In response, Western diplomats
called Clinton “naïve”63 in his belief that new global sanctions and a strengthened oil embargo
would alter their behavior.
Cédras underhandedly maintained that he would continue to respect the Governors Island
Accord, but was careful not to mention whether he would relinquish his position as required by
the agreement. Political commentator Joe Klein of Newsweek argued that the retreat of the
Harlan County showed that “America can be defied, even in its own backyard.”64 It was evident
that Haiti’s military rulers had no intention of relinquishing power, regardless of diplomatic
maneuvering. In the wake of the Harlan County evacuation, the FADH initiated an even more
relentless crackdown on those who embraced Aristide’s arrival, and returned to the process of
assassinating anyone seen as supportive of the agreement. An Aristide insider told Newsweek,
“They’ve [the US] been telling Haitians, ‘Be patient, help is on the way’,…This round is over—
now wait for the bloodbath.”65 Many Haitians, as well as critics across the international
community, could not understand how the powerful US was incapable of dismantling the junta,
and therefore, finally helping to revive Haiti’s political and economic situation.
After the humiliation of the USS Harlan County incident, Clinton faced increasing
pressure from a number of different factions, all clamoring for some sort of intervention to
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remove General Cédras and restore democratic rule, in Haiti. One of the loudest of these voices
was Aristide himself, who surrounded himself with expensive lobbyists demanding US
intervention. To the aggravation of many political leaders in Washington, Aristide purposefully
tried to escalate the immigration problem by publicly encouraging his Haitian supporters to
depart from the island on “flimsy rafts and balsa-wood boats”66 and make their way towards the
US. Since most involved felt it was his removal that generated the refugee problem, Aristide
knew an influx of Haitian immigrants would overwhelm local communities in Florida, resulting
in greater pressure for action.
Aristide was also determined to maintain his credibility within Haiti by denouncing any
suggestions that he may be a US puppet. He often publicly claimed that US support kept the
Duvalier regime in power, and had a well-documented history espousing anti-American
propaganda. Privately, however, Aristide begged the American government, under Presidents
Bush and Clinton, to reinstate him by force. He initiated an intense public relations campaign to
influence Clinton to act militarily. But he was careful never to specifically request American
intervention openly.67 He wanted Clinton to commit troops, but Aristide claimed he could be
impeached under the Haitian Constitution if he were to directly ask for US military support. He
attempted to solve this problem by sending a “weakly-worded letter” to UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali requesting “prompt and decisive action to implement the Governors
Island Accord.”68 The substance of this correspondence was quite ironic considering Aristide and
his advisors put forth the claim that he signed the agreement against his will. Even so, Clinton
showed signs of capitulating to Aristide’s demands, given the Haitian president’s champions in
the press and the possible political fall-out.
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For this reason, many Americans, particularly the Republicans in Congress, questioned
the motives behind restoring the Haitian president. Conservatives believed the notion of a
Haitian democracy was an oxymoron; the Haitian people never experienced democracy, even
with the election of Aristide. They concluded that living under depots, Aristide included, was all
the Haitians ever knew.69 Republican political leaders accused Aristide of implementing violent
tactics against his opposition during his short time in office. They did not see the morality in
using the American military to reinstate a leader who ruled using some of the same harsh
methods employed by his predecessors when dealing with those who challenged him. He was
elected by the people, but then removed by force. In the eyes of many American conservatives,
“Haitians…were not ready to govern themselves.”70 But other political concerns pushed Clinton
farther towards his aims of returning democratic rule to the Haiti.
One of the most powerful entities in support of Aristide’s restoration was a coalition of
African-American organizations who couched their demands for US intervention in Haiti in
terms of race. In his analysis of the efforts by some African-American groups to equate
humanitarian intervention in Haiti with national security interests, international relations
specialist Michael Hughes points to a shared identity of the black experience when it comes to
“oppression through colonialism and imperialism on the African continent, the legacy of the
transatlantic slave trade, slavery in the United States, and systemic racism and discrimination.”71
Hughes highlights a coalition of African-Americans, whose influence on foreign policy consists
primarily of lobbying American leaders on behalf of sovereign nations with majority black
populations. Dismantling the South African system of Apartheid remains one of their most
vociferous efforts. According to Hughes, the faction consists of:
the NAACP; the Congressional Black Caucus, formed in 1971 as an institution
within congress to advance African American interests both domestic and foreign;
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and TransAfrica, formed in 1977 as a private lobbying organization to advance
African American interests in foreign policy circles.72
Hughes’ work compares the African-American response to the crises in both Haiti and Rwanda.
It provides a useful point of reference that enhances the charge that action in Rwanda was
deemed a political liability, while Haitian intervention was viewed as a political asset. His
examination of the lobbying efforts by those comprising the faction above yields evidence of a
more forceful, well-publicized means of attracting support for Aristide. Hughes references “a
clear campaign by the African American lobby to influence US policy towards Haiti, and the
refugee crisis in particular, “including the use of Civil Rights Era “sit-ins, protests, and hunger
strikes.”73 No such actions were taken with regards to Rwanda, or Somalia for that matter.
Hughes blames this disparity on the locations of each crisis, but he also notes the lack of
support among black Americans for strictly humanitarian interventions in foreign nations,
without a clear benefit to domestic considerations. In this finding, African-Americans differed
little from the rest of the American population. Haitian intervention was viewed as less costly
and more aligned with American interests, given the rapid increase in immigration and the
subsequent strain on social services it initiated. As a key demographic group for Democrats, the
influence of the African-American community with regards to calculating the risks of
intervention cannot be overstated. The crisis in Africa, though more urgent, deadly, and
occurring within the “homeland,”74 was not enough to bring these lobbying groups together. The
conflict in Haiti proved more capable of providing a rallying point to alleviate the sufferings of
those seen as sharing an African identity with their supporters in the US.
A significant point is how Haitian immigration began to overwhelm African-American
communities in Florida, a key swing state. Again, the midterm congressional elections were
only a few weeks away, and given the attention paid to the issue by black members of congress,
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such as Florida Representative Alcee Hastings, political considerations most certainly figured
into President Clinton’s decision. New York Congressman Major Owens asserts that Haiti
would have remained outside of the president’s consideration were it not for the efforts of
African-American leaders in organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The representative argues “if we had not pressed,”75
Haiti would have been a second priority. Owens continues, “I think that in the final analysis, the
fact that [Clinton] wanted a positive relationship with us [the Black Caucus] made him look at
the situation very seriously, and made him move in a forceful way, more rapidly than he intended
to.”76 The African-American lobby made no similar efforts for an effective US presence in
Rwanda or Somalia. As previously noted, Somalia had an immense impact on the Clinton
Administration’s forceful denunciations of any proposed action to stop the genocide in Central
Africa. And it did not pay a political price for doing so. Haiti was different.
Deputy Assistant for the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, Prudence
Bushnell, describes the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs to approve any action in Rwanda due to the
president’s chosen mission to restore Aristide in Haiti. In her interview with Frontline, Bushnell
provides a context for this mindset. She points to the president’s preference to combat the
escalating situation in Haiti as a major obstacle to increasing any American role in Africa, where
almost one million people were slaughtered. Somalia undoubtedly had the greatest effect on the
Clinton Administration’s lack of support for Rwanda, due to its impact on the collective
American psyche. But Haiti served as a significant hindrance as well, particularly among leaders
at the Pentagon. The Clinton Administration needed a foreign policy win, particularly against
the backdrop of Somalia and the USS Harlan County incident. Given this presidential
preference, Pentagon planners had to make the decision to divert resources from Africa and
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move them to Haiti. As stated by Bushnell, “’there was a reluctance to invest resources
anywhere except where the president says he puts his influence and his policy.”77 According to
Bushnell, the Pentagon resisted doing anything in Rwanda out of concern for what the military
knew faced its forces in the near future. She relays the stock answer she received from the Joint
Chiefs whenever she demanded action to put a halt to the killings in Africa. They were
unwilling to commit resources where the administration felt the US did not have “strategic
interests,” and consistently explained to her “we just don’t have the resources.”78
Following the USS Harlan County disaster, the Clinton Administration understood it had
to restore American credibility, particularly with the Battle of Mogadishu still fresh in the
public’s mind. It could no longer allow the actions of a few dozen protestors to proceed
unpunished. Nor could it stand by as the Haitian military junta continued to defy international
agreements and increase its abuses. But Clinton decided against immediate retributive military
action. The debate over a proper response continued.79
Senior Aide George Stephanopoulas struggled with how to advise Clinton. True to form,
the young advisor believed an invasion “could be a political plus.”80 Even though Republicans,
such as John McCain (R-AZ) and Bob Dole (R-KS), both war veterans, believed Clinton’s focus
on Haiti involved risking American lives to appease a political constituency, others felt a resolute
US-led military action would show strength. But Stephanopoulas had his doubts. He notes that
“two-thirds of the country [was] against military action in Haiti.”81 The situation under General
Cédras continued to deteriorate, and Clinton resisted calls for intervention. In his account of the
incident with the USS Harlan County, Stephanopoulas admits that he felt Aristide to be “a
flake.”82 He refrained from giving Clinton any real policy advice on the matter due to Aristide’s
own reaction to the episode, which in Stephanopoulas’s view, reaffirmed his personal
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impressions of the exiled Haitian leader. After Vice-President Al Gore called Aristide to inform
him of the president’s decision to re-impose economic sanctions, and delay returning him to
power using American military forces, Gore informed Clinton that the Haitian was “ecstatic.”83
Clinton was relieved. This acquiescence to Third World criminals further illuminates the
president’s lack of seriousness involving foreign policy decisions that have real ramifications for
US credibility on the global stage.
Clinton seemed pleased that Aristide was not demanding his immediate return to Haiti.
The American president sarcastically responded to Gore, “See, I told you. What would you
rather do? Go back to Haiti, or sip champagne in Harry Belafonte’s apartment?”84 Still, Clinton
remained determined to reseat Aristide, even after the CIA leaked an assessment of him as “an
unstable manic-depressive.”85 He excused this analysis by stating “You can make too much of
normalcy. A lot of normal people are assholes.”86
One particularly valid claim for Clinton’s ultimate decision to forcefully restore Aristide
comes from an unlikely source. David Gergen, a former aide to President Ronald Reagan, joined
the Clinton Administration in 1993, where he served as a Senior Advisor to both the president
and Secretary of State Warren Christopher. After the Harlan County debacle, Gergen described
the political success generated by Reagan’s successful invasion of Grenada just days after the
devastating 1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. To Gergen, Haiti
could serve as Clinton’s Grenada. Reagan addressed both events on television simultaneously.
In doing so, he juxtaposed a severe blow to his Lebanon policy against a decisive military
victory over Cuban forces attempting to turn Grenada into a staging ground for possible Soviet
adventurism in America’s backyard.87 Reagan’s October speech actually led to an increase in
public support for Reagan’s policy in Lebanon, even after the tragic loss of 241 Marines, who
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were not there for combat purposes. After hearing Gergen out, and to the shock of the liberals in
the administration, Clinton said, “The Reagan people were much better at the politics of foreign
policy than we are. Look at Lebanon. They went into Grenada two days later and fixed it.”88
The comparison to Grenada is ironic considering who carried the most influence within
the Clinton national security apparatus. Many believed that Haiti was merely a “test case” for a
foreign policy that placed at the forefront the defense of human rights and the advancement of
democracy.89 But a group within the administration, led by National Security Advisor Tony
Lake, came to be described as “Haiti Hawks” 90 for their vociferous calls for action. Most served
within the Carter Administration, and as described by Newsweek, “they all speak the same
language, thee Carteresque ‘human rights first’ policy…All hated the Central American policy of
the 1980s.” 91 But in May, a new comprehensive review on Haiti was conducted, and invasion
plans were being prepared.
Clinton’s comparison of possible military action in Haiti to Grenada lends credibility to
those, like Lt. Col. Patterson, who believe that Operation Restore Democracy was born to score a
“win” after the embarrassments of Somalia and Rwanda, and amid the inaction over Bosnia.92
Regardless, the president had to show strength and rehabilitate America’s integrity. Even though
the public was against intervention, Clinton had the skills to persuade. As noted by Paul
Wolfowitz, “The use of force cannot be approached in an experimental way, by dispatching
military personnel to Haiti to withdraw them if they meet opposition.”93 It also does not signal
effective leadership for an American president to poll other countries for their input regarding a
possible US response. Clinton had to make a decision.
On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, authorizing the use of
military force to restore Aristide, and order, to Haiti.94 Considering the situation in Haiti to be
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one of a threat to regional peace, Clinton led the effort to establish a military presence to pave
the way for UNMIH. One of the deciding factors was the attempt by General Cédras’s
government to install Haitian Supreme Court Judge Emile Jonassaint as a “provisional
president,” which was a blatant attempt to replace Aristide, the legitimate president of Haiti.95
Under Security Council Resolution 940, Chapter VII of the UN Charter was activated. The
Americans began the process of coordinating member states to form a multinational force under
unified (US) command, or the MFH. Towards the end of August, Clinton announced that all
diplomatic efforts had been “exhausted,” and “force might be used to remove the military
leadership from power in Haiti and ensure the return of the democratic Government of President
Aristide.”96
Clinton delivered his “Address to the Nation on Haiti” on September 15, 1994, in which
he declared an upcoming invasion to “restore democratic government” in a “mission [that] is
limited and achievable.”97 The president described the American role as leading an international
effort, supported by the UN, to forcefully remove General Cédras and his military junta from
power. Twice in the speech, Clinton references Grenada as a comparable mission, thus assuring
the American people of the mission’s likely success and expeditiousness. He correlated the
military role with national interests by stating, “History has taught us that preserving democracy
in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity. Democracies here are
more likely to keep the peace and stabilize our region.”98 After presenting a long indictment of
the Haitian dictators who deposed Aristide, including recent increases in violence, Clinton spoke
directly to them, warning: “Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power.”99 He
vowed that action must be taken to:
protect our interests; to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of
Haitians; to secure our borders; and to preserve stability and promote democracy
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in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of commitments we make and the
commitments others make to us.100
The president spoke authoritatively about the national intolerance of brutal dictatorships that use
murder, rape, torture, and mutilation as a means to intimidate and oppress their populations,
especially when it occurs so close to American soil. He declared the planned action to be the
only logical step forward, as three years of intense diplomatic efforts by the UN, the OAS, the
Caribbean community, and six Central American presidents had failed. The US was on its way
to war in Haiti.
In a letter written to Congress on September 18, in which Clinton announced the
proposed troop landing, he echoed the sentiments of his September 15 speech by noting, “The
United States has a particular interest in responding to gross abuses of human rights when they
occur so close to our shores.”101 As referenced by Hyland, Clinton’s remarks had the “quaint
aura of the Monroe Doctrine”102 attached to them. Haiti was in the American sphere of
influence, thus it demanded US assistance. But Clinton had yet to fully give up on diplomacy.
On September 17, in a final diplomatic effort, the President sent a diplomatic team into Haiti in a
last-ditch attempt to solve the crisis by peaceful means. At the same time the US-led MFH
headed towards Haitian shores, former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and
Senator Sam Nunn were dispatched to Haiti to convince General Cédras and his military leaders
to resign. It was a last-minute maneuver, but it worked.103 Clinton remained dedicated to the
invasion deadline despite the progress, or lack thereof, of Carter and his team, so the Americans
held the upper hand. Cédras and his team agreed to transfer power back to Aristide, and leave the
island nation for good. With this agreement firmly delivered, the large American force landed in
Haiti completely unopposed.104 Not a shot was fired. Given the choice of an imminent invasion
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or resignation with amnesty, the military junta finally gave in. Almost immediately, the
president received a “bump” in the polls.105
Under the agreement, the FADH and police forces complied with the stipulation of
cooperating with the US military, which would clear the way for UNMIH personnel to enter the
country without fear of harm to their personal safety. This arrangement is partially credited with
setting the Haiti mission apart from what occurred in Somalia. But another difference existed.
Although held under dictatorial rule for almost two centuries, Haiti was a cohesive nation, with a
shared culture and national consciousness. Somalia had no such legacy around which to
coalesce. Unlike Haiti, Somalia lacked basic national institutions, such as a parliament or
constitution, upon which to rely. Additionally, the Haitians had a leader in Aristide. As difficult
as the Haitian president could be, he still provided the US with someone to use as a point of
contact in negotiations. Somalia lacked any similar authority, with the exception of General
Aideed, who violently opposed any American diplomatic attempts.106
Since no organized military opposition to US forces existed, the American troops relied
upon the local military to aid in civilian control. What they feared most was civil unrest. Once
the American forces landed in Haiti, their mission became less clear. Within one month, Aristide
resumed his position as president. With Clinton’s credibility restored, he turned his attention
elsewhere. But any clear goals for the operation during the occupation period did not exist. In
an effort to prevent American casualties, and in combination with battle fatigue, US commanders
on the ground instructed soldiers to take a more passive role in peacekeeping.107 This task fell to
the very army US forces originally planned to fight. The US-led multinational force reduced the
availability of weaponry by raiding some FADH compounds, but they mostly passed on the job
of law and order to the Haitian Army and the newly-created Haitian National Police (HNP).108
163

Along with the restoration of Aristide, the Clinton Administration also set goals of
developing the Haitian economy and solidifying the democratic process. By the end of his term,
neither of these aims were met. Few members of the FADH, who committed such heinous
violence against Haitian civilians, ever answered for their crimes. Reforms for Haitian courts,
prisons, and banks were passed, but due to a lack of funds, they rarely succeeded.109 Even the
overarching theme of democratic restoration suffered once Americans retreated from taking an
active role during the occupation. Although they were greeted as liberators upon the return of
Aristide, the operation quickly devolved into one Haitians referred to as a “humiliation.”110
Significant opposition to US-directed financial reforms stalled economic development, which led
to continued poverty and social ills. Foreign aid was squandered, violence persisted, and
political instability returned. Clinton approved the initial portion of the mission, and he achieved
one of his stated aims. But he lacked the will to remain involved to solve the challenges facing
Haiti. Aristide was one of the main obstacles. He attacked foreign donors and ignored voices of
opposition. As a result, political leadership at all levels in Haiti suffered. He continued these
actions when he was re-elected in 2004. And once again, he was forcibly removed from office.
Haiti remains mired in poverty, corruption, and chaos.
In his assessment of Clinton’s intervention in Haiti, Lt. Col. Patterson points to the
military’s frustration with the president’s inconsistency with regards to the use of America’s
Armed Forces. Patterson illuminates the disparity in support for the president’s chosen mission,
and others for which Clinton showed little interest or resolve. Patterson expressed his disdain
over the helplessness felt by those tasked with providing strict humanitarian aid in Rwanda, as
well as the administration’s incompetence when it came to providing much-needed equipment to
troops in Somalia prior to the Battle of Mogadishu. But Patterson almost laughingly references
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the multitude of gear flown into Haiti, such as jeeps, communications equipment, and most
importantly, the disproportionately large number of US soldiers, including the entire 82nd
Airborne Division. He notes, “There was so much military metal, the ramp was literally sinking
into the bay [in the Port-au-Prince harbor].”111 Given his own experiences with peacekeeping
missions gone awry, Patterson concluded:
The disparity of this picture compared with the one I’d seen in Somalia was
revealing and disappointing. When casualties were possible, as in Somalia,
President Clinton used strong rhetoric and little action. When casualties were
unlikely, he used overwhelming force.112
American troops remained in Haiti for five years. After reinstating Aristide, he adhered to his
role under the Haitian Constitution, and peacefully passed the presidency on to his successor
when his term ended, leading to the first successful transition of power in Haitian history.
Despite this milestone, significant problems continued to plague the country. After the
US spent almost $3 billion in Haiti, the economy only worsened, unemployment reached above
seventy percent, and drug trafficking increased.113 The military forces stationed in Haiti steered
clear of internal issues, particularly to avoid an international incident. Their confidence in
Operation Restore Democracy, and Operation Uphold Democracy, which transferred the original
mission back into UN hands, lessoned significantly as they watched the disorder, corruption, and
poverty around them.
Aside from what occurred in the years following Operation Restore Democracy, the
mission did restore some of the president’s credibility. Though the 1994 Congressional
Elections resulted in a massive Republican takeover, Clinton was pragmatic enough to work with
the opposition on domestic issues, and parlayed this bipartisan effort into some successful
policies at home. For this reason, Americans do look back upon the 1990s as the decade of
prosperity. As for peace…despite the relatively benign situation in Haiti once US forces
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intervened, global disorder continued to challenge Clinton and his administration, who lacked
both the willingness and perspective to confront issues of foreign struggles with any sense of
duty. Even though instability in Haiti provided some consequences for the US, given its status as
an American neighbor, it would pale in comparison to deliberate, direct attacks on US interests,
which simultaneously progressed unmolested.
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Chapter 7. A MISCALCULATED FOE: OSAMA BIN LADEN AND
AL QAEDA ON THE MARCH
"Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent. We are all over the place… I see
buildings. We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low. Oh my
God, we are flying way too low. Oh my God!"1 These were the last words heard by the
American Airlines Operations Center, spoken by one of their flight attendants, Madeline Amy
Sweeney, just before the line went dead. For twenty-five minutes, Sweeney and her colleague,
Betty Ong, attempted to remain calm and describe the hijacking of their flight by “Middle
Eastern men.”2 Each woman grew increasingly frightened by her lack of contact with the
cockpit, but even amid this fear, both were able to relay the unfolding events, as well as the seat
numbers of the hijackers. American Airlines Flight 11, from Boston to Los Angeles, struck the
North Tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in Manhattan, at 8:46am Eastern Time, on
September 11, 2001.
New Yorkers on the street, their attention drawn to smoke bellowing out of the North
Tower, gasped as they witnessed United Airlines Flight 175 slam into the WTC’s South Tower at
9:03am, killing all on board, and an unknown number within the building, upon impact.3 It was
now clear the United States was under attack. As the catastrophe unfolded on live television,
friends and relatives of those either traveling on the hijacked planes, or stuck inside the structures
hit, watched in horror as the lives of their loved ones were stolen. Melissa Doi of Queens, a
manager at IQ Financial Systems, was trapped on the 83rd floor of the South Tower. Doi
remained on the phone with a 9-11 dispatcher for over twenty minutes as she waited for help to
arrive. Struggling to breathe, she informed the operator, “It’s so hot, I’m burning up.”4 The
dispatcher repeatedly apologized, and tried to calm her. Doi then tearfully cried, “I’m going to
die, aren’t I?”5 The 9-11 operator desperately attempted to reassure her: “No, no, no…Ma’am,
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you’re not going to die. Say your prayers. You’re doing great. We’re going to get help.”6 At
9:59am, the South Tower collapsed. The North Tower tumbled to the ground less than a half an
hour later. Doi was one of thousands killed in the WTC attacks.
Barbara Olson, a best-selling author and wife of then-US Solicitor-General Ted Olson,
called her husband to inform him that her plane, American Airlines Flight 77, was hijacked by
men with box cutters and knives. As soon as the call cut out, Mr. Olson notified the Department
of Justice of his wife’s account. At 9:37am, AA Flight 77 slammed into the Pentagon.7
Terrorists had struck the heart of America’s most visible emblem of military strength.
Americans were in disbelief. Within an hour and forty-two minutes of the commercial airliner
strikes on the WTC Twin Towers, and with hundreds of police, firefighters, and Port Authority
officers working to evacuate as many people possible, each building disappeared from the New
York skyline. In Washington D.C., the Pentagon was on fire, with a gaping hole in a large
section of its five-sided structure. The total number of people who lost their lives, which
eventually reached 2,996,8 would not be known for weeks.
The only glimmer of hope on this dark day arrived among unraveling reports of heroic
actions taken aboard United Airlines Flight 93. Believed to be headed towards either the White
House or Capitol Building, a determined group of passengers on this final hijacked plane, after
being made aware of the hijackers’ true intentions through phone calls, decided to rush the
cockpit. Passenger Thomas Burnett informed his wife, “I know we’re going to die…There’s
three of us who are going to do something about it.”9 In a purely American act of defiance,
another passenger, Todd Beamer, delivered a line that would become synonymous with the
upcoming reckoning for those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001: “Let’s roll!”10
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The cockpit voice recorder on Flight 93 “captured the sounds of the passenger
assault…the assault was sustained.”11 Confirmed by the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States in The 9/11 Commission Report, the resolute Americans aboard
this plane thwarted the hijackers’ attempts to destroy another national symbol, losing their lives
in the process. What began with the chilling message, “We have some planes,”12 communicated
by a hijacker to a shocked Boston air traffic controller, ended with the most pivotal, deadly
attack ever to occur on American soil. America was at war. From the Oval Office, as the
harrowing day ended, President George W. Bush addressed a mourning nation, and vowed to
bring the perpetrators to justice.
Historical analysis of 9/11, in addition to the multitude of government inquiries, media
coverage, and personal accounts, is overwhelming. Virtually every American alive at the time
vividly recalls where he or she was that day, and how the tragic events personally affected each
of them. Blame for the attacks cannot be placed on one person, unless that person is Osama Bin
Laden, who, along with his Al Qaeda terrorist network, orchestrated and funded the operation.
Within the US government, mistakes were certainly made. But hindsight brings clarity to signals
that, at the time, were obscure. Americans lacked the vision to foresee the possibility, and the
magnitude, of 9/11. However, this admission does not rationalize inaction, especially with
regards to prior attacks delivered specifically against US interests. Within a mere decade, what
began as loosely-formed, “petty Muslim extremist groups wandering the deserts, on the margins
of international relations,” developed into “a full blown terror network operating in [over] 55
countries.”13 Al Qaeda matured in the face of American complacency.
The responsibility for monitoring the metastasizing terror group fell on many agents and
analysts who worked within multiple government agencies in the years leading up to 9/11. The
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sense of guilt felt by these dedicated employees is palpable. But it is important to document how
prior Al Qaeda attacks against American targets were received by senior level officials, most
notably President Clinton. Even though it is irresponsible to suggest that a specific action, or
actions, could have stopped the brutal events of 9/11, it is beneficial to document how a lack of
attention and response by the Clinton Administration allowed the culprits the time and space
necessary to strengthen their association and plot their deadly assault against the US.
During Clinton’s eight years as president, Al Qaeda grew to be the most sophisticated,
organized, and deadly terror organization in the world. Some members of the US intelligence
community observed this progression, and began notifying the president regularly just prior to
his second term. They sent warnings. But even they did not foresee the level of devastation that
would occur. According to the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, one of the most consequential
deficiencies that allowed the calamitous homeland strike to proceed unimpeded was a failure of
imagination.14 Attacks on American interests that preceded 9/11 presented government officials
with a pattern, as did the statements made by the designated leader of Al Qaeda. While Bin
Laden was at war, and publicly declared his violent intentions, the US was investigating crimes.
Americans were handing out warrants overseas as terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Africa
were building bombs.
Clinton’s foreign policy centered on the perception that a world “governed by globalism,
free markets, technology advances and soft liberalism”15 would choose peace and global
cooperation over conflict. The Clinton Administration began disposing of their initial policies of
democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism early on, particularly after the failed
peacekeeping efforts in Somalia. But they could never reach a healthy middle ground between
realism and idealism in foreign affairs. The post-Cold War was supposed to usher in a peace
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dividend upon which Clinton could decrease investment in the military and adequately fund his
domestic programs. He therefore resisted most requests for more assets in the fight against
international terrorism. It was not until the end of his second term that he began to advocate for
increased funding for the CIA in its fight against Al Qaeda. As with so many other instances of
foreign conflict during his tenure, the world refused to cooperate with his preferred areas of
interest. Unfortunately for Clinton, and Americans in general, foreign policy proposals based on
such ideals as free markets and the expansion of civil liberties meant nothing to Islamic
fundamentalists determined to destroy those they deemed responsible for the exploitation of
Muslim lands and people.
Osama Bin Laden originally gained notoriety as a wealthy financier of the successful
Mujahedeen effort to oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan during the 1980s. The Saudi-born
son of the head of the Binladen Group, who had close ties with the royal family due to the
company’s massive investment in The Kingdom’s infrastructure, was instilled with animosity
towards the US at a young age. After his father’s death, members of the Saudi royal family took
him in as their own. Growing up in the 1970s, Bin Laden became engrossed in the anti-Western,
anti-Israeli Arab nationalism sweeping across the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War and the
Arab oil embargoes. He informed a reporter in 1998, “Every grown-up Muslim hates
Americans, Christians, and Jews…It is part of our belief and our religion. Ever since I was a
boy, I have been harboring feelings of hatred towards America.”16 Bin Laden became a dedicated
follower of Wahhabism, which is a strict, fundamentalist view of Islam with a firm adherence to
Sharia Law that originated in Saudi Arabia. He was further radicalized in his position as the
primary fundraiser for Maktab al-Khidmat lil Mujahidin (Afghan Services Bureau), an
organization providing support for volunteer fighters, who traveled to Afghanistan from various
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Arab nations to fight the Soviets.17 In this role, Bin Laden traveled the world, raising several
billion dollars, and “establishing branches in over fifty countries for encouraging recruits and
raising money.”18 These actions would serve as the foundation upon which he would build his
terror network shortly after the Soviets left Afghanistan.
At the time of the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA, which funneled millions in funding and
support towards the Afghan effort, initially regarded Bin Laden as merely a wealthy
philanthropist. In his memoirs of his time at the agency, former CIA Director George Tenet
categorically states, “[the] CIA had no contact with Bin Ladin during the Soviet’s Afghan
misadventure.”19 In 1986, Bin Laden established his first training camp in Afghanistan, and from
this location, led a group of guerrilla fighters in a successful stand-off against Soviet forces.
From this endeavor, Bin Laden created Al Qaeda, which is Arabic for “The Base.”20 In 1989,
when the Soviets left Afghanistan in defeat, an internal battle began for control of the region.
The conflict was often among rival tribes, but two distinct powers emerged from it: The Taliban
and the Northern Alliance. Both factions would play integral roles in Bin Laden’s quest to wage
war on the US.
Prior to the departure of Soviet forces, Bin Laden was introduced to a radical Egyptian
doctor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who shared the Saudi’s militant vision of Islam. Both Zawahiri and
Bin Laden had relationships with high-ranking members of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), who held a mutual view of continuing the training centers in Afghanistan in order to
prepare for a fight against “disloyal, secular Muslim regimes, and…non-Muslim countries.”21
With the ISI’s blessing, Al Qaeda increased the numbers of terror training camps throughout
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden embraced his position as the leader of the new jihadist movement.
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Upon Bin Laden’s return to Saudi Arabia, the Al Qaeda founder grew incensed at his own
government for its cooperation with the US during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
After the Saudis denied his offer of aid in their conflict with Iraq, and instead allied with the
Americans, allowing them to install military bases in what extremists considered Muslim holy
lands, Bin Laden departed for Sudan. Regardless of his family’s prominence, the Saudis were
content to see him go.22 They stripped him of his citizenship in 1994.23
During Clinton’s two terms as president, Islamic extremists, largely recruited and
supported by Bin Laden, expanded their funding, reach, and capabilities for destruction. The
first known strike against the US by Al Qaeda occurred in Yemen in December 1992, under the
George H.W. Bush Administration, and during Clinton’s transition period as President-Elect.
The Yemen hotel bombings targeted US troops in Aden who were headed towards the UN
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Neither Bush nor Clinton were aware of Al Qaeda’s
connection to the Somali warlords responsible for the unrest in the African nation at the time.
Due to a premature detonation, the attacks in Yemen achieved little success. Two Australian
tourists were killed, with no American casualties. One month later, shortly after Clinton’s
inauguration, the World Trade Center was attacked for the first time on February 26, 1993. A
truck bomb that detonated in an underground garage killed six, including a pregnant woman, and
seriously wounded 1500 others. The first foreign terrorist attack against Americans civilians at
home was treated as a matter for law enforcement, and not an act of war.
At the time of the WTC bombing, Clinton’s first nominee for Attorney General, Zoe
Baird, was abandoned by the administration due to her neglect of Social Security taxes for her
illegal immigrant household help. The Senate was therefore in the process of approving Janet
Reno to replace the president’s initial choice for head of the Department of Justice.
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Additionally, Clinton’s new FBI Director, Louis Freeh, would not be confirmed by the Senate
until August 6, 1993. Prior to Freeh’s tenure, William Sessions, a Bush appointee, remained
head of the Bureau, despite Clinton’s intense distrust of him. Due to the Clinton
Administration’s treatment of the WTC attack as a law enforcement issue, the absence of an
Attorney General, as well as a virtually leaderless Federal Bureau of Investigation, illuminates
the initial chaos surrounding the investigation. Investigative journalist Richard Miniter describes
the detachment embodied by the president in reference to the 1993 WTC attack by noting,
“Clinton never even visited the site to assess the damage, nor did he order swift retaliation. It
was the start of a pattern.”24 Clinton’s only speech on the bombing came in the form of a radio
address, which largely consisted of his planned economic programs.
Though the issue should have been treated as a detriment to national security, which
would mobilize additional intelligence and investigative resources, Freeh notes, “Ever since the
1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the Bureau had been all but obsessed with terrorism and
its proponents.”25 The FBI took the matter as an affront to domestic security, and began to
methodically build a case. But chain of custody demands prohibited the sharing of evidence with
other investigative agencies. The Bureau gathered evidence, not intelligence. It was a different
approach from methods used by the CIA. The FBI sought justice through the application of
American law, with prosecution and conviction as its ultimate goal. Their meticulous work
resulted in the 1995 conviction of Sheikh Abdul Rahman, the head of a terrorist organization
known as the Islamic Group. Prosecuted by the US Attorney’s Office in New York, and
specifically, Andrew McCarthy, the “Blind Sheik,” as Rahman was known, was given a life
sentence for his leading role in the 1993 WTC bombing.26 He died while imprisoned in February
2017.
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FBI counterterrorism agents were aware of the Blind Sheik’s role as a spiritual leader for
Al Qaeda. The investigation into the 1993 bombing also generated the uncovering of plans to
bomb bridges, tunnels, and symbolic buildings in Manhattan, including UN headquarters. The
Bureau referred to this operation as the “Day of Terror” plot.27 Much of Rahman’s planning for
this attack was done within the US, and the evidence was under the protection of a sealed
indictment. The CIA would not receive the full findings of the FBI’s investigation until 1996,
when the details of the case were made public.
Although some of the terrorists directly responsible for the 1993 WTC bombing were
tried and convicted in criminal court, the escalation of terror activities, and the expansion of Al
Qaeda, proved the US legal system was becoming increasingly incapable of responding to these
international threats. Bin Laden declared war on the US, and acted accordingly. The CIA began
to put itself on a war-footing against Al Qaeda in the mid-1990s, recognizing the magnitude of
hostile danger Americans faced from Islamic combatants. The FBI, too, understood the
ramifications of the expanding global jihadist network, but operated under greater restraint than
its foreign intelligence counterpart. Unfortunately, American political leaders, the president
chief among them, refused to follow the lead of the nation’s chief law enforcement arm and its
premier intelligence agency.
The biggest failure to come from the 1993 WTC bombing investigation was the exclusion
of the CIA. Since the attack was not treated as an international counterterrorism operation, or act
of war, the CIA had no access to the evidence gathered. Unfortunately for the CIA, as well as
other intelligence agencies, “every lab test, every scrap of paper, every interview, every lead,
every clue from overseas was theirs [the FBI’s] alone.”28 Initially, the FBI lost two vital Al
Qaeda operatives suspected in the attack. The Bureau eventually came through on one. In 1995,
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agents captured Ramzi Yousef in Pakistan. He was staying in a guesthouse known to be funded
by Bin Laden. Yousef was tried and convicted in New York, but was never detained or
adequately interrogated. If he was subjected to harsher forms of questioning, perhaps he would
have revealed his relationship to fellow terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM), who also
escaped to Pakistan following the bombing, which he helped plan.
Yousef was KSM’s nephew, and while in custody, he never revealed the level reached by
his uncle within the command structure of Al Qaeda. KSM, now notoriously regarded as the
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, narrowly escaped the grip of the FBI and CIA in 1996.29 KSM is
now perhaps best known for the questionable treatment he received after his capture in 2003.
His detention, and the methods used by the CIA to gain intelligence from him, became
synonymous with the Agency’s controversial use of enhanced interrogation techniques—or
torture—depending on one’s perspective. Regardless, it was what KSM revealed, both directly
and indirectly, during this process that would eventually lead agents and analysts to a valued, and
highly protected, Bin Laden courier. After locating the courier, the CIA finally discovered Bin
Laden living in Abbottabad, Pakistan. On May 1, 2011, almost ten years after the deadly attacks
of 9/11, the elite Navy Seal Team 6 raided his compound and put a bullet in his head.
According to a 1996 State Department assessment of terror patterns, the US
counterterrorist policy stressed “treating terrorists as criminals.”30 It advocated their aggressive
pursuit, but emphasized the application of the “rule of law.”31 Many in the law enforcement
community took issue with this approach. Until 9/11, terror investigations were often treated as
those conducted against organized crime syndicates. Freeh states he does not know one FBI
agent who believed this approach was sufficient. In his mind, no one thought a “criminal
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investigation was a reasonable alternative to global intelligence gathering, or military and
diplomatic action.”32 Freeh sarcastically argues:
The enemy meanwhile was arming itself with trucks loaded with five thousand
pounds of explosive, with suicide boats…Our warrants could help us snatch a
Ramzi Yousef and bring him back to the United States to face justice. Their
trucks and boats…could rip the face off a military barracks, split open
embassies…al Qaeda is not the Cosa Nostra, and Osama bin Laden is not a John
Gotti or a Ted Kaczynski.33
One glaring example illuminates the limits faced by the FBI in its fight against global terrorism
prior to 9/11. It was not until June 1998 that the Bureau was able to secure an indictment against
Bin Laden for the plot to murder Americans in Aden, Yemen in 1992.34 But, Freeh states, “Those
are the tools we had available to us, the ones our legal system and our political system outfitted
us with to wage the war on terrorism.”35 As the attacks on US interests abroad became more
numerous, and more destructive, the CIA and the American military each felt it had to assume a
greater role.
As noted prior, the Clinton Administration started out on an uncomfortable footing with
the military due to the controversy over lifting the ban on gays serving in the military. The
tension escalated over the deep defense cuts planned in the president’s budget. Then-House
Minority Whip Newt Gingrich warned Clinton in the days after the 1993 WTC bombing to
proceed cautiously with regards to slashing funding and decreasing military capabilities.
Prophetically, Gingrich urged, “there’s a very real requirement for human intelligence and
military strength. Every time we have any display of weakness, any display of timidity…there
are people on the planet eager to take advantage of us.”36 Human intelligence (HUMINT), in
particular, has proved indispensable in the post-9/11 War on Terror. But neither the military, nor
the CIA and its Counterterrorism Center (CTC), were privy to the information gathered on the
first WTC attack, and the Agency’s HUMINT capabilities were largely deficient. To make
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matters worse, Clinton’s first choice for Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for the CIA,
James Woolsey, resigned in 1994, barely two years after his appointment, primarily due to his
lack of access to the president and the CIA being shut out of the WTC investigation. In his short
tenure, Woolsey never had one personal, face-to-face meeting with Clinton.
Although Clinton apparently refused to consider the 1993 WTC bombing a significant
threat to national security, the president did fervently push for the capture of Yousef. Instead of
tasking the CIA, military generals, or members of his cabinet with encouraging international
cooperation in locating the terrorist, the president turned to a National Security Council (NSC)
staffer, Richard A. Clarke.37 His purpose for such an unusual, and low-profile appointment was
to keep all operations regarding Yousef secret. While a public declaration and a shared sense of
mission would have generated more evidence in the process of the manhunt, Clinton had to
assure any failure of Clarke’s would not fall on him. Clarke’s success, however, would also be
his. For Clinton, Yousef “had to be caught, preferably before the 1996 presidential election.”38
The FBI came through for Clinton on Yousef, but Bin Laden remained in the shadows.
The pressure on the FBI in its role as the foremost authority on investigating foreign
terrorists began to build, mainly due to reasons of ineffectual diplomacy and restricted access.
On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb detonated directly outside of the Khobar Towers, a complex that
housed members of the US Air Force and American contractors. The attack resulted in the
deaths of nineteen American soldiers and one Saudi. Almost 500 were wounded. The
responsibility for the Khobar Towers Bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, though mostly assumed
to be the work of a Shia faction operating in The Kingdom, is still somewhat disputed.
Officially, the attack is believed to have been carried out by Saudi members of Hezbollah, and
sponsored by the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. But many still believe it to be at least
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partially the work of Al Qaeda. In an interview in 2006, former Clinton Defense Secretary
William Perry admitted that he believed Osama Bin Laden orchestrated the attack on the Khobar
Towers. Though the Al Qaeda leader commended the action, most evidence points to an Iraniandirected attack carried out by Hezbollah elements in Saudi Arabia. However, as noted in The
9/11 Commission Report, “While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are also
signs that Al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown.”39 US intelligence later uncovered
evidence of plans devised by the terrorist network to attack a US target in Saudi Arabia. Al
Qaeda sent weapons into the region for this purpose, and some of Bin Laden’s associates “took
credit” for the Khobar Towers attack.40
Confusion with regards to who was ultimately responsible for the bombing of the Khobar
Towers arose due to limited American access to evidence as the investigation progressed.
Immediately after the attack, Freeh and a team of FBI investigators, as well as then-Director of
Central Intelligence, John Deutsch, CIA agents, and military officials, headed towards Saudi
Arabia, with the aim of investigating the scene before evidence disappeared or was
compromised. Through the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, as well as the Saudi
Deputy Chief of Mission to the US, Rihad Massoud, Freeh received some level of initial
participation. Clinton made a call to Prince Bandar to let him know the FBI Director was in
charge, but stopped short of exerting any influence with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah.
The Saudi royal family had to manage a delicate balance between the ruling monarchy and its
more fundamentalist population of traditional Wahhabis, who exerted control over mosques and
local villages.41 Allowing Americans access to suspects captured in the years following the
attack would be interpreted as weak; the royals would be viewed as US puppets.
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Freeh suggests the president was indifferent to the attacks on US interests abroad; the
same attacks that consumed the FBI and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The
American public paid less attention to foreign affairs than domestic ones, so the president did not
experience much pressure for retaliation. But since the FBI again took the lead on the Khobar
Towers bombing, it remains a sore spot for Freeh. He vowed to uphold the president’s own
promise of delivering justice to the loved ones of those killed, and found it difficult to maintain
his word in the face of the administration’s obstruction. Clinton, whose decision it was to put the
FBI in charge of the investigation, which even Freeh believed to be more effective in the hands
of the CIA and the US military, offered no resistance when the Saudis quickly beheaded a few
low-level terror suspects without first informing the Americans.42
Although the man has little in the way of credibility, even with those on the Right who,
for a short time, entertained his insight into Clinton, Dick Morris served as the president’s top
political strategist, to the dismay of many who worked within the administration. Prior to Morris
being ousted during Clinton’s second term for unsavory moral behavior, he diligently worked
behind the scenes, and behind the backs of other trusted advisors, in an effort to gauge each
statement, action, piece of legislation, and domestic or foreign development through relentless
polling. Therefore, Morris’s statements regarding Clinton’s adherence to public opinion can be
viewed as notable, even while taking them with the proverbial grain of salt.
In reference to the bombing of the Khobar Towers in June of 1996, which occurred in the
middle of the president’s re-election campaign, Morris recalls that he “ordered an immediate
poll,” because “he was concerned about how Clinton looked in the face of [the attack] and
whether people blamed him.”43 While initial polling was encouraging, TWA Flight 800
accidentally exploded over the Atlantic Ocean the following month, and many Americans
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viewed it as another act of terror prior to the investigative findings being made public. Clinton’s
numbers began to fall, and advisors worried about the public’s view of the president as soft on
issues of national security, thus giving his Republican opponent, Senator Bob Dole, an edge.
Morris explains that he actually polled whether or not Clinton should present himself as a
“Peacemaker” or display “Toughness.”44 Toughness won the day, so Clinton changed his tone,
but not his actions. Here is where and why Clinton often comes across to men like George Tenet
and Colin Powell as more of a pragmatic, and almost hawkish leader, as opposed to one who was
often hesitant to use American force when absolutely necessary; when American interests were
directly attacked. He often told people what they wanted to hear, and was damn good at it. Even
his critics, such as Robert Patterson, struggled with the idea of coming forward with information
painting the president in a negative light, because he talked a great game. But Clinton’s attention
was elsewhere.
Clinton Senior Aide George Stephanopoulas states that in June 1996, “it felt like the
entire herd was converging on the White House.”45 Stephanopoulas was speaking of Special
Prosecutor Kenneth’s Starr’s convictions of Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker and Clinton’s
partners in the questionable Whitewater land deal, Jim and Susan McDougal. Starr also indicted
Bruce Lindsay, an Arkansas banker with ties to Clinton. Another Clinton scandal, known as
“Filegate,” appeared during this time. In his description of Filegate, Stephanopoulas compares
the actions of two White House staffers, hired by First Lady Hillary Clinton and investigated for
obtaining the private FBI files of nine hundred Republicans, to Watergate.46 The Clinton
Administration was in full-on damage control mode. In his article in National Review, Byron
York claims “Whenever a serious terrorist attack occurred, it seemed Bill Clinton was always
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busy with something else.”47 It is important to note that Stephanopoulas makes no mention of the
attack on the Khobar Towers in his description of this period of time.
Freeh also points out that in Clinton’s autobiography, My Life, the president misstates the
number of those injured in the attack. Clinton writes that the blast wounded “almost 300.”48
Freeh notes that it was actually 372 who were seriously injured. Clinton also confused the
Khobar Towers attack with an earlier Al Qaeda assault on a Saudi National Guard building in
Riyadh, in which five Americans were killed. The former FBI Director suggests:
He [Clinton] also appears to have somehow conflated the resolution of Khobar
with that of an earlier attack on the Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh.
‘Eventually,’ Clinton writes, ‘Saudi Arabia would execute the people it
determined to be responsible for the attack.’ Not so. Whether Clinton’s mistakes
resulted from speed of composition or indifference to the fate of those killed at
Khobar and their survivors, I’m not prepared to say.49
Freeh argues that the purpose for Clinton’s disconnection to the Khobar Towers investigation
evolved from the administration’s hopes for building a positive relationship with the newlyelected Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami. The FBI Director blames Clinton’s focus on
building diplomatic relations with the most infamous state sponsor of terror for the lack of
support given towards the Bureau’s efforts. Also, as the years wore on, and no progress had
been made in getting the Saudis to cooperate fully with the Khobar Towers investigation, Clinton
again became distracted by another domestic scandal: the media’s obsession over his improper
relationship with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.
Freeh repeatedly asked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger to convince the president
to approach the Saudi King and persuade him into granting the FBI greater access to detained
suspects and Saudi evidence. Each time Clinton returned from a meeting with King Faud or
Prince Abdullah, Berger claimed Clinton did not have time to address the issue. Adding greater
insult to Freeh, Berger made a public statement about the “seventeen people who had been killed
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in the attack.”50 This mistake infuriated Freeh. The FBI Director corrected Berger:
“Look…there were nineteen people killed, not seventeen.”51 Freeh states he had nothing against
Berger personally, but the National Security Advisor came from the “political side of the Clinton
machine.”52 He argues that as Deputy National Security Advisor under Anthony Lake, Berger
saw every foreign policy issue through the lens of getting Clinton re-elected. According to
Freeh, once he was appointed National Security Advisor, Berger only slightly altered his role
into one of “preserving Clinton’s legacy and the Democratic hold on the presidency.”53
Freeh’s frustration finally led him to call on former president George H.W. Bush, who
used his personal relationship with the Saudi royal family to encourage greater cooperation. The
Saudis agreed, and provided the FBI with new evidence, all of which pointed to Iran. When
Freeh presented this information, sufficient for several new indictments, Berger demanded to
know if anyone else knew about this connection. Referring to Freeh’s evidence of Iranian
involvement, Berger called it “hearsay,”54 and refused to bring it to Clinton’s attention. It was
suppressed. Freeh ended his personal interaction with the case when he handed over his suspect
list to President George W. Bush just before he left his post in June 2001. The Bush
Administration used the information to generate fourteen indictments against the suspects
unveiled by Freeh.
By the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, Bin Laden had already left Sudan, and
operated comfortably under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, Bin Laden’s
time in Sudan is both significant, and controversial. While in its capital city Khartoum, Sudan’s
leader, Hassan al-Turabi, aided Bin Laden in building a network of companies to serve as fronts
for his worldwide terrorist network.55 The Al Qaeda leader operated several successful
businesses, and funneled money into the formation of training centers for Muslim jihadists. As
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late as 1996, many within the CIA believed Bin Laden to be nothing more than a financier of
terror. After his name kept appearing in intelligence traffic beginning in 1993, the agency
formed “The Bin Laden Issue Station,” which would later become “Alec Station,” named after
the son of the unit’s first leader, Michael Scheuer.56 Operating under the CIA’s CTC, its initial
purpose was to investigate terrorist financial links. But Alec Station eventually became the
primary entity for gathering intel on Bin Laden and recommending action against the terrorist
and his network.57 As they delved deeper into his connections and influence, they learned he was
more than just a wealthy Saudi who despised the West. In Tenet’s words, Bin Laden “was an
engine of pure evil.”58
Bin Laden’s time in Sudan is dubious particularly due to one post-9/11 accusation made
by a Pakistani-American businessman and millionaire Democratic donor, Mansoor Ijaz.
According to Ijaz, Clinton and his national security team ignored several opportunities to capture
Bin Laden while he was in Sudan. Ijaz claims that he negotiated more than one of these
offerings through back channels, meeting with officials in both the US and Sudan, including
National Security Advisor Samuel “Sandy” Berger, the State Department’s Susan Rice, Sudan’s
President Omar Hassan Ahmed Bashir, and the Sudanese Chief of Intelligence. Ijaz’s reasoning
for Bashir’s willingness to hand over Bin Laden, along with lengthy intelligence about the
networks he constructed, was the suffering caused by sanctions against Sudan.59 Bashir wanted
them lifted.
Ijaz notes that two of the 9/11 hijackers were among those listed in the networks. He
then asserts, “The silence of the Clinton administration in responding to these offers was
deafening.”60 According to Ijaz, Rice in particular, then working as Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, was a major obstacle to the facilitation of the deal for Sudanese intelligence
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on Bin Laden. She lobbied for placing a ban on US government employees, including members
of the CIA and FBI, from meeting with Sudanese officials. Although Sudan was taken over by
an Islamist regime in the late 1980s, by the mid-1990s, the Sudanese government implemented a
more conciliatory approach to US relations, and wanted to re-establish a healthy diplomatic
rapport. Rice argued against any relaxation in the US stance towards Khartoum.
Ijaz maintains that the counterterrorism policies of Clinton and Berger “fueled the rise of
Bin Laden from an ordinary man to a Hydra-like monster.”61 As Bashir began noticing enormous
problems associated with his country’s hosting of the terror leader, the Sudanese sent intelligence
officials to the US in February 1996. Sudan offered to either arrest and extradite him to Saudi
Arabia, or monitor his activities and associates. Bashir feared Bin Laden would use his
considerable influence to try to overthrow him. Instead of accepting the Sudanese offer, the US
put pressure on Sudan to expel him. In May 1996, Bin Laden voluntarily left Sudan for
Afghanistan. Former CIA Director Tenet remains unaware of any Sudanese offer to extradite
Bin Laden, but he does admit that the terrorist’s relocation at first made things more difficult.
Afghanistan was in the midst of chaotic infighting, which would soon leave the country in the
hands of the Taliban, “a brutal, backward band of fanatics.”62 Bin Laden found a home with
radical cleric and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, and heightened the level of his sinister activities.
Tenet explains, “for the first time in history, we had something that was not ‘state-sponsored
terrorism,’ but rather a state sponsored by a terrorist group.”63
Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan with his second in command, Zawahiri, and other
collaborators, including Wadih El-Hage, currently serving a life sentence in the US for his role in
the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which were in the planning stages
during this time. Ijaz’s accusations against the Clinton Administration are absent any official
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verification, with the exception of Tim Carney, who served as US Ambassador to Sudan in the
mid-1990s, and allegedly worked with Ijaz on the multiple offers. As noted, the CIA was
unaware of any such deal presented by Sudanese officials. But due to the secret level upon
which the talks supposedly took place, along with the lack of any significant CIA relationship
with Clinton prior to Tenet’s tenure, the allegations should not be completely dismissed. In most
government circles, Ijaz, though almost universally well-liked, is considered either a heroic
whistle-blower, or “an attention-craving Walter Mitty type, prone to exaggerating his
importance.”64 However, with so many foreign policy documents from the Clinton era still
classified, and given Sandy Berger’s 2005 conviction for removing classified materials from the
National Archives just prior to his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Ijaz’s account
deserves further investigation.
In February 1998, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued a public “fatwa” in the name of a
“World Islamic Front” to be published in an Arabic newspaper in London.65 The fatwa “called
for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‘individual duty’ for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”66 Months later, Bin Laden sat for an
interview with ABC News reporter John Miller, in which he echoed many of the same themes,
and issued similar threats. One notable aspect of the interview is Bin Laden’s ridicule of the
United Nations. In an attempt to shame the organization for its treatment of Palestine, which is
ironic in today’s climate, Bin Laden stated:
The strange thing is that any act on their [the Palestinians] part to avenge
themselves or to lift the injustice befalling them causes great agitation in the
United Nations, which hastens to call for an emergency meeting only to convict
the victim and to censure the wronged and the tyrannized, whose children have
been killed and whose crops have been destroyed and whose farms have been
pulverized.67
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In his justification for Palestinian terror attacks, and anti-Israeli, anti-Western violence, Bin
Laden showcased his intent. Bin Laden points to the bombings in Riyadh, as well as the attack
on the Khobar Towers, as a signal to governments (i.e. the US), which “willingly participate in
the aggression against our countries and our lives and our sacrosanct symbols.”68 Nearly three
months later, Bin Laden solidified his capabilities when Al Qaeda attacked the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It was time to take him seriously.
The most devastating attacks against Americans abroad in the period leading up to 9/11
occurred in Africa. In August 1998, Al Qaeda orchestrated the near-simultaneous truck
bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The blasts
killed more than 200 people, mostly Africans, and injured more than 5,000 others. The attacks
were carried out by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who had ties to Al Qaeda and received funds
from Bin Laden. Twelve Americans were killed in Nairobi, including two CIA agents. The
embassy attacks occurred on August 7, likely due to the eighth anniversary of American soldiers
landing in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Gulf War. The following day, CIA Director Tenet
held a meeting where he distributed intelligence to senior officials on an expected gathering of
Al Qaeda leaders, including Bin Laden, at an Afghan camp to plan future attacks.69 The
meeting’s attendees agreed on military air strikes, which would include the use of Tomahawk
Cruise Missiles aimed at the terrorist congregation in Afghanistan. Missiles would also target
the al Shifa plant, a pharmaceutical facility in Khartoum, which was believed to contain nerve
gas.
With regard to any preventative action which may have been taken over the decade prior
to 9/11, Afghanistan was the key. The presence of the terror training camps was known to the
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CIA and other intelligence agencies as far back as 1992. Clinton admits that in 1996, under
pressure from his administration and the CIA, Sudan expelled Bin Laden. Clinton states:
We asked Saudi Arabia to take him. The Saudis didn’t want him back, but Bin
Laden finally left Sudan in mid-1996…He moved to Afghanistan, where he found
a warm welcome from Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban, a militant Sunni sect
that was bent on establishing a radical Muslim theocracy in Afghanistan.”70
Clinton then describes the aftermath of the 1998 African embassy bombings. Just one week after
the attacks, both the CIA and FBI confirmed Al Qaeda’s responsibility. He recalls receiving
CIA intelligence reports from Tenet that Bin Laden and his senior leaders were planning to meet
at one of the Afghani camps on August 20, which would give Americans the opportunity to
retaliate.
But the administration dithered over Pakistan, which would become a returning theme
both before and after 9/11. Because the ISI used some of the Al Qaeda training camps, the
chance that Pakistanis could be included in the damage was high. Clinton believed Pakistan
would assume the attack came from India. With India and Pakistan each in possession of nuclear
weapons, he feared the worst. Conversely, if the US military warned Pakistan of its planned
strikes, certain sympathetic members of the ISI would undoubtedly warn the Taliban, and thus,
Al Qaeda.71 Still, Clinton agreed to send the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joe
Ralston, to inform the Pakistani military commander of impending US strikes. Even though
General Ralston was to do so minutes prior to the missiles crossing over Pakistani air space, the
mission was risky. It would only take minutes for Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda operatives to
evacuate their locations. But as stated by Clinton in the same breath, “My team was worried
about one other thing: my testimony before the grand jury in three days, on August 17.”72 Here,
the president referred to his subpoena to testify about his purportedly false answers during the
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Paula Jones deposition, and whether or not he convinced Monica Lewinsky, who by this time
had immunity from prosecution, to lie under oath.
In response to the embassy bombings, Clinton reacted somewhat differently than he had
towards past attacks. In July of 1997, Clinton chose Tenet to take over as DCI for the CIA.
Tenet, incredibly affable, built a strong working relationship with the president, which somewhat
altered Clinton’s viewpoint of Al Qaeda and how to disrupt the network. Therefore, in
retaliation for the embassy attacks, Clinton launched Operation Infinite Reach, which served as
the code name for the air strikes against Bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan and the suspected
chemical weapons plant in Sudan. The UN Security Council also passed Resolution 1189, which
condemned the embassy bombings and included a call for “international cooperation between
States in order to adopt practical and effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate all
forms of terrorism affecting the international community.”73
On August 20, the US Navy launched the strikes from the Arabian Sea. Most of the
missiles hit their targets in Khost, Afghanistan, but no terrorists were killed. The al Shifa plant
in Sudan was destroyed, but no evidence of chemical weapons or harmful gases were found.
Clinton was thus accused of orchestrating an attack against an aspirin factory in Sudan, and
launching Tomahawk missiles into desert sand in Afghanistan. Given the ineffectiveness of the
retaliatory strikes, critics assumed Clinton approved the military response solely to draw
attention away from his personal problems involving the nation’s most famous intern.
Comparisons to a popular 1997 movie, Wag the Dog, in which a president fakes a war to distract
the public from his involvement in a domestic scandal, spread wildly. The timing was indeed
suspicious, but the case for the strikes, made in the interest of national security, were sound, even
if they were carried out with little effect.74
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Though Clinton’s motives were not entirely apolitical, he ordered the military action in
the immediate aftermath of the embassy bombings. What he did not do was rally the American
public, sell a continued assault on the training camps in Afghanistan, and organize a prolonged
attack on the sanctuary provided to Bin Laden by the Taliban. Clinton does not address the
charges of disinterest he and others in his administration are accused of displaying when it came
to taking any serious military action beyond this point. But many critics speculate that the
accusations regarding his possible manipulation of military action to gain protective cover for the
Lewinsky scandal hindered him from taking further aggressive measures against Talibanprotected Al Qaeda strongholds after Operation Infinite Reach.
In November 1998, the FBI was able to secure another indictment against Bin Laden.
The Bureau charged him, his military commander, Muhammad Atef, and several others with the
African embassy bombings. Five months later, Bin Laden finally made it onto the FBI’s Top
Ten Most Wanted List. Freeh notes, “Arrest warrants were flying around the globe for him.”75
But the FBI Director also admits that by the fall of 1998, “I had been Bill Clinton’s top cop for
half a decade, and he hadn’t spoken to me in two years.”76 Even though Clinton retaliated with
military air strikes, and the CIA took control of the hunt for Bin Laden, mostly as a result of
more resources being moved to the CTC and Alec Station, the FBI still acted as the justice arm.
When Freeh presented Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf with arrest warrants for Bin Laden,
Musharraf laughed and told him, “You’re probably the only person on earth who could serve
these warrants right now.”77 The Pakistani’s reaction to the American law enforcement officer
was indicative of a wider problem. Not only did the FBI not have the resources or power to
successfully implement a global manhunt; Bin Laden was fighting a war. A fanatic willing to
die for a cause is not concerned with being arrested and granted an attorney and fair trial.
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Unsurprisingly, Musharraf refused to help. Musharrah disingenuously informed Freeh
that Taliban leader Mulluh Omar had given his personal assurances that Osama Bin Laden was
innocent of the East Africa bombings and had abandoned terrorism. It is no coincidence that Bin
Laden was finally killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where he was safely guarded by Pakistani
officials for years. Freeh notes that with the protection provided by many senior officials in
Pakistan, “Osama Bin Laden was snug as a bug in a rug.”78 So, why not put sanctions on
Pakistan? Why not threaten to withhold financial aid? Freeh decries the situation as severely
lacking with regards to presidential authority and US power:
I had been the one who had gone to Pakistan in 2000 to ask for Pervez
Musharraf’s help in capturing Osama bin Laden because, before September 11,
2001, bin Laden was a law-enforcement issue…If our government had a different
mind-set, the secretaries of state and defense would have been in Lahore with me,
or instead of me. Or perhaps Sandy Berger. But that wasn’t the case.”79
The Clinton Administration did not force Musharraf’s hand in any way. The CIA also
understood Pakistan’s role in protecting Bin Laden, and communicated this fact in the
Presidential Daily Briefings. But Clinton remained focused on the tenuous conflict between
Pakistan and India, who each conducted nuclear weapons testing in 1998 and 1999. He was
unwilling to make any moves against Pakistan for this reason.
The Al Qaeda attack that provided the intelligence community with the strongest
evidence of a pending strike on the homeland was the bombing of the USS Cole in October
2000. A previously planned strike against the USS The Sullivans in January failed. The
terrorists placed too much weight on their small vessel, and could not carry out their plans. The
attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen, however, succeeded, killing seventeen American Navy
sailors, and wounding 39 others. Clinton immediately denounced the bombing as despicable and
cowardly, but his concern at the time was placed on the Camp David Summit. For most of his
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presidency, Clinton was determined to broker a peace deal between the Palestinians and the
Israelis, and he worried that any attempts at retaliation for the attack on the Cole could disrupt
the negotiations between the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak. Some even believe he did not want to do anything to harm Vice-President Al Gore’s
chances in the 2000 election.80 However, Clinton had evidence of a sustained pattern of Al
Qaeda attacks, and given his gift of effective communication and persuasion, he could have
easily sold strong military action against the perpetrators of the Cole bombing, and those who
protected them, to both the American public and the international community. Once again,
Clinton had the opportunity to disrupt the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and he balked. The
Camp David Summit in 2000 also ended in failure due to Arafat’s predictable entrenchment.
Clinton had multiple chances to be proactive against Al Qaeda by targeting the
organization’s numerous training camps. Again, the most persuasive argument for Clinton’s lack
of a consequential strategy for Al Qaeda was his unwillingness to follow the CIA into
Afghanistan, and provide the Agency with sufficient military support. Perhaps his historical
reference to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan prevented him from taking action against the
terrorist sanctuaries littering the barren country. The CIA had concrete evidence that Bin Laden
was being protected by the Taliban. Its agents spent time building relationships with the
Northern Alliance, who participated in the fight against the Soviets and also fought the Taliban
for control of Afghanistan. The CIA worked primarily with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of
the Northern Alliance, who orchestrated meetings between the Americans and tribal leaders
opposed to Taliban rule. In an act that illuminates the effectiveness of the CIA alliance with
Massoud, two days before 9/11, two Tunisian Al Qaeda members posing as journalists
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assassinated the Northern Alliance leader. Bin Laden ordered the murder to ensure his continued
protection by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Tenet’s description of the CIA’s focus on Afghanistan and the Agency’s work with assets
on the ground in country can be found in numerous public speeches, recorded testimonies, and
within his memoir, At the Center of the Storm. According to the former CIA Director, when
Clinton appointed him to the position of DCI, the CIA suffered from a severe lack of resources,
particularly in the area of qualified personnel. Global technological innovation marched forward
at an incredible pace, and analysts were unable to keep up. Tenet describes HUMINT as being
in a state of total disarray, and therefore, notes that the CIA’s ability to “recruit, train, and sustain
officers for our clandestine services” suffered greatly.81 He contends that the decline in funding
after the Cold War hindered the Agency’s effectiveness at a time when a strengthened
intelligence apparatus grew increasingly vital to the security of the nation and its interests. For
this reason, he set out to rebuild. By 1999, one specific area of concentration in the fight against
Al Qaeda in particular began to yield beneficial results. Known as “The Plan,” the CIA’s CTC
developed a strategy “to track—and then act against—Bin Ladin and his associates in terrorist
sanctuaries” in Afghanistan.82
The strategy was a good one, but it ran into several obstacles. The US government had
no official presence in the region, and challenging the Taliban regime was absent from any
foreign policy initiatives or diplomatic maneuvering. The strained relationship with Pakistan due
to the country’s nuclear testing in 1998 and military coup in 1999 also played a huge role in
handcuffing the Agency in Afghanistan. Even so, the CIA was able to grow HUMINT sources
by fifty percent between 1999 and 9/11.83 By the time of the attacks in New York and
Washington, the collection programs and human networks put in place by the CTC nearly
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covered Afghanistan. This build-up of sources was key to a greater understanding of the terrorist
network, and most importantly, allowed the CIA to confirm the existence of numerous Al Qaeda
facilities and training camps across the country. Given these improvements, and the actionable
intelligence they often yielded, aggressive, targeted strikes against these terrorist strongholds
could have disrupted the planning and efficiency of those who were at war with the US,
particularly after the bombing of the USS Cole. It is impossible to say if enhanced military
action against these camps would have prevented 9/11. However, as presented under oath by
Tenet, “The terrorist plotting, planning, recruiting, and training that Bin Laden and al-Qaida did
in the late 1990s were aided immeasurably by the sanctuary the Taliban provided.”84
Clinton had many obvious reasons for striking the terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
He was well aware of most of them, but like everyone else, he was also ignorant of others, which
would only become clear after September 11th. The “muscle hijackers,” or the operatives
responsible for storming the cockpits and controlling passengers on 9/11, were chosen by Bin
Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan during the summer of 2000.85 Under
detention, KSM claimed the hijackers were mostly Saudi due to their overwhelming presence in
the training camps. Other interrogated detainees suggested the Saudis were chosen to send a
message to Saudi Arabia about its relationship with the US. The 9/11 Commission found that
Saudi and Yemeni trainees in Afghanistan were the most willing to volunteer for suicide
operations.86 After acquiring US visas in Saudi Arabia, the muscle hijackers trained in
Afghanistan in late 2000 and into early 2001.87 Again, the president, along with the rest of the
world, could not foresee the magnitude of savagery that these sanctuaries would ultimately
produce. But this acknowledgment does not mean Clinton is excused from recognizing that a
deadly threat to US interests found solace and protection in this region. Though Clinton
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supported Tenet, and eventually advocated for increased intelligence funding, he ultimately
declined to take any significant offensive action in Afghanistan. According to Henry Crumpton,
who served as head of operations for the CTC during the Clinton Administration, “The most
important, most immediate objective was Afghanistan.”88 But even after both the embassy
bombings and the attack on the USS Cole, “AQ (Al Qaeda) in Afghanistan remained unscathed,
untouched.”89
Richard Clarke, who served as Clinton’s National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, said
in a 2002 interview with PBS’s Frontline, that by the time of the 1998 African embassy attacks,
“everyone in the Clinton Cabinet would have said that Al Qaeda is a serious threat.”90 But
Clarke, often criticized as a Clinton apologist, states that had 9/11 not occurred, Americans
would view any significant action taken against Bin Laden as an “overreaction.”91 He goes on to
imagine a world without the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Instead of the American
public asking “How could they miss it?”, Clarke alleges it would instead wonder, “Why were
they so preoccupied with bin Laden?”92 But 9/11 did happen. It is therefore reasonable to
analyze the lack of response to such attacks, especially given Clarke’s statement professing his
own supposed “preoccupation” with Bin Laden.
Clarke was forced to admit his overstatement regarding the Clinton Administration’s
activities against Bin Laden, which he describes as “massive.”93 When asked if the Lewinsky
Scandal hindered attempts by the CIA, NSA, FBI, or other counterterrorism entities to take more
aggressive steps, Clarke replied that Clinton never refused him. But almost immediately, Clarke
was asked, “But didn’t you push for military action after the Cole?”94 He suggested the attacks
on the USS Cole, one year before 9/11, were an exception.
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Clarke’s only criticism of the Clinton Administration appears to be unintentional. But
what he reveals illuminates the most consequential action the president could have taken. Clarke
notes:
I believe that, had we destroyed the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan earlier,
that the conveyor belt that was producing terrorists sending them out around the
world would have been destroyed. So many, many trained and indoctrinated Al
Qaeda terrorists, which now we have to hunt down country by country, many of
them would not be trained and would not be indoctrinated, because there wouldn’t
have been a safe place to do it if we had destroyed the camps earlier.95
Clarke hesitates to describe this lack of action as a mistake by Clinton and his national security
team. He references Clinton’s role in the Arab-Israeli peace process at the time, as well as USled NATO actions in Kosovo. But he still admits how vital the Afghan training camps were to
the successful implementation of the 9/11 attacks. When asked what was the one thing he
wished he would have done, he answered:
Blow up the camps and take out their sanctuary. Eliminate their safe haven.
They would have been a hell of a lot less capable of recruiting people. Their
whole ‘Come to Afghanistan where you’ll be safe and you’ll be trained,’ well,
that wouldn’t have worked if every time they got a camp together, it was blown
up by the United States. That’s the one thing that we recommended that didn’t
happen — the one thing in retrospect I wish had happened.96
But these measures were never taken. In an ironic twist, one day prior to September 11, 2001,
Clinton attempted to justify his decision against taking military action in Afghanistan. Speaking
to a pre-9/11 audience of Australian businessmen, with a self-righteous justification for his
decision-making, Clinton said, “I could have killed Bin Laden, but I would have to destroy a
little town called Kandahar…and kill 300 innocent women and children.”97 Clinton, at this time
out of office for months, claimed, “I nearly got him once.”98 These statements gained
considerable attention just one day later. They also garnered much scrutiny. Clinton actually
had other opportunities to take out the Al Qaeda leader. He just did not take them.
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In a 48 Hours special featuring interviews with the twelve living CIA directors, as well as
some agents and analysts, one specific account of Clinton’s unwillingness to take out Bin Laden
is given. In “The Spymasters: CIA in the Crosshairs,” Tenet, along with legendary CIA
operative and one-time director of the CTC, Cofer Black, describes an incident that occurred
when the Agency was testing drones, then unarmed, over Afghanistan. As noted, by this time,
the CIA had built a significant presence in the chaotic tribal nation, and won over many villagers
in their fight against the Taliban. Agents developed assets on the ground, many who were
members of the Northern Alliance, and worked with the CIA on several plans to capture Bin
Laden as part of The Plan. But many of these operations were discarded once they reached the
highest levels of the government, primarily due to a fear that Bin Laden would be assassinated,
or the civilians with whom he surrounded himself would become collateral damage. In 1998, the
group at Alec Station devised an operation designed to grab Bin Laden as he exited a compound
in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The proposed mission included US Special Forces, FBI agents, and
Afghani local fighters. FBI Director Freeh describes his frustration with the continued resistance
to take advantage of the CIA’s developing network in Afghanistan: “The scheme worked its way
up the chain of command until it was finally killed by the military, which owned the assets that
were to have been used.”99
On September 28, 2000, when the drone testing took place, Tenet states: “We saw a very
tall man in white robes who we assumed…was bin Laden.”100 The CIA contacted its Afghani
assets in the area, who confirmed his location, and the mission was set to proceed. Black then
sarcastically notes, “I mean—I love this. This is such a Washington thing. Our instructions
were to capture him. And that’s what we—attempted to do.”101 Black obviously preferred
another option: killing him. But according to Tenet, “Killing bin Laden in that time period we
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operated was never an option. Because the Attorney General [Reno] made it abundantly clear
that he could only be killed in the context of a capture operation.”102 Both Tenet and Black
understood their Afghan allies were not playing by the same rules that confined them, but the
CIA had to answer to the president of the United States. Black adds, “The Clinton
Administration spent eight years learning to appreciate this threat. And only at the very end did
they get it.”103 Tenet abided by the instructions given to him by the White House, and the action
was scrapped. Black then offers his assessment of future Al Qaeda preparations: “There was no
doubt in my mind that the United States was going to be struck and struck hard. Lots of
Americans were going to die.”104
This repeated course of solid intelligence gathering, mission preparation, and high-level
government obstruction became the norm until 9/11. After the September 11 attacks, Bush
granted Tenet’s request to lead the invasion of Afghanistan in October. The new president told
the director he could have anything he needed. With a solid network of Afghan allies, and
backed by the military prowess of US Special Forces, the CIA led the large-scale operation that
finally devastated Al Qaeda strongholds and training facilities in the war-torn country.
Unfortunately, Bin Laden, with the aid of sympathetic Pakistanis, was able to escape across the
border into Pakistan. But his sanctuary was destroyed…at least temporarily. Years later, the
Taliban would regroup, and the war in Afghanistan heightened. Members of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are now known to utilize the tunnels and caves that once protected Bin
Laden and his associates. In the spring of 2017, the Trump Administration launched an effective
attack on one of these underground systems, killing over 100 ISIS members in the process.
Freeh describes his service within the Clinton Administration as incredibly frustrating
when it came to dismantling Al Qaeda, or at least proportionately responding to their
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increasingly destructive attacks. He states, “I’d seen the evidence of the ongoing war with my
own eyes…in East Africa, on the USS Cole…But until 9/11, we lacked the political leadership
and more important the political will to do what had to be done.”105 The most glaring problems
facing the Clinton White House, affecting both its willingness and ability to respond to this rising
threat, and the attacks that foreshadowed something more ominous, were political calculations
over the use of military action, and the plethora of scandals being juggled by the president’s staff
during both of his terms. Perhaps it is why investigative journalist Richard Miniter described
Osama Bin Laden as “the unfinished business of the Clinton Adminstration.”106 Unfortunately,
the deadly terrorist would inherit the same designation over the course of the George W. Bush
presidency. The extensive dedication and painstaking work of the nation’s intelligence agencies
over the course of almost two decades, in concert with the impeccable training, bravery, and
competence of the US Navy Seals, finally culminated in Bin Laden’s long-awaited demise
during the Obama presidency.
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Chapter 8. EPILOGUE
Americans are often given a false choice between the rigid foreign policy options of
Realpolitik, a version of pragmatic political and diplomatic realism, or an idealistic concept of
humanitarian intervention and multilateral cooperation. The choice is too often presented as one
or the other. Realpolitik is often viewed as the selfish pursuit of national interests, with little
concern for principles or moral doctrine. It is most notably associated with Henry Kissinger,
who, as Nixon’s Secretary of State, opened relations with China during the Cold War despite the
Asian nation’s adherence to communism. Kissinger acted pragmatically, but many viewed his
form of diplomacy as legitimizing an enemy state with an atrocious record of human rights
abuses.
Conversely, President Jimmy Carter concentrated on a more humanitarian approach to
world affairs, and with the exception of the Camp David Accords, left a foreign policy legacy
construed as weak and ineffective. In the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
Iranian Hostage Crisis, Carter used the carrot instead of the stick far too often, and America lost
much of its credibility with regards to military strength and resolute foreign intervention.
President Bill Clinton does not fit into either of these categories. As noted within this
study, Clinton initially pursued an “internationalist vision”1 for US foreign policy. His goal was
to blend “idealism and pragmatism, internationalism and protectionism, [and] use of force and
reliance on multinational institutions.”2 As a result, he was criticized for attempting to be all
things to all people. The Clinton national security team during his first term put forth the ideas
of democratic enlargement and aggressive multilateralism to serve as the foundation upon which
to build a cohesive foreign policy. The focus was always economics, both foreign and domestic.
The president’s intense concentration on rebuilding American economic strength often
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supplanted the need for attention elsewhere, as international conflicts spiraled out of control in
various regions. Due to the post-Cold War nature of these crises, the notion of spreading
American ideals of free market democracy, trade, and human rights protections often proved
inadequate, particularly when the US refrained from fully committing to the goals the
administration itself proposed.
For this reason, Clinton’s hopes of greater cooperation with the international community
via the United Nations, as well as the pursuit of collective security among democratic nations,
were not realized, particularly during his first term. The problem was not the intent. It was the
execution. Diplomacy should always be the first consideration when confronting foreign
instability, but it often leads nowhere without the credible determination to use force if
necessary. Clinton shifted the burden of decision-making over foreign entanglements to the UN,
and quickly learned of the organization’s shortcomings, especially when American military
forces were involved. Speaking of the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, Clinton states:
After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the deployment of forces, I knew
much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations
had to be approved in Washington. The lessons of Somalia were not lost on the
military planners who plotted our course in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
other troubled spots of the post-Cold War world, where America was often asked
to step in to stop hideous violence, and too often expected to do it without the loss
of lives to ourselves, our adversaries, or innocent bystanders. The challenge of
dealing with complicated problems like Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia inspired one
of [National Security Advisor] Tony Lake’s best lines: ‘Sometimes I really miss
the Cold War.’3
Clinton admits the effort to seize Aideed was misguided; he should never have allowed it to
replace the original mission of peacekeeping and protecting and providing humanitarian aid. The
decision to leave Somalia after the Battle of Mogadishu had a lasting legacy on future decisions
over the use of military force, as well as on the emboldening of Al Qaeda. The first signs of
Clinton’s move away from his dependence on UN multilateral peacekeeping appeared on
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October 7, 1993, following the tragedy in Somalia, when he stated: “We have obligations
elsewhere…It is not America’s job to ‘rebuild Somalia society.’”4 Here, Clinton repudiated his
own administration’s faith in UN Security Resolutions, and rejected some of the policies
proposed during his campaign. But Clinton did not only suffer from his inexperience. He was a
quick study. Political calculations, as well as a tenure bogged down by numerous scandals, also
inhibited the president’s attention to foreign affairs, thus hindering his ability to react effectively.
In 1997, historian Richard Haas noted the difficulties in defining Clinton’s foreign policy.
In his article, “Fatal Distraction,” Haas points to the inconsistencies derived from the Clinton
Administration’s concept of democratic enlargement as a key to maintaining global order.
National Security Advisor Tony Lake put forth this element in a 1993 speech, which proposed
that the “successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of…enlargement of the
world’s free community of market democracies.”5 The idea behind using economic, political,
and social progress as a tool to lure unstable regions into compliance on the world’s stage lacked
a basic understanding of why certain foreign entanglements erupt. As stated by Haas, “Enlarging
the community of democracies might look good on paper,”6 but it is far too idealistic and
ineffective when faced with actors whose motives are far more complicated. It did not serve the
administration well when dealing with urgent crises, such as those in Bosnia, Rwanda, or
Somalia, all of which grew out of historic ethnic turmoil. The Clinton team suffered from their
inability to separate “theory and practice,”7 until events caused them to give up the theory
entirely. The national security apparatus under Clinton was forced to act in a “whack-a-mole”
fashion, consistently trying to pound out one problem as another quickly arose.
One of the main problems with Clinton’s approach is one mimicked by many other
leaders. American intervention, particularly if it involves military deployment, remains steeped
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in controversy. Proactive intervention is even more contentious. Often, the US steps into a
conflict under a cloud of domestic suspicion, which is the unfortunate byproduct of the legacy of
Vietnam, and now, Iraq. Clinton was not going to sacrifice his vast agenda for problem-solving
at home to the chaos of foreign affairs, especially without an obvious national security interest to
consider. So, he did not take the steps to block escalation where he could. Clinton often acted to
subdue international acts of violence just enough to keep it off of the front pages. In Bosnia, “lift
and strike,” if pressed vigorously, might have precipitated a political settlement and avoided the
mass murder that engulfed the Balkan region. In Somalia, there was nothing intrinsically wrong
in nation-building; some sort of political solution was implied in the original intervention.
However, it was arrogant to believe that nation-building could be accomplished within a few
months in a land as ravished and divided as Somalia. Returning the legitimate president to power
in Haiti was also a worthy objective, but it required a consistent follow-up from Washington,
which was never organized once the troop landings redeemed Clintons reputation.8
The military’s mission in Somalia evolved from one of humanitarian intervention to one
of nation-building. The same can be said of Haiti. Both failed. Somalia slipped even further
into chaos, and the attempts at securing democracy in Haiti, largely abandoned, have only
exacerbated the country’s problems in terms of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and violence.
Rwanda’s problems spread out to neighboring countries, the most notable being the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire. The flood of refugees from the genocidal region caused
another outbreak of similar violence and brutality in the Congo, with famine and the spread of
disease complicating its political and social balance.
Ironically, for an administration whose key participants viewed US military intervention
with skepticism, the Clinton team deployed American forces on multiple occasions. The
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frequency of deployments, as well as their almost overlapping missions, caused great distress
among soldiers and military leaders alike. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson notes with irony
that he and his fellow soldiers “were involved in more operations during the supposed ‘peace
dividend’ and ‘down-sizing’ of the military under President Clinton than during the Cold War
years of military buildup and improvement under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.” 9
With the possible exception of Bosnia, which is viewed as a tepid foreign policy success
due to late entry, the powerful American military felt disillusioned. They were not being utilized
correctly. Whether one is speaking of timing, or defining the objective of a particular mission,
US forces often felt they either did not arrive early enough, or they were not allowed to make a
real difference. Timing mattered in Bosnia. The US-led NATO force achieved its military goals
with precision, but only after the Clinton Administration and its European allies allowed
hundreds of thousands to perish while each attempting to pass the buck to the other.
Rwanda provides an upsetting illustration of sending in American troops when nothing of
note is left to do. According to scholar Michael Hughes, “The problem of political will remains
one of the most important challenges impeding significant, early action and the prevention of
genocide and crimes against humanity.”10 Haiti also gives an example of an unclear, or
unreachable, objective. The overwhelming force sent to remove the ruling military junta and
restore President Aristide ended up serving as yet another peacekeeping mission. Democracy in
some form was restored for a time, but corruption, violence, and poverty still plague the country.
Once critic suggests that in trying to find his way through Bosnia and Somalia, Clinton, whose
interest “lagged at the water’s edge,” became a “slave to public and congressional opinion when
he lacks his own bearings.”11
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In a rather prophetic article written just three days prior to the Battle of Mogadishu,
George Kennan, the man behind the Cold-War era containment policy, wrote an editorial in The
New York Times. Speaking of US intervention in Somalia, Kennan notes:
The fact is that this dreadful situation cannot possibly be put to rights other than
by the establishment of a governing power for the entire territory, and a very
ruthless, determined one at that. It could not be a democratic one, because the
very prerequisites for a democratic political system do not exist among the people
in question. Our action hold no promise of correcting this situation.12
Kennan’s thoughts on Somalia raise an interesting question regarding the use of American
military power, and even its support of humanitarian missions that fail due to a lack of any stable
institutions in a particular region. When one examines US presence in places such as Yemen,
Libya, or Sudan, these questions should be considered.
It is not realistic to close American doors to all, and remove US power, both physical and
financial, from institutions that intervene in places under intense strife. However, the
fundamental problem confronting American leaders is when and where to do so, and how. Of
course, national security interests continue to outweigh humanitarian ones. For this reason, US
forces remain on the ground, though in lesser numbers, across the Middle East in an attempt to
fight terrorism abroad rather than at home. But the entire region has devolved further into chaos.
After the Arab Spring, where revolutions against leaders throughout nations such as
Libya, Egypt, and Syria took place, President Barack Obama sang the praises of what he deemed
to be a unified people’s peaceful removal of autocracy in favor of democracy. However, these
uprisings ultimately led to the ousting of a long-term US ally in Egypt, and ushered in political
and social instability across the region. Hosni Mubarak had his problems, and his militaristic
regime had an imperfect record on human rights. But prior to his forced abdication, Egypt was
one of the most stable, successful, and powerful nations in Africa. After the election of the
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Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammad Morsi, the promise of democracy and freedom turned into
nothing more than an attempt to install a theocracy, such as that which exists in Iran. Morsi was
forcibly removed by a military coup shortly after his real motives became clear, and General
Abdel Fattah el Sisi took his place. Stability has returned, and US relations with Egypt have
improved. However, Libya and Syria are in complete disarray. Syria has been mired in civil war
for almost six years, and hundreds of thousands of people are either dead or existing as refugees.
Libya is being overrun by Islamic extremists. The UN has little effective presence in the region,
and Americans, for the most part, have stood by and watched the carnage unfold in the wake of
the country’s retreat from Iraq. Crises in the Middle East are again demanding an answer to the
question of intervention, whether due to humanitarian concerns, military objectives, or both.
Africa, too, demands international attention. With terror groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria
and Al Shabaab in Somalia, kidnapping and enslaving locals, and disease, famine, and violence
devastating regions across the continent, the global community is looking for leadership. If and
how America responds has yet to be determined.
When Richard Holbrooke visited Bosnia as a board member of the International Rescue
Committee, America’s largest nongovernmental relief organization, he recorded images of the
ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs, “filming house upon house that had been blown up by
the Serb soldiers and militia.”13 He recoiled when watching Muslims exchanging deeds to their
homes for safe passage out of Bosnia. He was disgusted by tales from refugees who described
the disappearance of thousands of Muslim men. In an article for Newsweek, upon his return,
Holbrooke asked “What would the West be doing now if the religious convictions of combatants
were reversed, and a Muslim force was now trying to destroy two million beleaguered Christians
and/ or Jews?”14 Unfortunately, Americans no longer wonder about the answer to this question.
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The weak international response to the systematic execution and displacement of millions
at the hands of the Islamic State shows what occurs with an absence of US leadership, even when
international humanitarian aid is deployed. Since their rise in 2011, ISIS has brutally tortured,
raped, and killed tens of thousands of Christians, Yazidis, and moderate Muslims in a campaign
to terrorize regions in Iraq and Syria into submission. The Obama Administration offered some
verbal denunciations, but mostly stayed out of the situation, with the exception of very limited
air strikes. ISIS members were able to carry out their swift takeover by hijacking millions of
dollars’ worth of US military equipment from Iraqi soldiers, who abandoned their posts when
faced with defending their homes and people. The terrorists were also able to travel without
harassment along long, lone roads, from city to city, free to pursue their bloodthirsty aims. They
continue to terrorize the few Christians who remain in these regions, subjecting them to such
brutal acts as burning them alive in cages and crucifixion. They have done the same to Iraq’s
Yazidi Kurds, who have experienced unbelievable persecution.15 Thousands of Yazidi women
and young girls have been kidnapped by ISIS members and forced into sex slavery.
It remains to be seen whether future American leaders can accomplish what President
Clinton could not, and find the middle ground between realism and idealism in foreign policy. It
will be up to the United States to put a halt to these gross violations of human rights. But, after
Iraq, do Americans have the will? Do they have the resolve? The American public has almost
resigned itself to the realization that the US is “damned if we do, damned if we don’t.” For this
reason, several countries in the Middle East, and many rogue states in Africa, are almost
uninhabitable. Countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria are in chaos. Most
lack any sort of central authority, and if they do, as in Syria, it is backed up by an adversary,
who, if confronted, could initiate widespread global conflict. Hardened diplomacy backed by
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smart and well-defined military action is the only way to stop the primary aggressors currently
wreaking havoc on the world stage. It will take cunning and persuasive American leadership to
do it.
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